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Abstract 
 
In a complementary Discussion Paper (MMCP DP 12 2011) we set out the reasons 
why we believe that there is extensive scope for linkage development into and out of 
SSA‟s commodities sectors. In this Discussion Paper, we present the findings of our 
detailed empirical enquiry into the determinants of the breadth and depth of linkages 
in eight SSA countries (Angola, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa 
Tanzania, and Zambia) and six sectors (copper, diamonds, gold, oil and gas, mining 
services and timber). We conclude from this detailed research that the extent of 
linkages varies as a consequence of four factors which intrinsically affect their 
progress – the passage of time, the complexity of the sector and the level of 
capabilities in the domestic economy. However, beyond this we identify three sets of 
related factors which determined the nature and pace of linkage development. The 
first is the structure of ownership, both in lead commodity producing firms and in their 
suppliers and domestic customers. The second is the nature and quality of both hard 
infrastructure (for example, roads and ports) and soft infrastructure (for example, the 
efficiency of customs clearance). The third is the availability of skills and the structure 
and orientation of the National System of Innovation in the domestic economy. The 
fourth, and overwhelmingly important contextual factor is policy. This reflects policy 
towards the commodity sector itself, and policy which affects the three contextual 
drivers, namely ownership, infrastructure and capabilities. As a result of this 
comparative analysis we provided an explanation of why linkage development was 
progressive in some economies (such as Botswana) and regressive in others (such 
as Tanzania). This cluster of factors also explains why the breadth and depth of 
linkages is relative advanced in some countries (such as South Africa), and at a very 
nascent stage in other countries (such as Angola). 
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FOREWORD 
Making the Most Commodities Programme (MMCP)/Africa results from a unique, cross-
cutting collaboration by the University of Cape Town and the Open University with the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC). The MMCP builds and consolidates on 
other IDRC supported research on Asian Drivers and their relations with Africa by expanding 
the research program to focus on the growth and boom in global commodity demand. The 
resulting data and analysis provided opportunities for vibrant and high quality capacity 
building processes which was an integral part of the core research process, as is evidenced 
in the various Discussion Papers.  
 
These discussion papers offer new information that will help Sub Saharan African (SSA) 
countries to maximize the potential linkage opportunities emanating from the production of 
commodities so as to promote sustainable industrial growth, and ensure widespread access 
to the fruits of this growth. The analysis will help decision-makers integrate and target efforts 
to increase the returns from extractive natural resources and promote mutual benefits 
between partner countries. The findings are aimed at academics, policy makers and high 
level technical officers working on African industrialisation, including those focusing on Asia-
Africa trade relations. The findings have also enhanced our understanding of the dynamics 
that SSA countries experience in management of their natural resources and the significant 
threats these pose to their governance, macroeconomic management, and industrial 
development. The MMCP also makes recommendations for developing countries to 
incorporate into local and regional decision-making and how governments can respond to 
development challenges associated with natural resources. This publication therefore 
encapsulates an area of critical importance to resource rich, but often poor, countries in SSA.  
 
The MMCP‟s approach, based on innovative ideas and integrated research, created 
exceptionally strong links with industry and public stakeholders, hence the potential for 
widespread application in other developing countries.  These final synthesis discussion 
papers ensure that decision-makers in Africa have the appropriate tools and information to 
minimize the potential costs of the boom in commodities prices and to maximize the 
opportunities to build industrial linkages to lead commodity producers. In achieving these 
objectives, the team applied a distinctive and innovative policy dissemination process. This 
involved taking the research results and policy proposals to forums where policy makers 
were present, not just in Africa, but in the UN system and the International Financial 
Institutions in Europe and North America. In doing this they contribute to a policy agenda 
which will ensure that new opportunities for SSA commodities will not bypass decision-
makers, and countries will not have to lose significant amounts of wealth as new natural 
resources are exploited.  The MMCP process has also played a major role in capacity 
development in SSA – in total seven of the young researchers in this project will have 
obtained their PhDs as a direct consequence of their participation in this programme. 
Moreover, links have been established with research institutions across the continent which 
will no doubt endure in future research collaborations. 
 
I am confident that the information contained in this document will assist SSA countries to 
develop strategic responses to the boom in commodity prices and improve the management 
of their natural resources. I therefore hope that decision-makers will see the value of the 
analysis and apply the findings to inform future decisions. On behalf of the International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC), I wish to extend our sincere thanks to the lead 
researchers involved in this effort, the University of Cape Town and the Open University, as 
well as all participating institutions and stakeholders that contributed to the development of 
these Discussion Papers. 
 
Paul Okiira Okwi, Senior Programme Officer, International Development Research Centre 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The strengthening of the industrial sector lies at the heart of the development 
agenda. The success of China and other emerging economies in expanding their 
manufacturing sectors and enhancing their economic growth rates over the past two 
decades is suggestive of the fruits to be obtained from this development path. 
However, the challenge facing many developing economies in promoting 
industrialisation in the modern era is a complex one. On the one hand, the 
foundations of the success of China and other newly emerging economies were built 
on decades of import substituting industrialisation. This route to promoting industry is 
now heavily restricted by the trade-policy liberalisation which has accompanied 
deepening globalisation. On the other hand the export-intensive route which has 
underwritten the success of the first- and second-tier Asian economies is 
circumscribed for new entrants precisely because of the success of China and other 
successful exporting economies. Global markets for manufactures are now intensely 
competitive, making it not just very difficult for new entrants in external markets, but 
also in competing with imports in their domestic markets. 
 
In recent years, commodity exporting economies have benefited greatly from a 
sustained increase in the price of their exports and there are reasons to believe that 
commodity prices will remain robust in the medium-term, and perhaps in the long-
term too (Morris et al, 2011a). There are great dangers to relying on these resource 
rents. The capital intensive nature of many commodities sectors limits employment 
and concentrates income, thus often confining the fruits of exploitation to a narrow 
segment of society. Moreover, despite the confidence which these economies may 
justifiably have in sustained high prices for commodities, prudence dictates that a 
diversified economy is more robust and less vulnerable to the shocks which confront 
monoculture economies, particularly in the commodities sectors which have 
experienced, and will almost certainly continue to experience severe price volatility. 
One route to industrial development in these commodity exporting economies arises 
from the possibilities of building linkages into and out of commodity production. It is 
this agenda which the Making the Most of Commodities Programme addresses.  
 
In an earlier Discussion Paper 12 (Morris et al, 2011a) we set out the reasons which 
lead us to believe that linkage development from the commodities sector – 
particularly with regard to backward linkages – needs to be looked at in a new light. 
We argued that in the current era of globalisation, the strengthening of linkages to the 
commodities sector presents an important and attractive avenue for industrial 
development. In particular we challenged the conventional wisdom in the Resource 
Curse literature that the exploitation of commodities undermines the viability of 
industrial activity. We observed that the association between low levels of 
industrialisation and high dependency on commodities was to a significant extent 
determined more by the absence of capabilities in commodity-dependent economies 
than by the inherent conflict between the simultaneous and synergistic expansion of 
both sectors. We drew this conclusion both on a basis of a review of historical 
evidence in economies such as Australia, Sweden, Norway and the USA, and an 
understanding of the factors driving outsourcing in the modern transnational 
corporation. In this latter respect we argued that contrary to the widespread belief 
that commodity-exploiting lead producers sought to promote enclave import-intensive 
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activities, the reality is that lead commodity firms have strong incentives to increase 
the level of outsourcing in general, and near-sourcing in particular in their non-core 
activities. This provides a substantial opportunity for a win-win alliance between lead 
commodity firms, existing and potential suppliers, national governments and 
supporting institutions.1  
 
In addressing this agenda, it is important to recognise a series of architectural factors 
which determine the nature and feasibility of linkages. First, a key distinction needs to 
be made between forward and backward linkages since they are differentially 
affected by a transition in the structure of the global economy. The scope for forward 
linkages has in some important respects been narrowed by improvements in global 
logistics which allow for the greater reaping of scale economies in transforming 
commodities into final outputs. By contrast, changing strategies of industrial 
organisation have led lead commodity firms to emphasise the virtues of external 
supply of inputs into their operations, initially from the lowest cost global supplier, but 
also over time to lowest cost local suppliers. Second, within forward linkages there is 
an important distinction to be made between the processing of commodity output 
(broadly-speaking which occurs in the same or related sectors), and the beneficiation 
of commodities. For example, sawing timber into wood is a much small linkage jump 
and requires different capabilities than those required to make electric motors which 
use copper wire. Third, in both forward and backward linkages an important 
distinction needs to be made between breath and depth. The former applies to the 
range of inputs and degree of spend on inputs into the commodities sector and the 
multiplicity of users and share of sales going to local customers for the commodity. 
The depth of linkages reflects the degree of value which is added in these linkages. 
Fourth, in principle, the degree of linkages is affected by a series of non-contextual 
factors – the complexity and scale of the processes involved in commodity 
production, the size and resource-endowments of different economies, and the 
passage of time. However, in addition to these general factors, there are also a 
series of contextual factors, which affect the linkage outcomes in particular contexts, 
and at particular points in time. Fifth, linkage development cannot be conflated with 
local ownership (a frequent occurrence in the policy domain). Many linkages arise 
when local suppliers and processors are owned either by firms incorporated abroad, 
or by foreign nationals resident domestically. Sixth domestic value added in 
commodities value chains is not synonymous with the extension of linkages. In some 
cases, value added may be increased within the lead commodity exploiting firm. 
Although this may be an important contribution to economic growth, we only consider 
the linkage part of the domestic value added story, that is, those cases where 
increasing value added occurs outside of the lead commodity exploiting firm. This is 
because we believe that sustainable industrialisation is built on the back of a growing 
inter-firm division of labour. Finally, industrial development through the exploitation of 
linkages will often take some time to develop, and only when there is some degree of 
government support. This raises important issues of trade-offs and time-preference in 
industrial policy. 
                                            
1
 A recent mapping exercise of mining supply chain development activities identified a number of 
initiatives undertaken by oil and mining companies. These initiatives, nevertheless, were neither 
widespread nor developed according to best practices, leading the report to conclude that 
„opportunities for local content partnerships are currently being missed in the mining sector‟ (Prescott, 
2009). 
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We are in a new phase of globalisation. At the same time, the desire of African 
governments to promote linkages from the commodities sector is not new. These 
previous efforts by governments to promote local content have by and large, 
achieved very limited success. However, in the light of these changes in the nature of 
globalisation, we believe strongly that historical experience cannot be used as a 
guide to the promotion of linkages in the current era. We further believe that there are 
unrealised opportunities in the current era and that there is the real possibility of 
increasing linkages, particularly backward linkages. This arises as a consequence of 
considerable shared interest between lead commodity firms and host governments 
and that policy and policy processes therefore need to be recast. The question is the 
degree to which the lead commodity firms and African governments have recognised 
these opportunities and the extent to which they have been embodied in concrete 
policies and practices. In turn, the development of these new shared visions needs to 
be rooted in an understanding of what actually occurs on the ground in Africa‟s 
commodity sectors. This is an area of considerable collective ignorance. Although 
there are a great many declarations of the nature, degree and drivers of linkages 
from Africa‟s commodity sectors, there is a virtual vacuum of concrete evidence to 
inform policy. It is this knowledge gap which the MMCP seeks to fill. 
 
In this Discussion Paper we report our research findings on the extent and 
determinants of linkages in and out of the commodities sector in eight SSA countries 
(Angola, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa Tanzania, and Zambia) and 
six sectors (copper, diamonds, gold, oil and gas, mining services and timber) (Table 
1). In addition to these sectoral studies, we undertook two sets of studies on 
infrastructure in order to highlight the role which this sector plays in both vertical and 
horizontal linkages into the commodities sector. The first of these two studies was on 
the Central Corridor in East Africa. The second focused on Chinese firms operating 
in infrastructure in Angola and their propensity to source inputs locally. We also 
commissioned a study on the determinants of linkages as seen from the perspective 
of the mining companies. These findings are based on detailed primary research 
undertaken between 2009 and 2011 by a group of African researchers working to a 
common methodology.  
 
We begin with a statement of the core hypotheses which has driven our research 
enquiry, seeking to understand the nature and determinants of linkages into and out 
of the commodities sector. This is followed in section 2 where we report our findings 
on the depth and breadth of linkages to the commodities sectors in our sample 
countries. In section 3 we interrogate the four factors which we hypothesise, based 
on initial pilot research, as determining the extent of these linkages. In the final 
section we conclude the comparative analysis laying the foundations for a policy 
agenda (set out in Discussion paper 14, Morris et al, 2011b) which needs to be 
pursued in order to deepen and broaden linkages between the commodities and 
industrial sectors in SSA. 
 
1.1. Core research hypotheses 
Based on a reading of related literatures (the commodities sector, core competences, 
global value chains, and supply chain development – see Morris et al, 2011a) and 
after reviewing the results of pilot studies in each of our main research terrains, two 
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sets of core hypotheses guided the research. These hypotheses, discussed in more 
detail in Sections 3 and 4 below are as follows: 
 
1. As a natural outcome of market forces, there will be: 
 
i. Linkages from lead commodity producers in the commodities sector to input 
suppliers (backward linkages) and to commodity processors (forward 
linkages).  
ii. These linkages will be a function of the age and the scale of the sector in the 
country in question  
iii. In the hard and energy commodity sectors, backward linkages will be more 
prominent than forward linkages; the soft industrial commodities sector (e.g. 
timber) will be characterised by both forward and backward linkages 
 
2. The breadth and depth of linkages will be affected by: 
 
i. The nature of ownership of lead-commodity firms and their suppliers and end 
users 
ii. The nature and quality of infrastructure 
iii. Capabilities, skills of the local suppliers and potential suppliers as well as the 
technological support that they receive through the National System of 
Innovation 
iv. Policy development, management and implementation  
 
These represent an ambitious set of hypotheses on the nature and determinants of 
linkages into and out of the commodities sector. Their substantiation or negation 
provides a comprehensive framework for the development of policies designed to 
enhance linkages and to promote economic diversification. However, as we will see, 
our capacity to provide a detailed and rigorous analysis of these factors was severely 
hampered by the uneven nature of data availability and research access, a problem 
affecting not just the MMCP research programme, but all research on the 
commodities sectors, especially hard and energy commodities.  
 
1.2. Methodology, sectoral coverage and resource-dependence in 
the sample economies 
In choosing a sample of sectors and countries in which to examine the determinants 
of linkages between the commodities and industrial sectors we were guided by the 
need to work with a sample of observations which provided the capacity to generalise 
our research results. In so doing, we took the following factors into account.  
 
 We are aware of the substantial differences between soft industrial 
commodities on the one hand and hard and energy commodities on the other. 
For this reason and in order to cover the range of commodity types, we included 
a study of the timber industry, two studies on the oil-sector (and four on hard 
commodities (copper, diamond and two studies on gold).  
 
 Since our a priori reasoning suggested that there were reasons why there 
might be differences in the linkage-potential between backward and forward 
linkages, we ensured the inclusion of both sectors primarily involving backward 
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linkages (six studies) and those in which forward linkages are prominent (two 
studies).  
 
 Since country differences and the elapsed time of commodity exploitation are 
almost certainly significant determinants of linkages, we researched the same 
sector in two economies (gold in Ghana and Tanzania).  
 
 In many cases the greatest possibilities for input provision lie in the local 
acquisition of services, and for this reason we covered services providers in 
some of the studies (IT services in Nigeria, engineering services in Zambia).  
 
 Since regional factors may also determine the breadth and depth of linkages, 
research focused on Southern (Botswana and South Africa), Central (Angola 
and Zambia), Eastern (Tanzania) and Western (Gabon and Nigeria) Africa.  
 
 China‟s resource hunger is potentially a game-changer in the SSA 
commodities sector, and for this reason we researched the role played by state-
owned Chinese firms in Angola‟s infrastructure sector, in Zambia‟s copper 
sector, and in Gabon‟s timber sector. In doing so, we set out some key 
differentiating features regarding China‟s role as an investor and final market 
customer.  
 
 Given the critical role of infrastructure in the commodities sector, we not only 
considered this issue in each of the individual sector studies, but also 
commissioned a study specifically focusing on one of the largest regional 
infrastructure programmes in Africa, namely the Central Development Corridor 
stretching from Tanzania to the Great Lakes region.  
 
 Many of the key decisions on local sourcing reflect the way in which lead 
commodity producers organise the exploration, construction and management 
of their operations in the commodities sector, and for this reason we also 
commissioned a study of the different modalities of firm-sourcing policy in the 
hard commodities sector. These various considerations and their relevance to 
individual sectors and countries are summarised in Table 1, which also 
identifies the links to the relevant MMCP Discussion Papers. 
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Table 1: Core characteristics of MMCP studies 
 
  Establishment Period 
of the Commodity  
Sector 
Linkage 
type 
Commodity 
type 
Emerging 
economy 
relevance 
MMCP 
Discussion 
Paper 
Angola Offshore-oil Mid 1990s Backward Energy  China No. 11 
Botswana Diamonds 1960s Forward Hard  No. 6 
Gabon Timber Early 1960s Forward Soft China, 
Malaysia 
No. 10 
Ghana Gold Late 19thC Backward Hard  No. 1 
Nigeria Oil 1950s Backward Energy  No. 8 
South Africa Mining capital 
equipment and 
specialist services 
1880s Backward Hard  No. 5 
Tanzania Gold 1998 Backward Hard  No. 7 
Zambia Copper Early 20thC Backward Hard China,  
India 
No. 3 
Angola Infrastructure >2004 --- --- China No. 2 
East Africa Infrastructure >2005 --- ---  No. 9 
Cross-sector Sourcing 
modalities 
--- Backward Hard  No. 4 
(http://commodities.open.ac.uk/discussionpapers;www.cssr.uct.ac.za/prism/publications) 
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In each of these studies, sample selection was designed to promote the 
generalisability of research findings. In some cases there were only a limited 
number of firms operating in a given activity, and sample selection was easy – 
“target the whole population”. In other cases, however, there was virtually no 
available information on the population of existing input providers, processing 
and beneficiating firms, and in this it was more difficult to ensure a 
representative selection of sample firms. Thus samples were selected through 
a variety of methods (random, purposeful, stratified and snowball sampling 
methods).  
 
We are confident that, overall, they are representative of the total populations 
in each of our sectoral-studies. In Angola, the sample covered 100 percent of 
control lines contractors, 82 percent of flow-lines contractors, and 57 percent 
of oil operators. The Botswana study interviewed 63 percent of the population 
of cutting and polishing firms. The logging/processing companies interviewed 
for the Gabon study covered between 50 percent and 70 percent of the total 
concession area. Zambia‟s sample of mining companies represented 70 
percent of copper volume production, while the sample of suppliers covered 
53 percent of firms based in Kitwe, Lusaka and Ndola. In Nigeria, the sample 
represented one-third of the total population, and 50 percent of local suppliers 
in the sub-sector of research enquiry. The analysis of the South African 
mining services sector involved was based on ten firm-interviews plus 
interviews with business organisations supplemented by firm-level survey 
data. The Central Development Corridor (Tanzania and Mozambique) was 
based on the use of secondary material and interviews with key industry 
informants. Table 2 provides a summary of the research population in the 
core sectoral studies. 
 
Table 2: Summary of sample size and composition for sectoral studies 
 Lead commodity 
producers 
Suppliers/ 
Processors/ 
Beneficiators 
Public/private 
institutions, key 
informants 
Angola 
infrastructure 
9 SOEs 44 private firms 
(suppliers/contractors) 
108 institutions 
Angola/oil 8 oil firms 13 oil services 
companies (suppliers) 
28 large scale and 
SME suppliers 
9 institutions 
Botswana  6 suppliers, 12 cutting 
& polishing firms 
14 
Gabon 20 logging/processing firms 8 suppliers 9 
Nigeria 15 oil firms 115 suppliers  Unspecified 
South Africa  12 supplier firms 5 institutions. 2 
industry associations  
Tanzania 3 mines, 3 exploration firms 8 suppliers  9 
Zambia 8 mining companies  50 suppliers  17 
 
In each case data was collected though semi-structured interviews. Interviews 
were conducted on the basis of a questionnaire which included both open-
ended and closed-ended questions. All the studies also made large use of 
secondary data, including company reports, reports and publications by 
independent consultancies, sectoral organisations, international 
organisations, macroeconomic and trade databases, journal articles, 
  
8 
conference papers and industry publications. 
 
However, despite our attempts to utilise a rigorous, common and structured 
methodology, without exception, all of our studies (although to varying 
degrees) encountered substantial problems in accessing the data required to 
document what was being observed. There were a number of factors 
undermining our attempts to obtain optimal datasets. In some cases, the 
respondents themselves did not collect the relevant data. This was evident, 
for example, in the case of some of the gold mining firms in Tanzania. In other 
cases, the lead-firms did appear to have the data which we sought, but were 
reluctant to share the information with our researchers. Research access was 
also very uneven between countries. In Angola, Botswana and Nigeria the 
majority of firms who were approached agreed to participate in the study. By 
contrast in Tanzania the barriers to research access were formidable, in part 
because the government was revising its policy towards the mining sector and 
the lead mining firms were concentrating on keeping a very low profile. 
 
A source of bitter comfort is that whilst research access proved to be at best 
sub-optimal and at worst very difficult, it is clear from our review of the 
literature on linkages from the commodities sector (particularly that with 
regard to hard and energy commodities and that focusing on SSA) that we 
have been able to gather a unique body of primary empirical material. This 
primary material is predominantly qualitative in nature, and that is unfortunate 
since in the best of worlds it would be valuable to have been able to bring 
considerably more quantitative material to support our findings. On the other 
hand, there is often an illusion that numbers reflect reality.2  
 
We draw three conclusions from this review of methodology therefore. First, 
the scale of our ambitions, as reflected in the hypotheses outlined above, is 
much greater than our capacity to evidence them in a comprehensive and 
rigorous manner. Second, however imperfect our evidencing may be, it is an 
improvement by a considerable margin on what is known about the 
commodities sector in any of the countries in which our research was 
conducted. And, third, despite the difficulties we encountered in our research, 
we are confident that we have been able to capture the reality of the breadth 
and depth of linkages into and out of the commodities sectors which we have 
researched, and the factors which determine the nature and scale of these 
linkages. 
 
1.3. The depth and breadth of linkages to the commodities 
sectors in our sample countries 
Determining the extent of linkages into and out of the commodities sector 
requires a focus on five sets of factors. The first is the breadth of linkages. On 
the input side, this refers to the share of the inputs of the commodity producer 
                                            
2
 For example, the official figures on employment in Botswana‟s mining industry which are 
used in the ILO and UNIDO databases to facilitate international comparison show a doubling 
of the labour force between 2008 and 2009 from 84 to 173 workers. This is despite the fact 
that Botswana not only produces almost forty percent of global diamond output, but that its 
mining sector also produces nickel, cobalt, copper, coal, soda ash, salt and gold! 
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that are acquired locally. On the output side, what proportion of commodity 
production is processed by local firms. Ideally this will reflect a combination of 
value and volume data. The second factor is what we refer to as the depth of 
linkage, that is, the extent of domestic value which is added to locally-
acquired inputs or locally processed/beneficiated outputs. As will be seen 
from our research results, there are a great many cases where what appears 
to be a “local product” is in fact merely an input imported by a local trader, 
rather than by the lead commodity firm. The local content is limited to the 
importer‟s margin and is close to zero. Third, there is the need to command 
linkages in the whole value chain, that is, how far down and up the chain the 
analysis goes. Ideally, it would be helpful to plot the degree of value added 
not just in the first tier of suppliers and processors but in the second, third and 
other tiers where domestic value added is significant. Fourth, and finally, is 
the question of depth and breadth of horizontal linkages, that is, the extent to 
which, as a direct consequence of linkages from the commodity sector, 
domestic value is added into inputs for or outputs from other related sectors. 
We should bear in mind that in reality there are often tiers of links, which 
include both vertical and horizontal links. Fifth production occurs in the context 
of value chains, so domestic value added needs to be seen in the context of 
value added in the whole chain rather than in a particular link under enquiry. 
 
Evidencing this conceptual discussion of the breadth and depth of linkages 
requires a daunting degree of detailed evidence. Indeed, even with complete 
access to the books of firms involved in the chain (assuming that all firms 
keep books, that they only keep one set of books and that these records are 
accurate!), it would be an extremely time-consuming task to accurately 
measure these numbers. The imperfect world encountered by our 
researchers‟ means that our evidence is a long way from this ideal type. As 
we shall see it is only partial, and despite our best attempts to collect data on 
the same indicators in all of the sectoral studies, this proved to be an 
insuperable task. Therefore, our recounting of the depth (the accretion of local 
value added) and breadth (the percentage of spend which is local) of linkages 
in each of our case-study countries is partial and uneven.  
 
2. THE DEPTH AND BREADTH OF LINKAGES 
 
With the above caveats in mind, we can now consider the evidence on the 
breadth and depth of linkages in eight country case studies – equipment 
provided to the offshore oil-industry in Angola; the cutting and polishing of 
diamonds in Botswana; inputs into copper mining in Zambia; inputs into the 
gold mining sector in Tanzania and Ghana; the processing of timber in 
Gabon; the sourcing of fabrication and construction; well construction and 
completion; and control systems and equipment and IT services inputs into 
the Nigerian oil industry; and mining equipment in South Africa. 
 
2.1 Backward linkages into offshore oil production in Angola 
Angola achieved independence from Portugal in 1975, but rapidly descended 
into civil war. This war continued until 2002 and was a source of major social, 
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political and economic disruption. What had been a relatively diversified 
economy during the colonial period, with a spread of economic activity in a 
variety of agricultural and mining sectors, collapsed into a bifurcated 
economy, with the cash economy being centred around the capital city 
Luanda, and the interior of the country retreating into semi-subsistence 
production. Economic decline was particularly marked during the height of the 
war between 1988 and 1994, and despite growth reviving in the mid-1990s, it 
was only after the end of the civil war in 2002 that the current rapid trajectory 
of economic growth was established (Figure 1). Until recently Angola‟s growth 
rate was below the average for SSA but after the commodities boom in 2003-
2004, Angola‟s growth rate decisively exceeded that across the continent. 
 
Figure 1: Annual GDP growth rate, 1986-2010 (%) 
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Source: World Development Indicators data online. <http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators> (accessed July 2011) 
 
The key to the revival of Angola‟s growth over the past two decades has been 
the discovery of offshore oil. Exploration of these deposits took off in earnest 
in the mid-1990s, and the first major offshore well started production in 1999. 
Angola possesses the 15th largest oil reserve in the world and the second 
largest reserves in Africa after Nigeria. By 2010 it had become the 15th 
largest oil producer in the world. As a consequence of the growth of the oil 
sector and the collapse in economic activity in other sectors, the Angolan 
economy has become increasingly dominated by oil. The oil sector not only 
accounts for more than half of GDP (Figure 2), but also is the primary 
contributor to government revenues, accounting for more than 60 percent of 
total government revenue (Table 3). 
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Figure 2: Sectoral composition of GDP, 2003-2008 (%) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Industry Non-tradable services Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing Oil and Gas
 
Source: Teka (2011); MIND (2009) 
 
Table 3: The share of oil and mineral rents in GDP and public expenditure, 
2000-2011 ($ and %)* 
Year Gov. oil rents  
(USD Billion) 
Oil rents  
(% of GDP) 
Oil revenue  
(% of gov. expenditure) 
2000 --- 63.3 64 
2001 0.5 50.8 66 
2002 1 48.8 68 
2003 1.06 48.3 66 
2004 2.2 53.7 58.3 
2005 2.7 65.1 45 
2006 3.7 60.8 52 
2007 21.2 61.3 61 
2008 37.1 67 58.2 
2009 17.2 38.6 60 
2010 25.3 -- 61 
2011 -- -- 62 
* The data includes (i) royalties (oil production and oil transaction taxes); (ii) share of profit in 
production sharing agreements (iii) revenue from consumption tax on petroleum derivatives 
and (iv) (iii) limited revenues from the awarding mining rights; 
Source: MINFIN (2011); World Development Indicators (2011) 
 
The Petroleum Activity Law (Law 13/76 of 1976) assigned sole ownership of 
Angola‟s hydrocarbon resources and mining rights to the Angolan state. The 
state manages the sector through Sonangol, which is the concessionaire of 
the country‟s oil industry and the sole owner of concession rights. Other 
investors can only participate in the oil extraction sector in partnership with 
Sonangol. But Sonangol‟s ambitions go beyond merely holding property rights 
over oil deposits. It also sees itself as an active investor both in oil extraction 
and in the forward processing of oil, and models itself on other National Oil 
Companies such as Petrobas in Brazil. In addition, as will be shown below, 
Sonangol is also involved in, and responsible for, driving backward linkages, 
and in particular those involving locally-owned firms.  
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National ownership of resources and concession rights gives the state 
(through Sonangol) significant bargaining power across the oil and gas value 
chain. Amongst other things, the government has used this leverage to 
advance what it sees as national interests (in this case not just the localisation 
of value added, but also the localisation of ownership) in the oil sector through 
local content policy. 
 
The decrees of 1982 and 2003 and the Petroleum Activity Law of 2004 
instituted two main drivers of local content. The first was a series of 
requirements to ensure the employment of Angolan nationals in the oil 
industry and in the linkages which feed into and out of the oil extracting 
sector. Inter alia this policy mandates (i) preferential employment of Angolans 
unless a lack of competent Angolan labour can be proved (iii) at the renewal 
of every contract and on annual basis, companies must submit a plan to 
recruit and train Angolan workers to meet the employment targets set by the 
government, and (iii) companies are required to pay a levy toward the 
development of Angolan human resources. Oilfield producers must contribute 
US15 cents of a dollar per barrel produced per year, associate operators (oil 
companies without operator status) must contribute $200,000 per year, and oil 
service companies must contribute amounts agreed bilaterally with the 
Ministry of Petroleum. Table 4 below shows the targets set out by the 
government for the Angolanisation of the oil sector‟s labour force. 
 
Table 4: Angolanisation Targets 
Levels (Grades) 1985 1987 1990 
Up to Grade VI  (Unskilled/Semi-Skilled) 100% 100% 100% 
Grades VII-XI  (Mid-Level Technicians) 50% 60% 70% 
Grades XII-XIII  (Higher Level Personnel) -- 50% 80% 
Source: Teka (2011) 
 
The second factor driving Angola‟s local content programme is the preferential 
treatment of national firms in the supply of goods and services. National firms 
are defined as firms having more than 51 percent of share capital owned by 
Angolan citizens. The key rule is that of exclusivity, which requires that all 
goods and services not requiring high capital value (the decree does not 
specify this in detail) and lacking in-depth and specialised know-how (again, 
this is left unspecified) must be sourced from national firms unless the price of 
these local inputs is more than 10 percent higher than the price of imports.  
 
Between 2004 and 2010 total investment in the Angolan oil industry was 
$69bn, with a further $15bn invested in supportive infrastructure and $1.2bn in 
the marketing link in the value chain. $52bn of this investment was directed to 
the construction and support of the offshore oil industry, all of which in 
principle could have resulted in local linkages. In reality the only linkages of 
significance (that is, where there was some semblance of domestic value 
added) was in two components of the SURF (sub-sea umbilicals, risers and 
flow-lines) sub-sector.  
 
Sub-sea umbilicals are cables that enable communication between sub-sea 
production systems (exploiting subs-sea wells) and rigs (production systems) 
on the surface and control centres on the shore. Flow-lines (whose main 
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components are risers and manifolds) enable a two-way flow of crude from 
sub-sea to surface and lubricants from surface to sub-sea production 
systems. This sub-sector (SURF) accounted for one fifth of total investment 
over the period (Table 5).  
 
Table 5:  Investment in the offshore oil production sector, 2004-2010 ($bn, %)3 
Oilfield segments Capital 
Expenditure 
($bn) 
Share 
(%) 
Local links 
Engineering 4 8 Services 
Procurement, construction & 
installation 
4 8 Systems construction 
Systems, equipment, piping & 
valves 
2 4 Systems sale & construction 
Sub-sea umbilicals, risers and 
flow-lines (SURF) 
11 21 Manufacture, sale & services 
Sub-sea production systems 6 11 Systems sale & installation 
Sub-sea services 1 2 Construction & services 
Rigs & drilling 12 23 Drilling services 
Drilling systems 3 6 Contracting & services 
Downhole & well 8 16 Equipment sale & services 
Decommissioning 1 2 Services 
Total 52 100  
Source: Teka (2011) 
 
Interviews were conducted into the nature and extent of value added in these 
two sub-sectors with eight oil producing companies, four control line suppliers 
and nine flow-line suppliers. One of these firms produces control-lines in 
Angola in a joint venture with Sonangol, and two firms assemble flow-lines in 
Angola. Table 6 shows the composition of cost structures in the domestic 
manufacture of flow-lines and control-lines. The bulk of costs – almost two-
thirds of the total - was made up of intermediate products and raw materials. 
Next in importance was expenditure on labour. Together these two inputs 
accounted for 84 percent of total costs. Only 6.2 percent of expenditure was 
on machinery. This breakdown of expenditure reflects the fact that in both of 
these sub-sectors, the primary activity is assembly (although control-lines 
production does also involve a degree of design and transformation of raw 
materials through the use of carousels). Turning to the last column of Table 6, 
it is evident that the only items procured locally were consumer goods i.e. 
basic goods and services (accommodation, catering, cleaning, human 
relations management, stationery, etc) and labour. But even here much of the 
value of these products which were procured locally was in fact largely made 
up of imports. For example, basic goods and services include computers, 
paper and furniture, none of which are produced domestically. 
 
                                            
3
The study focuses on the SURF segment 
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Table 6: Local content in domestic manufacture of flow lines, control lines (%) 
Types of inputs Share of 
operating 
expenditure 
Description Source 
Import Local  
Production 
Machinery 
(Amortisation cost) 
 
6.2% 
Carousels, reelers, pipe pincers, 
loaders, rollers, stalk racks, 
cranes, etc. 
 
  
 
-- 
Intermediate 
materials 
 
 
64.2% 
 
Carbon & stainless steel, brass, 
inconel, monel, polyethylene, 
services, etc 
 
  
 
-- 
Raw-materials Metal, steel, copper   -- 
Labour 
(skilled/unskilled) 
20% Engineers, managers, welders, 
etc. 
 
  
 
  
Basic General 
Services 
5.4% Lease (rental cost of 
buildings/facilities) 
 
-- 
 
  
Basic General 
Services 
 
2.5% 
HSE, catering, cleaning, security, 
civil construction, labour 
recruitment, lease 
 
-- 
 
  
Basic General 
Goods 
 
1.4% 
PPE, IT & electronic equipment, 
office furniture, stationary, etc 
 
  
 
-- 
Source: Teka (2011) 
 
Focusing on the labour component of domestic value added – which accounts 
for one-fifth of the total expenditure in domestic manufacturing – it is evident 
that between 2003 and 2009, there was a significant increase in the 
Angolisation of the labour force.  Although most of the local labour employed 
is unskilled and semi-skilled, there has been a marked increase in the 
percentage of Angolan citizens in skilled operations. There are ambitious 
targets for the Angolisation of this skilled cadre of labour by 2014.  
 
Table 7: Local labour content in manufacture, 2003/4-2014 
Period Control lines (%) Flow-lines (%) 
 
 
Basic/mid-skilled Higher-skilled 
(Engineers) 
Basic/mid-
skilled 
Higher-skilled 
(Engineers) 
2003/4 80 0 70 5 
2009 90 17 72 20 
2014 90 52 85 35 
Source: Teka (2011) 
 
2.2 Forward linkages in the diamond sector in Botswana 
Botswana is a geographically large country roughly the size of France or 
Texas with a small population of 1.9 million. Over two-thirds of the drought-
prone country is desert, semi-desert or scrub and does not lend itself to 
settled agriculture. It does, however, have a large pastoral sector and exports 
beef to the EU. But unlike the more verdant New Zealand, if Botswana were 
predominantly a pastoral economy it would not be able to provide its 
population with a high standard of living. Yet in 2010, Botswana‟s per capita 
income (of $8,180) ranked it as a middle-income country. This relatively high 
per capita income was a result of four decades of sustained economic growth 
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(Figure 3), and for much of this period Botswana ranked, with China, Korea 
and Singapore, as one of the world‟s most rapidly growing economies.4 
 
Figure 3: GDP growth rate, 1971-2009 (% p.a.) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators data online. <http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators> (accessed July 2011) 
 
The driver of this rapid economic growth and the resulting high level of per 
capita income in Botswana has been the production of diamonds, a precious 
stone yielding large resource rents, particularly to countries such as Botswana 
with easily accessible surface deposits of high quality stones. Diamonds were 
first discovered in Botswana shortly after independence in 1966, and large 
scale production began in 1971. Currently Botswana accounts for more than 
one-quarter (by value) of global diamond production. In the context of a 
virtually non-existent manufacturing sector and a poorly endowed agricultural 
sector, the contribution of diamonds to Botswana‟s GDP (Figure 4) and to 
government revenues (Figure 5) has been very significant. Currently the 
sector contributes more than 40 percent of GDP and more than half of all 
government revenue.  
 
However, the contribution of this bounty of nature to the economy is not 
without its problems. For one thing, the sector employs only a small proportion 
of the labour force, and the capacity of the population to share in the resource 
rents depends largely on the continuation of a relatively un-corrupt and 
efficient government. But more problematically, the low cost surface diamonds 
which have hitherto sustained the industry will be exhausted. Unless new 
deposits can be found within two decades, Botswana faces a major squeeze 
on incomes. For these reasons the government has committed itself to a 
programme of diversification, based on the extension of production linkages 
form the diamond sector. 
                                            
4
Botswana was one of 13 countries identified in the World Bank Growth Commission (Spence 
Report) as having sustained growth of over 7% for more than 25 years. 
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Figure 4: Percentage contribution to gross domestic product by selected 
economic activities 
 
Source: Mbayi (2011) 
 
Figure 5: Composition of government revenue (2000-2009) 
 
*  Diamonds account for more than 90 percent of mineral revenues 
Source: Mbayi (2011) 
 
The long-recognised need to diversify out of the heavy dependence on mining 
had previously led the government to promote the development of a cutting 
and polishing industry in the early 1980s, mainly as a way of increasing 
employment. At the time De Beers, the global mining company which 
dominated production in Botswana and the sale and marketing of diamonds in 
the global economy, did not support the government's ambitions. De Beers 
argued that cutting and polishing activities were not economically viable in 
Botswana. Mild pressure from government on DeBeers led to the start of 
three cutting and polishing factories between 1980 and 1990. However none 
of these factories ever reported a profit. Some observers believed that these 
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losses were artificially achieved through transfer pricing by De Beers in order 
to avoid pressures for further processing, but this is an untested assertion. 
Whatever the reality of the reasons limiting this truncated programme of 
forward linkages during the 1980s, Botswana‟s opportunity to ratchet up the 
pressure for forward linkages came in 2005 when De Beers‟ 25 year mining 
license was due for renewal. The government had a great deal of bargaining 
power due to De Beers‟s reliance on production from its 50-50 joint venture 
with Debswana. Debswana supplied around 60 percent of De Beers‟s global 
supply of rough diamonds. The government insisted that in order for De Beers 
to renew its mining license for another 25 years it should help Botswana to 
create a viable and globally-competitive cutting and polishing industry. De 
Beers gave in to the government's demands realizing that it could no longer 
hold back beneficiation in Botswana and signed the new mining contract.  
 
After the new contract was signed the Government invited the world's leading 
cutting and polishing companies to establish factories in Botswana and in the 
process to transfer cutting and polishing skills to local citizens. 16 of these 
companies were selected and licensed to operate in Botswana. DeBeers and 
the government then established the Diamond Trading Company (DTC) in 
2008 which, like Debswana, is a 50-50 joint venture. DTC Botswana is 
responsible for the sorting and valuing of Debswana‟s production (replacing 
the Botswana Diamond Valuing Company). It also controls the supply of 
diamonds to the 16 cutting and polishing companies and is responsible for 
supporting the development of the cutting and polishing industry. The new 
agreement required DTC Botswana to release diamond to the local 
manufacturing industry to a value of at least $500 mn  a year and to develop 
targets for this to grow over time. It was also tasked with the creation of at 
least 3,000 jobs in the development of the cutting and polishing industry. The 
agreement includes a penalty clause for non-performance, so in marked 
contrast to the previous attempt to promote beneficiation, De Beers has a 
vested (and financial) interest in making the programme a success. The 16 
cutting and polishing companies, known as Sightholders, are only assured 
rough diamond allocations on the condition that they hire and train locals with 
cutting and polishing skills.  
 
The Government has established a Diamond Office to support government's 
primary objective of beneficiation in Botswana diamond industry. This office 
focuses on building strategic alliances, developing infrastructure and providing 
a favourable fiscal regime. The government‟s vision for diamond beneficiation 
is supported by multi-faced strategy aiming to create downstream 
competencies in the value chain in the cutting and polishing industry, jewellery 
manufacturing industry, diamond trading industry and ancillary businesses 
(Figure 6). The first part of the beneficiation strategy, and the only one to be 
systematically addressed by 2010, was the creation of a viable cutting and 
polishing industry. Policies designed to enhance competences further down 
the chain (for example, in jewellery manufacture5 and trading) are still under 
development. 
                                            
5
 To date two of the Sightholders have started jewelry manufacturing factories in Botswana in 
2011 
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The 2005 agreement between the Government and DeBeers included 
agreements on sales and distribution, in which the 5-year sales agreement 
stated that all Debswana production would be sold to DTC London (a wholly 
owned DeBeers entity), whilst the distribution agreement stated that 
aggregation, which had taken place in London for over a century, would be 
moved to Botswana. Aggregation involves the mixing of all DeBeers‟ supply of 
diamond regardless of origin into parcels that meet the demands of each of 
DeBeers‟ customers or Sightholder. Although DeBeers agreed to have this 
process moved to Botswana, by the end of 2010, when the sales agreement 
ended it had not done so. DeBeers offered many reasons for this including the 
financial crisis and inadequate infrastructure in Botswana. When the sales 
contract ended at the end of 2010 it was extended for another three months 
because DeBeers and the Government had not reached an agreement on the 
new sales contract.   
 
In September 2011, DeBeers and the Government finally signed a new sales 
agreement after long negotiations. Its bargaining power over the control of 
diamond supplies meant that the Botswana government was able to over-rise 
the concerns of De Beers and to ratchet-up the promotion of linkage 
development exert and in particular to allow government to also enter the 
marketing links in the value chain. Thus, the ten-year sales agreement 
(signed in mid 2011 was backdated to January 2011) requires that by the end 
of 2013 DeBeers will finally implement the previously agreed on relocation of 
aggregation. This relocation of aggregation will have considerable spill overs 
on many industries like transport, finance and hospitality because the worlds 
diamond industry will now go to Gaborone instead of London to buy diamonds 
from DeBeers. In addition, the agreement provides for an independent sales 
channel for 10 per cent of Debswana‟s production, which will increase to 15 
per cent over five years, whilst the rest of Debswana‟s production will be sold 
to DeBeers/DTC London. Further, the 2011 agreement stated that more 
diamonds will be made available in the local cutting and polishing industry but 
no figures have been stated to date. The Government will also license two or 
three additional Sightholders in Botswana to start new cutting and polishing 
factories. Thus, as a consequence of this new agreement, linkage 
development in Botswana‟s diamond value chain is likely to increase, both in 
terms of depth and breadth from the levels recorded in our survey conducted 
in 2010. 
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Figure 6: Botswana’s Downstream Value Chain 
 
Source: Mbayi (2011) 
 
Hence, there is clear evidence of substantial forward linkages in Botswana‟s 
diamond industry, driven by government policy rather than by market forces. 
The issues at stake are therefore whether this will be a globally competitive 
industry in the future, and how much of these forward linkages reflect real 
domestic value added. In exploring these issues we interviewed 12 of the 16 
cutting and polishing firms and six of their suppliers. 
 
It is as yet too early to determine whether Botswana‟s cutting and polishing 
industry will be globally competitive. At first glance, the answer seems 
negative, since labour costs per carat of cut-diamond in Botswana are much 
higher than either India or Botswana (Table 8). However, there are three 
reasons to suspend judgement on this count. First, whilst Botswana‟s labour 
costs are indeed higher than China and India, they are much lower than those 
in Belgium and Israel, both of which have long-established cutting and 
polishing industries. These high cost centres manage to maintain their 
presence by focusing on larger and more valuable stones, and leaving the low 
wage economies (India and China) to produce cheaper stones. Botswana is 
targeting a mid-level quality of cutting and polishing, above the small stones 
produced in China and India, and below the highly specialised stones 
produced in Europe. Second, it is dangerous to make static cost judgements, 
particularly in a skill-intensive sector. The question is not so much whether 
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Botswana‟s current production costs are high, but whether they will remain 
high in the future. Heavy investments in training by the government, and the 
need for firms to invest in skills (since, to some extent, they have no 
alternative but to cut and polish in Botswana), suggests that wage costs in 
Botswana may be a moving frontier as domestic skills improve. And, third, 
new technologies are being introduced which substitute for the long-
accumulated tacit skills which have historically dominated this industry. As in 
the introduction of computer-numerical-controlled machine tools in global 
metal industries in the 1990s, these technological innovations offer the 
possibility of newcomers circumventing skills barriers which had historically 
excluded them from competitive production. 
 
Table 8: Industry and Botswana government estimates on the range of cost per 
carat in Botswana relative to some centres ($) 
 Industry Government 
Botswana 45 - 120 35 - 90 
India 35 10 
China 20 –25 17 
Namibia 45 –100 - 
Source: Mbayi (2011) 
 
A further issue is the extent to which the forward linkages in the diamond 
sector involve domestic value added. If the complete diamond value chain is 
considered, most of the product‟s final value accrues after mining, and 
particularly in jewellery manufacturing and retail (Table 9). Nevertheless the 
sorting and valuing, and cutting and polishing stages which Botswana aims to 
command in the short- to medium-run are substantial, accounting for an 
additional 33 percent of the value generated in mining. A significant (but 
unmeasured) component of these additional processing costs is the cost of 
labour. If the projected development of marketing capabilities – as proposed 
in the 2011 legislation and included in the “Marketing and retail” category in 
Table 9 - bears fruit, the degree of domestic value added may increase 
significantly within the next decade. 
 
Table 9: Value Addition in the Diamond Pipeline 
Stage of Global Value Chain % of original value 
Producer Selling Value 100 
Sorting and Valuing 115 
Cutting and Polishing 127 
Polished Dealing 133 
Jewellery Manufacturing 166 
Marketing and Retail 320 
Source: Even-Zohar (2007) 
 
Since the cutting and polishing industry began in 1982, 16 cutting and 
polishing firms (“sight holders”) have established operations in Botswana.  14 
of these firms were set up after the new agreement with Debswana in 2005.  
(An additional two firms will locate in Botswana after the 2011 Agreement with 
De Beers). They employ more than 3,000 people, most of whom are citizens 
(Table 10) an important outcome given the high rate of unemployment in the 
economy (estimated at 30 percent of the labour force). The monthly salaries 
are in the range of $150 to $600 ($2=Pula12), which is above the minimum 
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wage for the manufacturing industry. Most of these firms own their premises, 
suggesting a long-term commitment to Botswana and continuous investment 
in local procurement. 
 
Table 10: Ownership and employment patterns in twelve cutting and polishing 
firms 
Origin of Parent 
Company Est. % Local Employ. Salary Range* 
Own or Rent 
Premises 
Belgium 
1982 90% - Own 
1990s 97% P1300 – P3000 - 
2007 95% P1000 Rent 
2004 95% P1000 Own 
Israel 
1990 95% P1500 Own 
2007 80% - Rent 
2007 95% P900 – P3000 Own 
2007 n/a n/a Own 
India 
2007 80% - Rent 
2007 85% P1000 - P4000 -  
South Africa 2007 83% - Own 
Source: Mbayi (2011) 
 
The direct employment of around 3,000 people in the cutting and polishing 
firms results in an annual wage bill of over $135 m (Table 11). The portion of 
the wage bill accruing to the 210 expatriates employed in the industry is 
almost double the proportion of the wage bill going to the 2,730 local citizens 
who are employed. In addition to these 3,000 employees in cutting and 
polishing, employment is also created in second-tier supplier industries.  
 
Table 11: Direct employment and wages and salaries, 2010 
 Employees/
Total 
employment  
Employees Average 
Monthly 
Wage ($) 
Annual Wage 
Bill ($) 
Total employment  100% 3000 … $22,628,064 
- Factory  91% 2730 … $7,268,160 
- Middle Management 7% 210 … $7,799,904 
- Top Management 2% 60 … $7,560,000 
Total Locals Employed 93% 2790 … $7,928,064 
- Factory  96% 2678 $200 $6,428,160 
- Middle Management 4% 107 $1,167 $1,499,904 
- Top Management 0% 0 …  $0 
Total Expatriates Employed  7% 210 … $14,700,000 
- Factory  20% 42 $1,667 $840,000 
- Middle Management 50% 105 $5,000 $6,300,000 
- Top Management 30% 63 $10,000 $7,560,000 
Gross Salaries and wages as 
% of total costs (excluding 
rough diamonds) 
… … … 15% - 45% 
Source: Mbayi (2011) 
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2.3 Forward linkages into the timber sector in Gabon 
Based on an ubiquitously-grown soft commodity (wood) and feeding into a 
range of both basic and income elastic goods (furniture and construction), the 
timber value chain is well developed in a wide range of countries. Figure 7 
shows the range of links in this value chain, from the plantations of timber 
through intermediate products. In recent decades the industry has become 
more integrated into the global economy. A key development was the 
introduction of flat-pack furniture during the 1990s, an innovation which 
reduced the cost penalties involved in shipping bulky and relatively low value 
products. The result was that, increasingly, furniture production was 
gravitating to the site of log-production, and away from the site of final 
markets. This transition in timber processing was intensified since many wood 
products are labour-intensive in production and often also involve noxious 
environmental emissions. Further, government policies in many low income 
countries specifically fostered the timber processing industry as an entry point 
into industrialisation since this is a sector with relatively few technological or 
scale barriers to entry. 
 
Figure 7: The global timber value chain 
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Notes: Grey text boxes highlight the three dominant products produced in Gabon; EWP = 
engineered wood products, MDF = medium-density fibreboard, DIY = do-it-yourself;  
Source: Terheggen (2011) 
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Tropical timber fills a specialised niche in this global industry. Its timber takes 
a long time to grow, has a distinctive appearance, is “hard”, and is in short 
supply. It therefore tends to sell at a premium, particularly for species such as 
mahogany and ebony where there are growing pressures to halt the depletion 
of global stocks and to limit supplies to renewable plantations. The share of 
tropical timber in global timber production is around 15 percent, with the 
largest five producers accounting for 70 percent of the total. Of this, Brazil 
accounts for 20 percent, Indonesia for 16 percent, Malaysia for 16 percent, 
India for 15 percent and Nigeria for five percent. Although Gabon only 
accounts for three percent of global tropical timber production, It consumes 
very little of this output domestically and is the seventh largest tropical log 
exporter. 
 
Situated on the African West Coast between the Congo and Cameroon, 
Gabon is sparsely peopled, with a total population of 1.9 million. Although it 
has a relatively high per capita income for the region ($7,240 in 2008) much of 
the population lives in poverty. GDP of $14.4bn in 2008 was dominated by 
highly concentrated income streams from oil production. In 2008, around 80 
percent of total export earnings and 65 percent of government revenue were 
derived from the oil industry. But these resource rents are poorly distributed. 
In addition to oil, Gabon possesses valuable deposits of manganese, copper 
and precious stones. Logs, the third largest export after oil and manganese, 
accounted for 6.2 percent of total exports in 2008 (OECD, 2009). Gabon has 
around 23 million hectares of forests, which cover nearly 85 percent of its total 
land mass, making it the second most heavily forested African country. 
Although historically timber was the major sector in Gabon‟s cash economy, it 
has become overshadowed by the oil sector, and now accounts for less than 
three percent of GDP. It is, however, the second largest employer after the 
state, absorbing an estimated 28-30 of the active labour force (much of this is 
part-time employment). 
 
Extraction and exportation of tropical timber on an industrial scale began 
around 1900, and until the late 1990s timber was predominantly destined for 
France, and other EU markets. Since then, exports to China have grown and 
(in round-wood equivalent volume) exceed those to the EU. In 2001 the 
government introduced legislation designed to provide both for a sustainable 
timber industry and to encourage forward linkages. The Forestry Code (Loi No 
016/01 Portant Code Forestier) of 2001 included four major features. The first 
was the termination of the state-owned company‟s (SNBG, Société Nationale 
des Bois du Gabon) monopoly over the commercialisation of the dominant 
species Okoumé and Ozigo. The second was the introduction of a sustainable 
forest management system, and the third saw the introduction of a higher 
degree of transparency to combat corruption and illegal logging. The final 
component of the Forestry Code was designed to promote the domestic 
processing of logs. It established a target of domestic processing, specifying a 
target of 75 percent by January 2012. Since progress in meeting the 75 
percent processing target for January 2012 was slow, at the beginning of 
2010 the government announced a log export ban.  
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Two key factors led to the introduction of the Forestry Code. First, Gabon's oil 
reserves are finite and oil production peaked in 1996/7. This led the 
government to target economic diversification in general, and the adding of 
value to raw materials in particular. The second factor was pressure from a 
series of external agencies, including the IMF and the World Bank (Gabon‟s 
largest creditors), European governments and European buyers of tropical 
timber and wood products. The fact that the historically dominant buyers from 
Europe were happy to see primary processing occurring at the site of logging 
removed a potential obstacle to this policy-induced promotion of forward 
linkages. Even though progress in meeting the January 2012 target was slow, 
the timber value chain in Gabon has seen a deepening of forward linkages 
(Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Gabon's tropical timber value chain 
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In the early years market-led exports were relatively small and stable 
(hovering between 50,000 and 100,00 cubic metres p.a.), but after the late 
1990s, and particularly after the introduction of the Forestry Code in 2001, 
exports of processed timber products grew rapidly, exceeding 450,000 cubic 
metres in 2005. However, despite this growth, in terms of round-wood 
equivalents, this export of processed timber was only 33 percent of total 
timber exports in 2007 (Figure 9). Whilst European buyers have imported a 
growing proportion of processed timber products, Chinese buyers almost 
exclusively buy unprocessed logs. 
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Figure 9: Export volumes of wood products, 1961-2007 (cubic metres) 
 
Source: ForesSTAT data online <http://faostat.fao.org>(accessed January 2011) 
 
Aside from the timber, local content in the Gabonese timber industry and in 
the processing sector is largely confined to labour. It is estimated that wage 
costs account for up to a quarter of total production costs in a vertically 
integrated logging-processing company. Other major cost items are capital 
goods (20 percent), transportation (14 percent), customs (22 percent), and 
taxes (10 taxes). Most of the machinery and transport is made up of imports. 
But even this overstates the domestic value added component of costs 
(excluding the resource rents derived from ownership of timber), since Gabon 
has an acute shortage of skilled labour and of unskilled labour too. As one 
company observed: "We would like to fill our senior positions with Gabonese, 
but …we cannot find skilled labour in Gabon". Consequently a high proportion 
of the skilled labour force, and 16 percent of unskilled labour was made up of 
migrants, many of whom repatriate their salaries abroad (Table 12).  Senior 
management is most often sourced from Europe and/or Asia (depending on 
the ownership of production), whereas foreign labour in administrative 
positions, in transportation, and in production/processing (labourers) is mostly 
made up of migrant labour from other Central African countries. 
 
Table 12: Distribution, origin and cost of labour (percent, Euro) 
  Distribution Origin Cost  
(percent) (percent) (euro) 
 Gabon Foreign  
Management 7 24 75 5,700 
Technicians 4 59 41 1,600 
Administration 6 87 13 700 
Labourers 74 84 16 300 
Transport 6 70 31 800 
Environment & Social 2 74 26 600 
Source: Terheggen (2011) 
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An index of the value of logs and processed wood products after their 
respective points of production (ex-forest or ex-factory) as well as the point of 
exportation (at port, fob), provides an overview of the accretion of value-
added throughout Gabon‟s tropical timber industry (Figure 10). The value 
chain starts at the forest level where the standing value of a tree is assigned 
an index value of 100 points. Once the tree is felled, cleared of its branches 
and transported to the landing site (log collection point in the concession area) 
there is an increase in its value to 113 index points. The transportation from 
the landing site (ex-forest) to the port results in an index point value of the 
same log of 220 points. Similarly, the sawn logs (with an index of 163) result 
in a fob price of sawn-wood with an index of 285, of veneer sheets of 310 and 
of plywood of 390. 
 
Figure 10: Intra-chain value-added distributions 
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Source: Terheggen (2011) 
 
To some extent, the slow progress in meeting the Forestry Code objectives is 
a function of processing inefficiency. Exported as logs, Gabonese producers 
are able to command the highest share of resource rents, since Gabon is a 
privileged supplier of many tropical species, particularly Okoumé6, which is 
prized because of the ease with which the bark can be peeled. However, to 
the extent that processing is inefficient by global standards, some of these 
resource rents are dissipated. Processing may increase domestic value 
added, but will lead to lower levels of profits. And insofar as these profits are 
invested productively and the returns to this investment stay in Gabon, it may 
be that the social interest is best met without the beneficiation of Gabon‟s 
timber wealth.  
 
It is difficult to compute these variables, in part because of problems with 
research access, and in part because most logging companies produce 
different types of wood, and have a different product mix in the share of log 
exports, sawn-wood, veneer and plywood. The simulation in Table 13 shows 
what the levels of surplus would be if production was entirely concentrated in 
any one of these four product families. Whilst this is a highly artificial 
simulation, since the only accord with reality are the firms exporting raw logs 
                                            
6
 Okoumé grows in 70-80% of Gabon's forest and in much smaller volumes in neighbouring 
countries. There are no perfect substitutes although Meranti (an Asian species) is a second-
best option. 
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alone, it suggests that inefficient timber processing in Gabon does lead to an 
erosion of resource rents.  
 
Table 14 simulates output value and factor utilisation if the same quantity of 
wood is exported exclusively in the form of logs, sawn-wood, veneer sheets or 
plywood. The simulations also calculate the resultant earnings of foreign 
exchange, employment figures and investment requirements, taking into 
account processing conversion rates of logs. It shows that foreign exchange 
earnings are highest if the timber is exported as logs, and lowest if exported 
as sawn-wood. There would be a significant gain in employment if the logs 
were processed domestically, but since the production of veneer sheets and 
plywood are both relatively capital intensive, this employment gain would 
come at a considerable capital cost. 
 
Table 13: Outcome of simulation – fixed quantity of log inputs (3.43m cubic 
metres round-wood) 
Item Unit Log Sawn-wood Veneer Plywood 
RWE Input 
a
 CUM 3,430,000 3,430,000 3,430,000 3,430,000 
Real Output 
b
 CUM 3,430,000 1,370,000 1,750,000 1,490,000 
Foreign exchange 
c
 USD m 1,050 750 1,170 1,190 
Employment 
d
 number 7,400 21,000 22,500 47,100 
Capital 
e
 USD k 39,900 74,800 428,700 730,400 
Capital productivity  146.4 31.2 6.9 3.5 
Labour productivity  465.1 65.4 77.8 31.7 
Capital intensity   5.4 3.6 19.1 15.5 
Source: Terheggen (2011) 
Notes: a RWE = roundwood equivalent 
 b Converted using average rates of conversion for Gabon based on interview data, when 
necessary adjusted for species mix and final destination, at fixed RWE input levels 
 c Prices weighted for species mix and averaged over the period 2003 until 2007; extracted 
from Commodity Price Statistics (www.unctad.org) accessed November 2009 and July 
2010 
 d Based on 2004-2006 sectoral employment averages extracted from Nguema (2007) and 
production data retrieved from ForesSTAT (http://faostat.fao.org) accessed November 
and December 2009; corrected for domestic skill deficiencies (20% reduction of simulated 
employment figures) 
 e Based on 2003 capital depreciation costs across sectors as stated in Odysée 
Développement (2005),converted into USD using the average 2003 exchange rate 
(http://data.un.org) 
 
It is dangerous to base this assessment on static comparative advantage, and 
a further simulation was thus conducted based on the assumptions that 
processing rates reach global standards, that skilled labour is available in 
Gabon hence suspending the 'skill deficiency' variable applied in the first 
simulation, and that capital costs decrease by 20 percent. In this case, there 
are still seeming costs to forward linkages and there is little difference in the 
foreign exchange earned from the various products, and the capital costs of 
employment creation are diminished. 
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Table 14: Outcome of simulation – fixed quantity of log inputs (3.43m cubic 
metres round-wood), adjusted output, employment and capital variables 
Item Unit Log Sawn-wood Veneer Plywood 
RWE Input 
a
 CUM 3,430,000 3,430,000 3,430,000 3,430,000 
Real Output 
b
 CUM 3,430,000 1,910,000 1,810,000 1,630,000 
Foreign 
exchange 
c
 USD m 1,050 1,030 1,210 1,300 
Employment 
d
 Number 9,200 33,000 28,700 62,200 
Capital 
e
 USD k 31,900 70,700 352,900 615,800 
Capital 
productivity  162.6 40.8 7.7 4.0 
Labour 
productivity  372.1 58.0 62.9 26.1 
Capital intensity   3.9 2.4 13.8 11.1 
Source: Terheggen (2011) 
Notes: a RWE = round wood equivalent 
 b Converted using global average rates of conversion, when necessary adjusted 
for species mix and final destination, at fixed RWE input levels 
 c Prices weighted for species mix and averaged over the period 2003 until 2007; 
extracted from Commodity Price Statistics (www.unctad.org) accessed 
November 2009 and July 2010 
 d Based on 2004-2006 sectoral employment averages extracted from Nguema 
(2007) and production data retrieved from ForesSTAT (http://faostat.fao.org) 
accessed November and December 2009; numbers not corrected for skill 
deficiencies 
 e Based on 80% of the 2003 capital depreciation costs across chains as stated in 
Odysée Développement (2005),converted into USD using the average 2003 
exchange rate (http://data.un.org) 
 
These simulations are, as observed, artificial. But they are helpful in 
highlighting four important characteristics of forward linkages, both in Gabon‟s 
timber industry and in other sectors and in other countries. First, if 
beneficiation is inefficient by global standards, there can be high costs to any 
resulting employment creation. Second, these costs can diminish over time if 
there is progress in domestic processing efficiency. However, this progress 
has to be assessed relative to the moving global frontier, rather than to 
historic levels of inefficiency. Improvements in absolute factor productivity 
may be more than outweighed by a faster rate of technological progress in 
competing countries. Third, the high cost of log processing in Gabon is not 
just a function of processing efficiency in the downstream industry itself. It 
also reflects a general systemic inefficiency, for example in the poor quality 
and high cost of infrastructure. And, finally, the logic of foregoing beneficiation 
in order to maximise profitability and future investment only makes sense if 
this surplus is used productively and is not wasted in other inefficient ventures 
or repatriated abroad. In the Gabonese context none of these assumptions 
can be made with confidence, and hence despite the Forestry Code 
promoting inefficient production, attempts to force the pace of deepening 
forward linkages may despite the erosion of potential resource rents may the 
least worst policy alternative given the prevalence of corruption in Gabon. 
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2.4 Backward linkages into the gold sector in Ghana 
Gold has been produced for over 1,000 years in the territory of the Ancient 
Kingdom of Ghana, the Gold Coast Colony and post-independence Ghana. 
After South Africa, Ghana is the second-ranked African gold producer. Large-
scale industrial gold mining in Ghana dates back to the last quarter of the 19th 
century. After a period of decline under government control in the nationalist 
era in the 20 years from the early 1960s, the industry was restructured and 
modernised under the post-1983 Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), 
which prominently featured a revised mining code, the Minerals and Mining 
Law (PNDCL 153) of 1986.  
 
Since the mid-1980s, gold mining has seen sustained increases in foreign 
investment, output, and export volumes. Between 1980 and 2000, production 
increased by 700 percent. In 1999 gold comprised 97 percent of mineral 
exports, and became the country‟s leading contributor to overall exports. After 
a brief interruption during a period of gold price weakness at the turn of the 
century, production expansion resumed. Facilitated by a further revised 
mining code that was consolidated in the Minerals and Mining Act 703, 2006, 
$3bn was invested in the industry 2006 and 2009. In 2009, gold exports 
exceeded $1bn, and accounted for 43 percent of Ghana‟s exports (Table 15). 
Mining‟s contribution to Gross Domestic Product, of which gold still represents 
some 95 percent, was 5.8 percent in 2009, up only a percentage point from 
1990, but still higher than Ghana‟s other main export commodities, cocoa (3.9 
percent) and forestry (3.2 percent). Total employment in the large scale 
mining sector fluctuated, falling from a peak of nearly 20,000 in 1995 to 
17,332 in 2009. This fall reflected a period of sustained productivity-enhancing 
investment. Given the rapidly escalating price of gold in the context of the 
post-2002 commodity boom and global economic uncertainties, investment in 
the mining sector has grown significantly in recent years, and looks likely to 
continue growing in the future. 
Table 15: Ghana Gold Mining - 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2009 
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Production oz 541,147  1,715,867  2,457,152  2,138,944  3,119,823 
Contribution to 
GDP (%) 
4.8 5.6 5.6 5.0 5.8 
Export Value $304m $647m $702m $946m  
Share total exports 
(%) 
19 44 36 34 43 
Employment Total N.A. 19,557 15,120 13,766 17,332 
Mining Leases 
Granted 
3 4 2 2 6 
Prospecting 
Licenses Granted 
37 23 4 22 72 
Reconnaissance  
Licenses Granted 
1 42 1 31 21 
Small-Scale Gold 
Licences Granted 
0 0 9 21 66 
Source: Ghana Minerals Commission 
 
By 2009, Ghana had become the world‟s ninth largest producer of gold, 
accounting for 3.8 percent of global production, up from 2.6 percent five years 
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earlier. The Birimian and Tarkwaian gold belts (known as greenstone belts) 
which characterise the western half of Ghana and which host gold 
mineralisation that contains both hard rock and placer (alluvial) gold deposits 
continue northwards and westwards into the broader region. Ghana is thus 
simultaneously at the forefront of an expanding West African industry, as 
production increased significantly in the neighbouring countries of Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mauritania and Cote d‟Ivoire.   
 
Ghana has eight large mines, all of which are owned and managed by five 
international producers. It also possesses a small number of far smaller 
producers; and a significant contribution of registered semi-formal, small-scale 
producers which generate around 10 percent of national output (triple the 
level of 20 years ago). In addition there is substantial, albeit unmeasured 
production from the unregistered, informal and technically illegal small-scale 
artisanal miners known as galamsey, whose activities spread through gold 
mining areas and which employ in an estimated range of 50,000 to 200,000 
people. 
 
The Minerals and Mining Law of 1986 is the core legislation which frames the 
operations of the industry. A key component of the ERP, it constituted the 
first-ever Ghanaian legislation that was specific to mining. This law was 
amended with the Minerals and Mining Amendment Act of 1994 (Act 475) 
after the re-establishment of civilian democratic rule in 1992. Act 475 has 
subsequently been amended with the Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 (Act 
703). Act 703 is a comprehensive law that covers virtually all aspects of 
mining, namely, ownership of minerals and the cadastral system; mineral 
rights; royalties, rentals and fees; dispute resolution; reconnaissance licenses; 
prospecting licenses and; mining leases. Other areas include surrender, 
suspension and cancellation of mineral rights; surface rights and 
compensation; industrial minerals; small-scale mining; and administration and 
miscellaneous provisions.  
 
Act 703 seeks to promote a localisation policy and facilitate the local content 
of the industry to maximise the benefits of mining for the Ghanaian economy. 
In this regard, it provides for the following measures: 
 
 A 10 percent government stake in all large-scale gold mining 
companies without any financial contribution; 
 The reservation of  small-scale mining for Ghanaian citizens; 
 Gold mining companies are to give preference to “made in Ghana” 
products, to public corporations and service agencies located in the 
country, and to employment of Ghanaians; 
 Gold mining companies are required to submit detailed programmes for 
the recruitment and training of Ghanaian personnel; 
 Clause 50(3) of Act 703 specifically calls for eventual “localisation” of 
mining staff. It defines “localisation” to mean a training programme 
designed towards the eventual replacement of expatriate personnel by 
Ghanaian personnel  
 
  
31 
Besides restructuring the law governing the operations of the mining sector 
the Minerals and Mine Law of 1986 sought to strengthen mining support 
institutions under the Mining Support Program. The main aims of this 
programme were to develop the capacity of mining support institutions to 
enable them to promote investment in the sector and to develop mechanisms 
for enhance productivity and financial viability.   
 
As a consequence of the very long history of gold mining in Ghana, and 
particularly the demand arising from the rapid expansion of the industry after 
the mid-1980s, there has been a gradual development of a supplier industry. 
Ghana‟s leading Business Directory, the Surf Yellow Pages Ghana (2010 
edition), indicates a large population of companies involved in supporting the 
mining sector, the vast majority of which are concerned with gold mining. 
Some 300 companies are listed under the three categories of mining 
companies, mining equipment, and mining services. The first-tier suppliers 
include global mine construction companies such as Lycopodium, and a 
strong showing by a number of well-known, international OEM companies 
(Atlas Copco, Boart Longyear, Sandvik, Liebherr, Mantrac/Caterpillar), input 
suppliers (Carmeuse Lime Products, Castrol, Maxam, African Explosives) and 
agents and distributors (Barbex Technical Services, Riepco).  
 
Local firms feature more prominently amongst the smaller first tier- and 
second-tier suppliers. These are primarily in the metals and metalworking 
(Tema Steel), chemicals and plastics (Riepco, Interplast), civil engineering 
(Engineers and Planners), business services (KEK Insurance Brokers) and 
logistics (Allship Logistics) fields. While not presently members of the Ghana 
Chamber of Mines, a number of other locally-owned companies (such as 
Western Forgings, Tropical Cable and Conductor, and Wire Weaving 
Industries) also provide inputs to the mines. 
 
The major gold mines claim a large number of local suppliers. For example, 
Golden Star Resources lists several hundred suppliers, of which 60 are 
“active suppliers” (defined as 12 or more orders a year). Gold Fields, Anglo 
Gold Ashanti, Chirano, and Newmont list a total of 521 suppliers. These 
claims are supported by Chamber of Mines data on the distribution of mining 
revenues. This demonstrates a large aggregate spend by producing 
companies making up some 20 percent of revenues ($467m) on local 
purchases, to which a further 18 percent ($428m) on fuel and power must be 
added. Imported consumables comprise 16 percent of the total, and capital 
expenditure (largely in capacity expansion, the majority of which is imported 
plant and equipment), 29 percent (Table 16).  
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Table 16: Local Linkages in Ghanaian Gold Mining: Ghana Chamber of Mines 
producing members 2008:  Distribution of funds 
Classification Amount 
(million $) 
% 
Employees 175 8 
Capital Expenditure 669 29 
Direct payments to Govt. 146 6 
Mining Host Communities 12 1 
Local Purchases (excluding Fuel/Power) 467 20 
Local Purchases (Fuel/Power) 428 18 
Loans 52 2 
Imported Consumables?  376 16 
TOTAL 2,325 100 
Source: Ghana Chamber of Mines 
 
A striking feature of this supplier development, which supports the 
conclusions that this has been a largely market-driven process of outsourcing 
and specialization, is the geographical concentration of suppliers in mining 
supply industrial districts. Of the firms listed in the directory of suppliers, at 
least 80 percent, are located in Greater Accra, in Accra itself or in the 
adjacent port/industrial city of Tema. The only other metropolitan area with a 
substantial number of suppliers is Takoradi in the Western Region (Kumasi, 
the large metropolitan commercial and political capital of Ashanti Region, is 
seemingly under-represented as a locale for mining supply). 
 
The Chamber of Mines Supply Manager‟s Sub-Committee has identified 27 
product categories (Table 17), presented in the box below, which are either 
already being manufactured in Ghana, or should be assessed for “import 
substitution potential.” Annual spend on these Ghanaian-owned suppliers is 
estimated at $120m, and the aim is to increase this to $200m in the longer 
term. The Chamber is seeking to move from a sourcing policy based on 
percentage value of procurement spend to one based on targeting products 
(services are not included) which are being, or likely, can be made in Ghana.  
 
Table 17: Feasible products for future near-term backward linkages 
1 Activated Carbon 15 Conveyor Rollers, Idlers & Pulleys 
2 Yelomine Pipe 16 Steel Products, including fabrication 
3 Rock-bolts and Split-sets 17 Tyre-retreading 
4 Caustic Soda 18 Heavy Duty Electric Cables 
5 Explosives Manufacturing, 
including Ammonium Nitrate 
19 Metal or PVC Core Trays 
6 Ventilation Ducting 20 Chain Link Fencing, Wire Netting, Barbed Wire, 
Welded Mesh, Expanded Mesh, Concrete Mesh, 
Razor wire and Panel Mesh 
7 Ammonium Sulphate  21 Motor Re-winding 
8 Mill Liners 22 Plastic Sample Bags 
9 Grinding Media 23 Calico Bags 
10 General/Specialty Lubricants 24 Bullion Boxes 
11 HDPE & PVC Pipes 25 Reversed Engineered Specialty Products 
12 Overalls & Work Clothes 26 Cupels & Crucibles 
13 Cement and Cement products 27 Wood Products 
14 Quicklime and Hydrated Lime   
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A number of mines have introduced programmes designed to increase local 
content, particularly from communities based close to the mines. This includes 
the purchase of goods and services such as construction, maintenance, 
catering, landscaping, haulage, transportation and security. In 2002 the 
Ghana Minerals Commission mandated all mining companies to assist their 
host communities to develop local linkages.  
 
All large mining companies in Ghana have set up departments and units to 
deal with this. In some cases to demonstrate their commitment, foundations 
have been set up which tie mining production and revenue to funds for local 
community development. A case in point is Gold Field Ghana Limited‟s (GFG) 
Foundation which was established in 2004 to promote and fund community 
development projects within the Tarkwa and Damang catchment area of the 
company‟s operations under an initiative titled the Sustainable Community 
Empowerment and Economic Development (SEED) programme. The main 
objective of the GFG Foundation is to promote the development of the 
company‟s primary stakeholder communities. The Foundation‟s work is 
funded by a contribution of one US dollar for every ounce of gold sold by the 
company, as well as a deduction of 0.5 percent of pre-tax profits. Based on 
this funding contribution, increases in the price of gold and in company 
profitability imply that there will be growing funds for community development 
projects. In addition, other companies providing mining support services to 
Gold Fields Ghana are also encouraged to contribute, either in cash or kind, 
to the Foundation‟s activities. Table 18 shows the contributions made by the 
GFG Foundation to various sectors in its primary catchment area. 
Table 18: GFG Foundation: Percentage Expenditure on Sectors and Total 
Contribution (in US Dollars) on Community Development Projects, 2002-2009 
 
Sector 
Financial Year Total 
(%) 
Total 
($’000) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Education 57 8 57 35 31 25 36 25 31 2808 
Health 21 64 8 27 3 3 5 2 12 1060 
Water & 
Sanitation 
9 17 11 19 13 17 16 11 14 1315 
Agriculture - - 6 1 23 45 31 33 24 2213 
Others 13 11 18 18 30 10 12 29 19 1710 
Total ($’000) 474 721 362 915 1380 1391 1932 1931 100 9107 
Projects not funded by GFG Foundation  
 
1382 
Grand Total  10,489 
Source: Gold Fields 
 
Newmont has a Foundation for local development, funded by a contribution of 
one US dollar for every ounce of gold sold by the company as well as a 
deduction of one percent of pre-tax profits. Golden Star Mining Company has 
established the Golden Star Development Foundation (GSDF) to promote and 
fund development projects in its operational areas. Projects funded by GSDF 
in 2008 included the establishment of an educational scholarship scheme; 
provision of educational infrastructure (school building); health infrastructure 
(including medical supplies) and a community electrification project.   
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2.5 Backward linkages into the oil sector in Nigeria 
Nigeria has a well-established oil and gas extraction industry following the 
discovery of commercial quantities of oil in 1956. But it was not until the end 
of the Nigeria civil war (1970) that the oil industry began to play a prominent 
role in the economy. By 1982 the oil sector was providing more than 60 
percent of total government revenue, and although this share has fluctuated 
with volatile oil prices, it has consistently remained above 60 percent. The 
contribution of the oil industry to Nigerian GDP has been significant over the 
years, exceeding 20 percent since the early 1980s, and in some years 
accounting for more than one-third of GDP (Figure 11). The downturn in this 
share of GDP between 2004 and 2007 was interrupted by the increase in oil 
prices in 2009 and 2010 (although up-to-date GDP figures are not available). 
The likelihood that oil prices will remain high in the future ensures that the oil 
and gas sector will continue to play a dominant role in the economy. 
 
Figure 11: Shares of Oil in Total Revenue, GDP of Nigeria (1980-2008) 
 
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin (2009) 
 
In 2010, Nigeria was the 10th largest global oil producer, and until recently 
(when Algeria became the largest producer), the major oil-exporting economy 
in Africa. Reserves at the end of 2007 were 36.2 billion barrels, 2.9 percent of 
the global total. Nigeria's downstream oil industry is made up of four refineries 
with a capacity of 438,750 bbl/d. But a series of problems - fire, sabotage, 
poor management, poor maintenance and corruption - have meant that the 
refineries often operate at less than 40 percent of full capacity. This has 
meant that despite being a major exporter of crude oil, Nigeria is also a 
significant importer of petroleum. Policy attention is focussed on increasing 
this downstream processing capacity. 
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Despite this focus on forward linkages, there has been a long history of local 
content policy designed to deepen backward linkages. This started with the 
Petroleum Act of 1969 which contained a section on the protection for 
indigenous Nigerian firms and a section on human capacity development. The 
joint operating agreements (JOA) and the production sharing contract (PSC), 
between the Nigerian government and the foreign oil companies in 1991 and 
1993 included measures to promote local content by explicitly recognising that 
this might require the industry to pay more for local inputs than for imports. 
Policies introduced in 2005 moved beyond price-premia and involved the 
issuance of 23 directives by the Nigerian government mandating the use of 
selected local services and mandating the sourcing of low-tech on-shore 
supply of goods and services to indigenous firms.  
 
Partly as a natural working-out of market forces, and partly as a consequence 
of these local content policies, estimates of local content in the oil and gas 
industry has risen sharply, particularly over the past decade. Local content 
rose from 3-5 percent in the 1970s to 20 percent in 2004 (UNCTAD/CALAG, 
2006).  In 2005, the Nigerian Government set a local content target of 49 
percent for 2009 and 70 percent for 2010, but these targets were not met. In 
2009, local content had only reached a level of 39 percent. Despite this failure 
to meet the 2010 target, Nigeria has made significant progress. Nevertheless, 
Nigeria‟s level of local sourcing is much lower than countries such as Brazil, 
Malaysia, Venezuela and Norway, all of which achieve local content levels of 
between 45 and 75 percent (UNCTAD/CALAG, 2006). Local content levels 
are however much higher than in other SSA oil-exporting economies such as 
Angola – see Section 4.1 above. 
 
Nigerian policy has long recognised that local content – i.e. the percentage of 
spend procured domestically – is not the same as local value added (i.e., it is 
not just the breadth of local content which is important, but also its depth): 
 
 “the quantum of composite value added to, or created in the Nigerian 
economy through the utilization of Nigerian human and material 
resources and services in the exploration, development, exploitation, 
transportation, sale and processing of Nigerian crude oil and gas 
resources resulting in the development of indigenous capabilities, while 
encouraging foreign investment and participation, without 
compromising quality, health, safety and environmental standards‟‟ 
(NNPC, 2009) 
 
Most recently, the Nigerian Content Act (2010) seeks to speed up the 
indigenisation of the industry, privileging not just domestic supply, but 
domestic supply by Nigerian firms: 
 
“Nigerian independent operators shall be given first consideration in the 
award of oil blocks; oil field licenses, oil lifting licenses and in all 
projects for which contract is to be awarded in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. In the bidding for any license, permit or interest and before 
carrying out any project in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, an 
operator shall submit a Nigerian content [plan] to the board 
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demonstrating compliance with the Nigerians Content Act. Finally, the 
award of contract shall not solely be based on the principle of the lower 
bidder; where a Nigerian indigenous company has capacity to execute 
such job, the company shall not be disqualified exclusively on the basis 
that it is not the lowest financial bidder, provided the value does not 
exceed the lowest bid price by 10 percent”. 
 
The capacity to increase local content clearly follows from the quality of 
domestic capabilities. In 2003 a detailed study of the industry suggested that 
the gap between the needs of the oil and gas sector and local capabilities was 
smallest in seven sectors, namely in fabrication and construction; well 
construction and completion; modification, maintenance and operations; 
transportation; control systems and ICTs: design and engineering; and 
consultancy (Heum et al., 2003). 
 
In he light of this assessment, our study of backward linkages into the oil and 
gas industry focused on three of these sub-sectors - fabrication and 
construction; well construction and completion; and control systems and ICT. 
We chose these three sectors since they covered a range of competences 
and represented a discrete and researchable set of companies. We 
interviewed 15 of the 45 large foreign- and locally-owned producing firms, 
most of whom had Head Offices in Lagos, and 115 oil and gas industry 
suppliers clustered around the two oil cities of Port Harcourt and Warri 
(accounting for half of all known supplying firms in these regions). These cities 
were chosen since they were the major centres where oil prospecting, 
exploration, production and refining occur and local serving firms have 
concentrated. A multi-stage sampling technique was used in the case of oil 
firms‟ suppliers. In the first instance, the population was stratified into the two 
regions (Port Harcourt and Warri) and each of the cities was further stratified 
into wards. Using the raffle variant of simple random sampling, 50 percent of 
suppliers firms were selected in each ward.  
 
What is the evidence on local sourcing which emerges from this focus on the 
three sub-sectors feeding into the oil industry? Beginning with data derived 
from the oil sector companies, nine of the 12 interviewed firms estimated that 
they purchased more than half of all their goods and services from local 
suppliers (Table 19). This considerable commitment to local purchasing exists 
despite the fact that procurement decisions (including of consumables) are 
largely taken by the Head Office (which is generally outside of Nigeria),  
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Table 19: Share of inputs from local suppliers/outputs sold to local processors 
 Frequency Percentage 
Backward linkages: 
Goods:   Up to 50% 
               51%-75% 
               Above 75% 
 
Services: Up to 50% 
                51%-75% 
 
3 
5 
4 
 
3 
9 
 
25 
41.7 
33.3 
 
25 
75 
Forward linkages 
Up to 50% 
51%-75% 
Above 75% 
 
5 
4 
3 
 
41.7 
33.3 
25 
Locus of decision making 
Who is in charge of supply management? 
Local office 
Head office 
Does this include consumables? 
Yes 
   No 
 
 
0 
12 
 
10 
2 
 
 
0 
100 
 
83.3 
16.7 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
 
Despite this high level of local sourcing, much of this occurs on an arms-
length basis, suggesting that there is considerable leeway for the promotion of 
better links between the oil firms and their suppliers. Figure 12 shows the 
result of asking the same question of both the oil firms and their suppliers 
about the nature of their interchanges on a range of factors which are 
important in achieving systemic value chain efficiency. On a scale of 1 (“not at 
all”) to 3 (“constantly”) each of the parties were asked to score the quality and 
frequency of their contacts. It is clear that as a general rule, the oil firms tend 
to rate their linkage with their servicing firms higher than the suppliers for all of 
these modes of interaction. The gap in perceptions was greater with regard to 
payment negotiations and delivery reliability and delivery frequency. But it is 
interesting that with regard to quality – a critical success factor in the oil 
industry – there was a close alignment in the perceptions of the oil firms and 
their suppliers. 
 
Figure 12 Alignment of perceptions on the frequency and quality of 
interchanges between lead oil firms and first-tier suppliers 
 
1=No contact, 2=Occasional contact 3=continuous contact 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
  
38 
This misalignment in perceptions between the oil firms and their suppliers 
exists despite the fact that most of the large oil firms have active supplier 
development programmes (Table 20). It is clear, however, that the 
International Finance Corporation supplier development programme does not 
appear to be seen as useful by the oil companies. Further, although the oil 
companies believe that they have reasonably close relationships with their 
first-tier own suppliers, this does not extend down the supply chain. Only one 
of the 12 lead commodity producers said that it provided support to second-
tier suppliers.  
 
Table 20: Supply chain development programmes 
 % 
1. Provide assistance to suppliers in meeting up with standards 
Yes 
No 
 
75 
25 
2. Have a strategy for supply development for local business 
Yes  
No 
 
75 
25 
3.Participate in IFC suppliers development programme  
Yes 
No 
 
8.3 
91.7 
4.Keep relationship with firms that provide input to suppliers 
Yes 
No 
 
8.3 
91.7 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
 
The lack of contact between lead commodity producers and second and third 
tier suppliers raises the associated question on the depth of local content 
provision. In other words, are local sources merely a front for the importation 
of goods and services? Table 21 provides data on the local purchasing by 80 
first-tier suppliers to the oil industry in the three sub-sectors. They reported 
substantial levels of local content in their own purchases. Taken as a whole, 
55.1 percent of 80 first-tier supplying firms purchased more than half of their 
services from local second-tier suppliers. This level of local sourcing was 
highest in the fabrication and construction sub-sector and in the well-
construction and completion sub-sector. In these two sub-sectors 45.5 
percent and 41.1 percent respectively source more than 75 percent of their 
inputs locally. The significance of this data is that it suggests a considerable 
depth to backward linkages in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. That is, unlike 
the experience of “local supply” in many of SSA‟s commodity sectors, where 
“local” represents merely the localisation of the importation function, in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry a large measure of “local supply” does indeed 
reflect local value added. 
 
Table 21: Share of local content in purchases by first-tier suppliers to the oil 
and gas industry (%) 
Sector 0-25% 26-50% 51 -75% 76 -100%  
Control system & ICT 31.6 21.1 21.1 26.3 
Fabrication & construction 13.6 22.7 18.2 45.5 
Well construction & completion 20.6 20.6 17.6 41.1 
Others 40 40 20 - 
Total 22.5 22.5 18.8 36.3 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
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2.6 Backward linkages into mining equipment and services in 
South Africa 
The large scale exploitation of minerals in South Africa dates back more than 
150 years to the discovery of diamonds, and subsequently during the 1870s 
to the discovery and exploitation of deep deposits of gold ore. South Africa not 
only possesses the most developed mining and mining supply industry in 
SSA, but in some important respects also stands out as a world-leading 
producer, of individual minerals and in the contribution of mining to the 
economy as a whole. It also possesses extensive forward linkages from the 
commodities sectors, not just in the processing of many ores, but especially in 
the processing of soft industrial commodities. South Africa possesses a well-
developed industrial sector the origin of which rests in mineral extraction and 
the development of extensive linkages to this sector. South Africa thus 
provides a cogent challenge to one of the central tenets of the Resource 
Curse theory, that is, that resource-exploitation undermines industrial activity.  
 
In recent years, mining has seen a decline in its share of GDP (from 8.8 
percent in 2000 to 6.3 percent in 2010). Its share of exports (41 percent in 
2010) remained roughly stable over the decade, but fell and then rose in 
tandem with global commodity prices (Table 22).  
 
Table 22: Share of Mining and Quarrying in South Africa GDP and Exports, 
2000-2010 (%) 
Year Value Added In GDP Exports 
2000 8.8 39 
2001 8.5 39 
2002 8.3 37 
2003 8.4 33 
2004 8.1 32 
2005 7.8 32 
2006 7.3 33 
2007 6.9 32 
2008 6.3 33 
2009 6.1 39 
2010 6.3 41 
Source: Value Added GDP values from South Africa Statistical Yearbook (2011).  
Exports values from http://apps.thedti.gov.za/econdb/rapportt/rapstruc.html 
 
In the early years, economic policies with regard to mining had two main 
thrusts. The first was to provide a favourable environment for mining 
investors. This, in turn, entailed keeping costs down, notably the wage costs 
of African miners. At the same time, there was a second thrust that entailed a 
number of policies which sought to advance backward linkages. Prominent in 
the past were policies of tariff protection that provided support for domestic 
industry. 
 
Currently, a major thrust of government policy with respect to mineral 
products is to promote downstream beneficiation. Beneficiation features 
strongly in the National Industrial Policy Framework and in the Industrial 
Policy Action Plan (IPAP). The IPAP envisages minimum beneficiation levels 
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for ten “selected commodities.” These commodities are not specified, but 
presumably involve all of the major mineral products. Thus, the IPAP Key 
Action Programme 12.5.1, specifies  
 
Setting minimum beneficiation levels for key commodity chains. Nature 
of the intervention: The Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) to 
establish and define minimum levels of beneficiation for each of the 10 
selected commodities. This will lay the foundations to create specific 
value chains, including in 5 instances up to the fourth level of minerals 
value addition. 
 
Our natural comparative advantage in the underlying resource-based 
industries along with additional factor endowments (especially relatively 
inexpensive electricity costs) provides us with an opportunity to be 
competitive in downstream value addition.  The end-game is to acquire 
a competitive position as far down the value chain towards finished 
product production as is possible.  
 
However, this is not the only approach driving the development of industrial 
policy. The International Panel on Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative 
for South Africa (ASGISA) argued that  
 
..both theory and practice provide reasons to question the presumption 
that downstream processing is an appropriate development path. The 
skills and other inputs required to process raw material and market 
finished products could be very different from those required to mine or 
grow them….Moreover…as transportation costs have declined, and 
global markets have become more integrated, the advantage of 
proximity to raw material production has diminished. (Hausmann, 
Klinger and Lawrence, 2008:1) 
 
Leaving aside the current policy debate on whether to promote forward or 
backward linkages from the commodities sector in the future, past 
developments have meant that insofar as South Africa has a globally 
competitive industrial structure in the hard commodities sector, this is to be 
found in regard to backward linkages, particularly mining equipment and 
specialist services. This comparative advantage can be evidenced in a 
number of ways. 
 
The first is with regard to innovative capabilities in general, and patents in 
particular. The quantity and quality of South African mining and related 
technologies were assessed utilising 1976-2006 USPTO patent data from the 
United States Patent and Technology Office (USPTO).7 South Africa has a 
considerable number of patents. Mining related technology patents make up a 
much larger share of South Africa‟s total patenting activity than for other 
comparator countries which have significant mining industries and are 
considered to be at the technology frontier (Table 23).   
                                            
7
 The data and analysis on South African patents were provided by Professor Lee Bransetter 
to a World Bank Study entitled “Closing the Skills and Technology Gaps in South Africa.”  
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Table 23. All Patents and Mining Technology Patents at the USPTO 1976-2006; 
South Africa and Comparator Countries. 
 All Patents Mining Tech. 
Patents 
Share (%) 
South Africa 3151 142 4.51 
United States 1,587,915 7,882 0.5 
Australia 16,283 311 1.9 
Canada 65,580 853 1.3 
Global total/average 3,189,941 17,098 0.54 
Note: A patent belongs to the “Mining Related Technologies” cluster if it belongs to one of the 
following 3-digit USPC classes: 299 - Mining or In Situ Disintegration of Hard Material, 051 - 
Abrasive Tool Making Process, Material, and Composition, 023 - Chemistry: Physical 
Processes, 037 – Excavating, 075 - Specialized Metallurgical Processes, 172 - Earth Working 
Source: United States Patent Office database. 1976-2006. 
 
Patent quality can be assessed by examining the number of citations 
received. In aggregate, South African patents receive fewer citations than 
patents in the comparator countries. By contrast, South African mining and 
related patents receive more citations than patents of comparator countries. 
By this measure, the value of South African patents is higher than for 
comparator countries. Randomly matching each South African patent to a 
similar American, Canadian, or Australian patent gives somewhat weaker 
results. The average number of citations for a South African mining 
technology patent is likely to be less than that of a similar Canadian or US 
patents. However, a South African mining patent is more cited than that of a 
comparable Australian patent. 
 
A second indicator of the development of world class backward linkages from 
South Africa‟s hard commodities sector is the share of this sector in external 
trade. The level and particularly the growth of exports of mining equipment 
and specialist services is one clear manifestation of global competitiveness. 
This is particularly so in the light of the fact that these exports have not 
benefited from any specially designated state support. Exports can be divided 
into two broad categories. The first category is exports related to new projects 
– new mines or mineral processing activities. The second category is the 
after-market – to existing mines or mineral processing activities. The latter is 
much more critical, but the competitive edge to supply to the after-market is 
often secured through firms being engaged in projects from the outset.  
 
The determination of specifically mining exports is a complex issue. Since 
trade data is categorized by product rather than by customer, it is very difficult 
to determine precisely what is destined for mining as opposed to other 
markets. The South African Capital Equipment Council (SACEC) has 
assessed, (for South Africa) at an eight-digit HS level, which capital 
equipment products are destined for the mining sector. SACEC categorization 
has been used in the data below. Currently exports of mining capital 
equipment are running at approximately $4bn. Exports have been growing 
rapidly – in nominal terms quadrupling since 2000.8 Figure 13 shows both the 
absolute level of mining capital equipment exports and the share of these 
                                            
8
 Prior to 2000, there were a number of changes in the definition of products which make it 
difficult to construct a clear time series. 
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exports in total exports. This shows a rapid rise in exports between 2000 and 
2007 and a largely stable share of total exports. 
 
Figure 13: Mining capital equipment exports ($m) 
  
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE database accessed through WITS online 
<https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.aspx> (accessed February 2011) 
 
For all capital equipment, South African imports exceed exports by a large 
margin – in 2008 and 2009, imports were three times larger than exports. In 
respect of mining equipment, however South Africa is a net exporter. But this 
overall positive trade balance reflects a negative trade balance with the rest of 
the world, but a strong positive trade balance with Sub-Saharan Africa (Table 
24). The dense network of mining production and services companies results 
in a high local value added for this sector – estimated at approximately 90% 
(Kaplan 2011).  
 
Table 24: South Africa Mining Equipment Exports, Imports ($’000), 2005 -2009 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Trade with World 
Exports 3,292,256 4,721,750 6,200,709 6,742,700 4,130,184 
Imports 3,173,526 4,285,689 5,987,691 6,174,743 3,668,875 
Trade 
Balance 
   118,730     436,061     213,081     567,957    461,309 
Trade with SSA 
Exports 786,793 1,025,801 1,494, 146 1,935, 971 1,542,666 
Imports    10,972       13,423       15,317       24,485      32,232 
Share of 
Total 
Exports 
24% 22% 24% 29% 37% 
Source: Calculated from COMTRADE database accessed through WITS online 
<https://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/Restricted/Login.aspx> (accessed February 2011) 
 
Much of these exports result from the global expansion of South African 
mining houses which then utilise their existing supplier base in South Africa. 
African countries – notably in the Southern Africa region – are the major 
markets for South African exports of capital goods. Eight of the top ten 
destination countries are Africa and all except Nigeria are located in the sub-
region. Unfortunately, the services export data do not allow for mining 
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services to be isolated. But, net export earnings are likely to be substantial 
and significantly positive.  
 
Beyond this aggregate data, more specific enquiry supports the conclusions 
that the South African supplier industry has developed globally-competitive 
capabilities on the basis of its experience in serving the domestic mining 
industry. South Africa is a world leader in a host of mining equipment 
products. These include spirals for washing coal; pumping up water; 
hydropower; tracked mining; underground locomotives; ventilation; shaft 
sinking; turnkey new mine design and operation, and many others. The area 
where South African expertise is particularly advanced and is at the global 
frontier is in deep level mining and associated competencies. South Africa is 
much weaker in so-called “yellow metal” areas – such as mining vehicles – 
where scale economies are critical and where large TNCs dominate. There 
are also examples of horizontal linkages, where competences were built in 
other sectors and then applied to mining, for example, transport and haulage 
equipment where South Africa has leading global products (Morris et al, 
2011a). Similarly, as in the case of hydraulic equipment, there are also cases 
where the mining sector provided the initial source of demand and successful 
domestic firms then branched out to serve the needs of other sectors.   
 
Focusing on the depth and breadth of backward linkages in South Africa it is 
possible to draw six conclusions. First, South African mining activities have, 
from a very early stage, required the utilisation of advanced technologies and 
systems. This has in large part been a consequence of the geological 
specificity of mining deposits in South Africa, particularly the need to mine at 
great depths. Second, the local deployment of such technologies and systems 
combined with a particular structure of the South African mining industry and 
state directed policies, allowed for the early development of considerable local 
technological expertise. State policies have been critical in the past. 
Government provided not only tariff support but also financial and 
technological support to local industry. Linkages with the National System of 
Innovation have been important for the mining sector and also for local 
industry. Third, the technological content of mining and mining related 
activities everywhere has increased significantly over the last two decades as 
a result of a number of factors – including increased globalisation, market 
segmentation and the changing role of TNCs and the engagement of generic 
technologies, particularly IT. Fourth, the significantly enhanced technological 
content of mining related activities coincided with two critical changes in South 
Africa: the decline of mining output for some minerals, notably gold, and the 
end of apartheid in 1994. As a result, South African mining firms have 
engaged in substantial expansion abroad. This, in turn, has created significant 
opportunities for exports of mining related equipment and services. Fifth, 
South Africa has a significant cluster of firms in mining equipment and related 
services which are at the global technological frontier. This is evident in 
respect of exports, intellectual property and leading products and companies. 
Indeed, this cluster is the only significant area of industrial activity where 
South Africa is located at the global technological frontier. Sixth, South 
Africa‟s competitive position is being undermined – both at the “lower” 
  
44 
manufacturing end and the “higher” end of R&D and new product 
development. 
 
2.7 Backward linkages into the gold sector in Tanzania 
Historically gold production has been dominated by a few large producers. For 
many years, South Africa accounted for more than 60 percent of total global 
production. Recent decline in its production and the rise in production in other 
countries have meant that in 2010, the world‟s largest gold producer was 
China, followed by the USA and then South Africa. Beyond a group of eight 
large gold producers (together accounting for almost one-half of the global 
total in 2010), are a clutch of around 90 smaller producers. Tanzania, with 
production capacity of 50 tonnes in 2009 fits into the second tier of producing 
countries, along with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ghana 
Kazakhstan, Zimbabwe, Mali, Morocco, Mexico, Papua, and the Philippines  
 
Since Independence in 1961, Tanzania has had a stuttering growth 
experience. For much of the 1980s and 1990s, economic growth was slow. 
Average annual growth between 1988 and 1993 was 1.1 percent (less than 
the rate of population growth), which compared poorly with that for SSA as a 
whole (2.7 percent). However, since the late 1990s, economic growth has 
revived. Between 2000 and 2010, the economy grew at an annual rate of 6.8 
percent, above the average for SSA as a whole (4.6 percent).  
 
One major factor underlying this revival in growth was the development and 
expansion of Tanzania‟s gold mining industry. Following the onset of 
production in 1998, there are now six active gold mines in Tanzania, and gold 
has emerged as the country‟s leading foreign exchange earner. Gold exports 
more than trebled between 2000 and 2010, exceeding $2bn in 2010 and 
accounting for more than 20 percent of total exports (Figure 14). However, the 
low-tax regime introduced to foster the gold industry meant that the 
contribution of the gold sector to total government revenue was only $46.5m 
in 2004-5 (the most recent year for which data is available), contributing only 
1.4 percent of total government revenue.  
 
Figure 14: Exports of gold and gold as share of total exports ($m and %) 
 
Source: World Economic Indicators and COMTRADE (2010) 
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Access to the country‟s mineral resources which is governed by the Mining 
Act of 1998, was in a process of revision in 20109. This 1998 legislation 
represented a radical departure from the 1979 Act which had previously 
restricted access to mineral deposits to the state. The new policy opened the 
mining sector to local and foreign private sector investors. It reserved two sets 
of activities for firms wholly-owned by Tanzanian citizens - Primary 
Prospecting Licences (PPL) and Primary Mining Licences (PML). However, 
these local firms may then sell these rights on to foreign firms at a later stage 
if they enter into joint ventures with local partners. Whilst licences for other 
activities which are issued to foreign firms require proof of both technical and 
financial capacity and capabilities, these requirements are not specified for 
wholly-locally owned firms. Section 10 of the 1998 Mining Act has provisions 
that allow the Minister of Minerals and Energy to negotiate and grant tax 
exemptions and environmental impact assessment exemptions with individual 
investors, without being restricted by other legal requirements. The Mining 
Development Agreements (MDA) is designed to provide large investors with 
the assurance of stability in long-term mining projects. A MDA is negotiated 
and granted in addition to other incentives provided to all investors, such as 
depreciation allowances of 100 per cent, repatriation of capital and profit 
directly related to mining, exemption of import duty and Value Added tax 
(VAT) on equipment and essential materials. 
 
 Government policy recognises the need to develop linkages into and out of 
the gold mining sector. However, other than the exclusive primary prospecting 
and mining rights granted to local citizens, there are no other elements of the 
legislation which target local content or which restrict the capacity of the 
mining firms to import their inputs.  
 
In examining the breadth and depth of backward linkages into the Tanzanian 
mining sector we interviewed a range of firms across the value chain, 
including seven representatives from the three large-scale mining firms, four 
exploration firms and 12 representatives from eight suppliers to the mines. As 
noted earlier, however, research access in general, and the ability to collect 
numerical data in particular was especially difficult in Tanzania, given the 
heated political debate accompanying the revision of the Mining Act in 2010 
when our research was conducted. 
 
The structure of the gold mining value chain in Tanzania is shown in Figure 
15. It consists of three primary sets of activities – exploration, the 
development and construction of the mine, and the operation of the mine. Our 
analysis of backward linkages focuses on linkages into the production and 
exploration sub-chains. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
9
 This research was carried out before the Tanzanian Parliament legislated a new Mineral Act 
in April 2010.  
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Figure 15: The Tanzanian gold mining value chain 
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Source: Mjimba (2011)  
 
Linkages to local provision of inputs into both these sub-chains are weak. In 
the exploration link of the chain, the three large-scale mining firms active in 
Tanzania have their own in-house greenfield exploration department. 
AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) has an exploration branch with head offices in 
Johannesburg, South Africa and its exploration team in Tanzania comprises 
both Tanzanian citizens and expatriate staff. A similar pattern exists for 
Resolute and Africa Barrick. Nevertheless, each of the large mining houses 
also out-sources part of their exploration activities (Table 25). Consequently 
there are a range of exploration firms operating locally. But with two 
exceptions, all of these are foreign-owned and draw their inputs from abroad 
(Table 26). 
 
Table 25: Outsourced and in-house activities in exploration sub- chain 
Service/Process In-house Outsourced 
Target generation Y N 
Area selection Y N 
Geophysical work  N Y 
Laboratory work N Y 
Quality assurance and quality control Y N 
Drawing up contracts Y N 
Reserve estimation Y N 
Logistics N Y 
Data capture and processing Y N 
Drilling  N Y 
Source: Mjimba (2011)  
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Table 26: Gold exploration firms active in Tanzania. 
Firm Head 
quarters 
Ownership 
structure (shares) 
Service scope Works location in 
Tanzania 
Canaco 
Resources 
Canada 0 100 Junior explorer Magambazi 
Zari 
Exploration 
Tanzania Majority Minority Junior explorer Imweru and Lupa 
Curries Rose 
Resources 
Canada 0 100 Junior gold 
explorer 
SusiRiver and 
Mabele Hills 
Shanta Gold Guernsey 0 100 Gold exploration 
and development 
Lupa gold field, 
Mgusu and Singida 
Kibo Mining 
plc 
Republic 
of Ireland 
0 100 Gold and Nickel 
deposit exploration 
and development 
Itetemia, Luhala and 
Morogoro 
Helio 
Resources 
Corporation 
Canada 0 100 Junior gold 
explorer 
Saza and 
Makongolisi 
Sub-
Saharan 
Resources 
N.L. 
Australia 0 100 Mineral 
exploration and 
development 
Nyanzaga 
Macquarie 
Harbour 
Mining 
Limited 
Australia 0 100 Mineral 
exploration  
Miyabi and Igurubi 
African 
Eagle 
Resources 
Corp 
United 
Kingdom 
0 100 Mineral 
exploration and 
development 
Miyabi 
Peak 
Resources 
Australia 0 100 Mineral 
exploration and 
development 
Imweru 
MDN 
Exploration 
Canada 0 100 Gold and base 
metal Exploration 
and development   
Ikungu, Isambara, 
Mnekezi, Vinyoza 
and Msasa projects 
Tan-Zoz 
Exploration 
Tanzania Majority Minority Junior explorer Not indicated 
Gold Finders Tanzania 100 0 Junior explorer Not indicated 
Tanzimex Tanzania 100 0 Junior explorer Kinyambwiga 
 
There are a limited number of local linkages from these first-tier exploration firms to second-tier suppliers. The 
linkages are limited to relatively simple geophysical and geochemical exploration works such as ground based 
magnetic surveys and exploration, drilling; and general services such exploration logistic services, 
Source: Mjimba (2011)  
 
The structure of suppliers providing geochemical services – that is the 
collection and analysis of rock samples – is somewhat different in that three 
sets of activities are also provided by state-owned Tanzanian firms (Table 27). 
These are the Geological Survey of Tanzania (GST) (which engages in 
geological mapping, surveys and analysis), and STAMICO and SEAMIC (both 
providing drilling services). These three locally owned providers have been 
operating for many years and reflect the pre-1997 environment in which the 
state had exclusive control over the gold mining industry.  
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Table 27: Exploration geochemical works goods/services providers in Tanzania 
Firm Head 
Office 
Service scope Ownership structure 
(shares) 
Local Foreign Public 
GST Tanzania Geological mapping, geophysical and 
geophysical surveys and analysis 
100 0 100 
STAMICO Tanzania Drilling (scope and range not 
ascertained), mineral exploration and 
property consultancy and Joint 
Venturing 
100 0 100 
SEAMIC Tanzania Geological mapping, geochemical and 
geophysical surveys and analysis 
100 0 100 
Tan Zoz Tanzania Drilling (scope not ascertained) Majority Minority 0 
Gold Finders Tanzania Stream sediment, soil and rock chip 
sampling 
100 0 0 
Capital 
Drilling 
Singapore Surface diamond core, high air 
capacity, reverse circular, grade 
control, heli-portable diamond, deep 
directional core orientation, air core, 
geotechnical, coal and coal-bed 
methane drilling services. 
0 100 0 
Layne 
Drilling 
Tanzania 
(formerly 
Stanley 
Mining 
Services)   
Australia Rotary air blast (RBA), kit bit, reverse 
circulation, diamond, directional and 
grade control drilling services. 
0 100 0 
Africa Mining 
Services 
(Owned by 
Ausdrill 
Australia Reverse circulation, surface diamond, 
directional, RBA and air core drilling 
services 
0 100 0 
Major Drilling Canada Surface and underground coring, 
directional, reverse circulation, 
geotechnical coal and coal-bed 
methane drilling services 
0 100 0 
ALX Chemex Australia Sample preparation and analysis 0 100 0 
SGS 
Laboratories 
Italy Sample preparation, analysis and 
turnkey surveys 
0 100 0 
Source: Mjimba (2011)  
 
Local content in the geochemical services link in the exploration sub-chain is 
very low and is largely limited to local labour inputs.  For example, all drilling 
equipment and components used in Tanzania are imported without any local 
value addition. The maintenance of the machinery is effectively a closed 
system with the drilling firms dealing directly with machinery and spare 
manufactures who service their global operations. Two such firms with 
worldwide operations supplying drilling machinery and spares are Atlas Copco 
and Sandvik Mining and Construction. Both have established subsidiaries in 
Tanzania to service equipment used in the large mines. Typically, they source 
specialised skills from their global labour force rather than from Tanzania. 
Local sourcing of manufactured inputs is only at an embryonic stage. For 
example, containers for rock samples (which have to be made of inert and 
durable materials) are imported from South Africa and Australia. In 2010, local 
suppliers began producing these containers in small volumes. 
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The exploration sub-chain also draws on geophysical services (Table 28). 
Here, too, foreign-owned firms dominate and almost exclusively draw their 
skills form their global labour pool rather than from Tanzania. There is, 
however, one locally-owned firm which participates in this sub-sector, 
providing ground-based magnetometer surveys.  
 
Table 28: Geophysical work service providers active in Tanzania 
Firm Head 
Office 
Service scope Ownership 
structure share 
Local Foreign 
Fugro Airborne 
Survey 
South 
Africa 
Airborne geophysical surveys 0 100 
Geophysics GPR Zimbabwe Ground based geophysical surveys 0 100 
Geoimage Australia Satellite imagery and geo-spatial 
solution provider (Quick bird images) 
0 100 
Jigsaw 
Geosciences  
Australia Geological mapping 0 100 
UTS Geophysics Australia Airborne magnetic surveys 0 100 
Gold Finders  Tanzania Ground magnetometer surveys 100 0 
Source: Mjimba (2011)  
 
A similar story of very limited local purchases emerges in the case of the 
production link in the gold value chain. The major local purchase is of liquid 
fuel required for the heavy drilling and earthmoving equipment used in gold 
mining. Liquid fuel is imported and reaches the mines at great cost due to the 
poor quality of infrastructure. A group procurement manager illustrating the 
point observed that; 
 
„If you think about your Caterpillar truck,… … your average fuel 
consumption [during typical mining operations] is about between 95 
litres to 100 litres per hour and you can work it out if you have 30 
trucks, 24 hours a day , 360 days a year.. …… that excludes the 
loaders.‟ (Interview, November 2009). 
 
The maintenance and repair of the heavy equipment which is utilised in the 
mine is generally outsourced, but to the global firms which supply this 
equipment for the global operations of the mining companies. Caterpillar 
operates as Mantrac with local branches in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Tanga 
and Moshi. The firm offers a range of comprehensive repair and maintenance 
contracts to the mining (and other) sectors. The Mwanza workshop services 
the country‟s gold mining sectors. Komatsu operates as Pan African Mining 
Services Tanzania Limited, with maintenance and repair contracts with 
individual mines. There were almost no changes in this sourcing structure 
between 2005 and 2009 for a range of goods reflecting varying degrees of 
technological content (Mjimba, 2011). These data are also interesting since 
they shows the heavy presence of South African and Australian suppliers. 
Both countries have developed mining industries and have, over the years, 
seen the emergence of significant backward linkages. 
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2.8 Linkages into the copper sector in Zambia 
Zambia has a long history of copper mining, dating back to the early twentieth 
century. Soon after independence in 1964, the copper mines were 
nationalised, and later consolidated into the Zambia Consolidated Copper 
Mines (ZCCM), majority-owned by Government (60 percent of equity), with a 
minority share owned by Anglo American Corporation (27.3 percent). Copper 
mining generated the bulk of government revenues in the early post-
independence period. From the mid-1970s, Zambia‟s copper mining sector 
came under mounting pressures from plummeting world prices and low levels 
of re-investment. Consequently, production levels fell sharply.  
 
The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) introduced in Zambia during 
the 1990s resulted in the gradual privatisation of the mines, a process all but 
completed by 2001. Policies towards the mines were subsumed under the 
general provision of the SAPs, and no specific mining vision was adopted, 
either during the SAPs or subsequently. Inter alia, as a consequence of the 
absence of a vision towards the mining sector, there are currently no 
provisions in any of the legislation which explicitly target backward linkages 
and local content. Only the bilateral Development Agreements with each 
mining company envisaged an effort from the mine to use local suppliers, but 
these were not legally binding commitments.  
 
In 2009, Zambia was the largest African and the 7th largest global copper 
producer, accounting for 3.3 percent of global output. Reserves are such that 
even without new discoveries, copper mining can continue at current rates for 
60 years. In 2000, Zambia‟s copper exports were valued at $474m, but a 
combination of increasing production and rising prices resulted in export 
receipts rising rapidly to almost $4bn in 2009. In recent years copper has 
accounted for between 74 and 83 percent of Zambia‟s total exports, and for 
9.1 percent of GDP in 2009.  However, as a consequence of the liberal fiscal 
regime accompanying privatisation, virtually none of the resource rents 
accruing from copper mining in Zambia have gone to the government. That is, 
whereas copper mining had contributed an average of 45 percent of 
government revenues between 1965 and 1975, it made virtually no direct 
contribution to government revenues during the post- 2002 price boom (Bova, 
2009). The low revenue stream was due to the very generous fiscal regime 
included in the bilateral development agreements. Moreover alleged  transfer 
pricing, whereby copper was sold by the mining companies to their 
subsidiaries at prices well below market prices, further lowered the corporate 
taxable basis. (Al Jazeera, 18 June 2011).  
 
There is considerable breadth to both forward and backward linkages in 
Zambia‟s copper value chain (Figure 16). Focusing on forward linkages, 
copper is mostly exported in refined form, representing a number of value 
added stages after mining (cathodes) (Figure 17). In recent years there has 
been substantial investment to increase productive capacity in downstream 
processing, including the construction of two new smelters (one of $310m by 
a Chinese firm, and a smaller investment by an Indian firm). In addition a 
Swiss-Canadian firm invested $190m to expand an existing smelter to 
850,000 tons per annum, making this the largest copper smelter in Africa and 
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the fifth-largest in the world. Further downstream processing into semi-
fabricates takes place, but this linkage is thin. Semi-fabricates represents the 
first stage of processing for refined copper, and feed into the construction and 
manufacturing sectors. Zambian exports of semi-fabricates include copper 
plates, sheets and strips, and copper wire, and export values increased 
substantially over the years, though official figures are inconsistent.10  
 
Figure 16: Copper Value Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
10
 COMTRADE, which sources data from the revenue and customs authority, records exports 
of engineering products totalling more than $1bn in 2008.  For the same year, Zambia 
Development Agency data record exports of only $210.5m, This latter (and lower) figure) is 
almost certainly more reliable as it is directly sourced from the company. 
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Figure 17: Composition of Zambia’s Copper Exports, 2000-2009 ($, ‘000) 
 
Notes: concentrates includes ores, concentrates, unrefined. Source: COMTRADE 
 
This downstream processing of copper ore is currently almost exclusively 
undertaken by one company, which is a subsidiary of a large American metal 
processing conglomerate. It is important to note that as a sectoral 
characteristic, competitiveness in semi-fabricates manufacturing is not 
typically determined by proximity to the mines, but by labour cost and access 
to infrastructure. Semi-fabricates manufacturing, therefore, faces the same, 
substantial challenges that the manufacturing sector suffers in Zambia in 
general.  However an on-going $800m investment by a Chinese firm in the 
Chambishi Multi-Facility Economic Zone will deepen forward linkages by 
building large-scale semi-fabricates manufacturing capacity. 
 
There have also been substantial backward linkages to the mining sector. 
From data supplied by the Kitwe Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the 
mining companies it is possible to estimate the total population of suppliers to 
be around 200 firms. (Of these, 50 were interviewed, in addition to eight of the 
14 large and small-scale mines). This estimate comprises established formal-
sector industrial suppliers. Before the late 2000s, there were also a number of 
informal traders, but many of these exited the industry (see below).  
 
The breadth of linkages from the mines, particularly the larger mines, is 
significant. Large mines procure between 60 percent and 86 percent of inputs 
from the local supply chain, whereas small mines procure between 35 percent 
and 80 percent (Table 29). This procurement reflects the purchase of goods 
and services required for the operation of the mines, rather than for their 
construction. The smaller mines are less mechanised and mainly consist of 
small, open-pit operations. Therefore their demand for specialised capital 
equipment such as hydraulic equipment, pumps and valves, is low but the 
degree of local sourcing figures is high because, rather than importing 
equipment and spares, small-scale mines often hire equipment from local 
firms.  
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Table 29: Local sourcing as % of total spending among selected mining 
companies 
 Share of local sourcing  
Large-scale mine A 82% 
Large-scale mine B 86% 
Medium-scale mine C 60% 
Small-scale mine D Equipment and spares: 
 10% purchased from local suppliers  
 90% directly imported  
Consumables: 
 60% purchased from local suppliers  
 40% directly imported 
Small-scale mine E Production costs are disaggregated as follows: 
 80% on equipment and consumables – purchased from 
local suppliers 
 10% food  
 10% labour  
Small-scale mine F Supply chain:  
 25% is directly imported (mainly spares) 
 75% purchased from local suppliers (but 70% are 
purchased from importers)  
Small-scale mine G Supply chain:  
 80% purchased from local suppliers 
 20% directly imported  
Source: Fessehaie (2011) 
 
The first-tier suppliers, who are mostly based in the Copperbelt, fall into three 
categories. The first are manufacturing firms producing a wide range of inputs, 
such as metallurgical, plastic and rubber products, engineering products, 
paints and foundries. In 2010, there were less than 40 of these firms 
operating. With the exception of one large steel foundry, they are relatively 
small-sized. The local value added content of these suppliers tended to be 
substantial, but most of the firms in this category are finding it increasingly 
difficult to compete with imports from South Africa and China. In 2010, for 
example, two engineering companies and two foundries were exiting or had 
just exited the mining supply chain.  
 
The second group are medium and large-scale services providers, 
predominantly subsidiaries of TNC OEMs, large distributors and 
representatives of specialised, capital-intensive firms (such as drilling 
companies and providers of specialised transport). Value added amongst this 
set of suppliers is significantly lower than among the manufacturing firms, but 
some of them operated in skills-intensive sectors, such as specialised 
engineering services. Approximately 150 firms operate in this category, and 
most are competitive and profitable enterprises, with their services being 
highly valued by the buyers.  
 
In addition to these formal-sector suppliers (approximately 40 local 
manufacturing firms and 150 TNC OEM subsidiaries) there is a third and more 
numerous category of very small scale suppliers, with very low levels of local 
content. Most of the few hundred firms in this category - characterised by low 
entry and exit barriers - are widely referred to as “briefcase businessmen” 
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because they operated „out of a briefcase‟. They engage in small scale 
importation of supplies, often securing contracts in an illicit manner and with 
no value added in after-sale services. After the 2008 copper price crisis, most 
of the copper mines restructured their supply chains, and eliminated these 
largely inefficient suppliers, drastically reducing their number. However, not all 
of these suppliers are informal and transient. Some agents and distributors 
provide stockholding and back-up services, often developing agreements with 
sole manufacturers abroad and slowly graduating into sole distributors. but as 
in the case of the “suitcase businessmen”, other than importation and 
stockholding, no value is added to the chain. 
 
Although the local acquisition of inputs represents a substantial spend by the 
mines. this needs some qualification. First, in some cases, the level of 
outsourcing is illusory, since as in the case of the “briefcase businessmen”, 
the suppliers are merely importing intermediaries. Second, the level of 
outsourcing has fallen in recent years, as mining firms have internalised 
activities which were previously bought-in. For example, one mine had 
outsourced the maintenance and operation of loaders, but weak local 
capabilities and the criticality of these operations led to the vertical re-
integration of this activity. Third, Chinese and Indian firms, who are the latest 
investors, have a shorter history of supply chain management and therefore 
tended to outsource a smaller proportion of their input needs. For example, 
the Chinese mining houses developed in-house engineering, electrical and 
mechanical services and built a foundry. Moreover, when one of the largest 
OEMs downsized its workforce due to the economic crisis, the Indian mine 
employed the skilled workforce and built in-house capabilities in its own mine.  
 
A key factor leading to the thinning out of the Zambian supply chain was the 
privatisation of the mines. This dramatically changed the rules of the game. 
The new mines previously owned by TNCs with long experience in mining, 
required efficient supply chains, operating at the technological frontier and 
within acceptable costs and lead times. They were not legally bound to 
maximise local outsourcing, and they operated in a period in which they had 
to undertake large expenditures to re-capitalise the mines, despite the fact 
that copper prices were low during this period. In these circumstances, buyers 
shifted from local suppliers to cheaper imports, especially from South Africa, 
but also from Europe, Canada and Australia. Within the supply chain, major 
changes took place. Local manufacturers had to compete with foreign 
investors locating production, or often only distribution facilities in Zambia, as 
well as with imports. Lacking, amongst other things the technological 
capabilities and economies of scale of competitors, and no longer protected 
by high import tariffs, they found it increasingly difficult to compete with the 
quality and prices of foreign suppliers. Consequently, in the early 2000s, 
manufacturers were exiting the mining supply chain, replaced by services 
providers, both Zambian and foreign-owned. Only a fraction of the latter 
engaged in value-added services. Moreover, and as part of a global trend, 
many first-tier OEM suppliers established a direct presence in the Copperbelt, 
in order to tighten control over the quality of the goods and services provided 
to the mines, and to increase revenues streams from highly-profitable after-
sale services (Table 30). 
  
55 
Table 30: Key participants in the copper mining supply chain 
During nationalisation Post-privatisation 
Large number of state-owned and privately-
owned manufacturers (providing specialised 
mining components, spares and 
consumables 
Importers. A large number of briefcase 
businessmen (now disappearing),agents and 
distributors. of components, spares and 
consumables) 
Independent agents and distributors of 
capital equipment (some locally owned) 
OEMs subsidiaries (only distribution and 
after-sale services) 
Specialised services providers  Specialised services providers  
Some OEMs with manufacturing capabilities, 
for capital equipment  
Privately-owned manufacturers, mostly 
Zambian-owned (providing consumables and 
protective equipment) 
Note: In term of the category of firms dominating the supply chain (in numbers)  
Source: Fessehaie (2011) 
 
The diminishing capability of local suppliers in the context of the rising 
technological complexity of mining is reflected in the judgements of two sets 
of buyers – the “Northern/traditional” investors (including South African 
buyers) and the new emerging country investors from China and India. These 
different groups of buyers rate the capabilities of local suppliers differentially 
(Figure 18). The “Northern” buyers have over the years established 
relationships with their supply chains which have led them to identify, and 
work with a relatively stable set of suppliers. By contrast the newer entrants 
tended to have more arms-length relationships with their suppliers and to 
have less confidence in their capabilities. The Chinese, and particularly the 
Indian, mines tended to place more emphasis on price in their negotiations 
with suppliers. It is notable, and this reflects international experience in 
environments of immature supply chains, that the suppliers had a much 
higher confidence in their capabilities than did the buyers. 
 
Figure 18: Comparative rating of supplier capabilities by traditional buyers, 
Chinese and Indian buyers and by the supply chain itself. 
 
1=poor performance, 10=highest level performance  
Source: Fessehaie (2011) 
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3. DRIVERS OF LINKAGES 
 
One of the central contentions of our earlier conceptual analysis (MMCP DP 
12) was that the prevailing view that there were few linkages from the 
commodities sector was inaccurate. We also postulated that there would be a 
trajectory of increasing linkages as a consequence of market forces as lead 
commodity firms outsourced non-core activities. Moreover, we hypothesised 
that the breadth and depth of linkages and the speed of linkage growth would 
be a function of the sector, the capabilities in the economy, scale, and the 
passage of time. The small sample of sector and country studies and the 
limited availability of data means that these contentions cannot be verified 
statistically. Instead the analysis employed here is largely qualitative in nature, 
and therefore the assessment on the extent of linkages and their trajectory, 
the impact of specific drivers of linkages and the interaction between these 
drivers will inevitably be a question of judgement. This qualitative assessment 
of the depth, breadth and trajectory of linkages in the eight country studies is 
presented in Table 31.  
 
A range of experiences can be identified from our case-studies. Beginning 
with the breadth and depth of linkages, at the one extreme lie Angola, 
Botswana and Tanzania. In each of these countries linkages are very thin, 
although there seems to be a more positive trajectory in Angola and 
Botswana than in Tanzania. At the other extreme is South Africa, where there 
is a very broad spectrum of linkages, with considerable depth, in some cases 
of a globally-leading character. There are also, less substantial, but well 
developed linkages in Zambia, Nigeria and Gabon.  
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Table 31: Summary of findings on the breadth, depth and trajectory in linkages from commodities to other sectors in eight SSA 
economies. 
Country Sector Linkage type Establishment 
Period of the 
Commodity  
Sector 
Breadth of 
linkage 
Depth of 
linkage 
Horizontal 
linkages 
Trajectory of 
linkages 
Angola Offshore-oil Backward Mid 1990s Thin Thin (labour 
only) 
None Increasing depth 
Botswana Diamonds Forward 1960s Thin Thin (labour only None Increasing depth 
Gabon Timber Forward Early 1960s Thick Transformation 
of commodities 
None Resistance to 
shallowing 
Ghana Gold Backward late 19
th
 Century Beyond thin Some 
transformation 
and knowledge 
intensive 
services 
Not known, but 
probable 
Increasing 
breadth and 
depth 
Nigeria Oil Backward 1950s Approaching 
thick 
Knowledge 
intensive 
services 
Not known, but 
probable 
Increasing 
breadth and 
depth 
South Africa Mining capital 
equipment and 
specialist 
services  
Backward 1880s Thick Transformation 
of commodities 
and knowledge 
intensive 
services 
Substantial Shallowing 
Tanzania Gold Backward 1998 Thin Thin Unlikely Static 
Zambia Copper Backward Early 20
th
 
Century 
Approaching 
thick, but 
diminishing 
Approaching 
thick, but 
diminishing 
 Shallowing 
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It is notable that linkages were often limited, and the extent of the depth was 
thinner than the breadth of linkages. In Angola, Botswana and Tanzania, the 
only effective addition to value was the labour content, although in two of 
these countries (Angola and Botswana) there was an increasing depth to 
these skills. In South Africa and Nigeria there is also evidence of horizontal 
linkages, that is, competencies developed in meeting the needs of the 
resource sector are also applied to meet the needs of other sectors. 
 
As will be shown in Section 4 below, there are a variety of factors which 
explain these linkages, but the duration of commodity exploitation emerges 
strongly as an explanatory factor in this summary table. South Africa, where 
large-scale mineral exploitation stretches back for more than a century is a 
clear indicator of this at one extreme. The depth and breadth of linkages in 
Zambia and Nigeria (particularly when contrasted with the pattern of linkages 
in the same sector in Angola) also shows a positive association with time, as 
does the pattern of linkage in the gold sectors of Ghana and Tanzania. 
Gabon, too, reflects the deepening of linkages over time. On the other hand, 
despite the diamond industry having a fifty year history in Botswana, linkages 
only really began to develop after 2005.  
 
One of the contentions emerging from the review of the linkage literature was 
that backward linkages hold more potential than forward linkages, particularly 
in the hard and energy commodities sectors. However, the small sample of 
studies does not make it possible to draw a robust conclusion on this issue.   
 
Finally, the trajectory of linkages was not always positive. In some countries –
Angola, Botswana, Ghana and Nigeria - there are signs of linkage growth. By 
contrast, in other countries the degree of linkages is static. This is the case for 
Tanzania as well as in Gabon where the tendency for linkages to become 
shallower has only been arrested due to government fiats limiting the export 
of logs. In the two most advanced cases of linkages – South Africa and 
Zambia – there is evidence of a shallowing of linkages. 
 
In analysing the determinants of this linkage development, we seek to go 
beyond the observation that, as a broad general rule, the breadth and depth 
of linkages will be a function of time. Other factors will affect the extent of 
input provision and use of outputs, the value added during the course of these 
linkages and the direction and pace of linkage development. Four primary 
explanatory factors emerge from our detailed sectoral enquiry, namely 
 
1) The nature of ownership of lead-commodity firms, and their 
suppliers and customers 
2) The nature and quality of infrastructure 
3) Capabilities, skills and the National System of Innovation 
4) Policy development, management and implementation  
 
In addition to these four core determinants of linkages we also explored the 
impact of proximity to a regional hub as a facilitator or blocker of linkage 
development. However, outside of a few isolated cases, this did not surface 
as a significant influence on the breadth and depth of linkages. 
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3.1 The nature of ownership of lead commodity producers, 
and their suppliers and user customers 
The firm is a heterogeneous entity, and although each firm is individual with 
particular competences and business strategies, there are important structural 
features which influence the behaviour of firms in general, and with regard to 
linkage development in particular. In our research we hypothesised that a key 
differentiating factor in firm behaviour was ownership. In pursuing this issue, 
we distinguish between three different ownership attributes. The first of these 
is whether the firm is locally incorporated or of foreign origin. The widely held 
view is that locally-owned firms are more deeply embedded in the local 
economy, have greater familiarity with local suppliers and customers, know 
their way around the institutional infrastructure and, crucially, that they are 
more committed to local development than footloose, foreign-owned firms. 
Each of these characteristics has a potential effect on linkages, with the likely 
outcome that locally-incorporated firms are more prone to participate in 
linkage-intensive chains.  
 
Second, a subsidiary component of the nationality of ownership is that as a 
reflection of their particular country of origin, foreign-owned firms may behave 
differently with regard to linkages. For example, the nature of equity markets 
in the home countries may predispose firms to operate with particular time 
horizons and attitudes to risk. Thus, it is argued that Chinese firms, with 
greater access to patient capital, with higher internal savings rates and being 
“guided” by the central and provincial governments, are more likely to be 
involved in the slow process of supplier development than are their northern 
competitors (Farooki and Kaplinsky, 2011). They are also likely to be backed, 
at least in the African case, by support from the Chinese government which is 
engaged in the construction of industrial processing zones in a number of 
African countries11.  
 
Third, and beyond the nationality of ownership are a series of firm-specific 
attributes. The importance of this factor was prefigured by theories of 
imperfect competition in the 1930s (Chamberlin, 1933) and developed further 
by Hymer (1976). Subsequently Dunning built on these firm-specific attributes 
in his widely-used eclectic framework for explaining foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Dunning (2000) argued that whilst FDI was a reflection of country-
specific factors (reflecting particular endowments) and the decision by the firm 
on which competences to internalise, it also reflected the specific attributes of 
individual firms. (Dunning‟s eclectic theory is widely referred to as the OLI 
framework – Ownership, Location and Internalisation as determinants of FDI). 
Thus, individual firms act in very different ways even though they operate in 
the same industry and same environment. This individual behaviour will reflect 
a number of conditioning factors, including their pioneering or follower 
character in the industry, their particular bundle of competences and the 
strategic visions of their leadership. 
                                            
11
China‟s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is supporting the development of six (possibly 
seven) economic and trade cooperation zones in Zambia, Egypt, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Mauritius, Uganda and Ethiopia. 
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The relative importance on linkage development of these three ownership 
factors – foreign/national, origin of home country and firm-specific attributes – 
will vary as to how they impact four different actors in the chain. The first of 
these are their influence on buyers in the chain. There is considerable 
evidence that buyers play a crucial role in the extent and nature of 
outsourcing in global value chains (Gereffi, 1994; Kaplinsky and Morris, 
2001). The second concerns the ownership character of the lead commodity 
producing firms, the companies which mine minerals, extract oil and grow the 
major soft industrial commodities. The third reflects the influence of ownership 
on suppliers to lead-commodity firms, and the fourth is the influence of 
ownership on the users of commodities.  
 
The various country and sectoral studies we have undertaken evidence the 
relevance of these factors in different ways. The evidence is partial (for 
reasons discussed above) and the interaction between these factors varies 
across sectors and countries. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw on various 
studies to illustrate the influence of ownership of linkage development. 
 
Foreign ownership of lead commodity firms as a determinant of linkages  
With the exception of South Africa, in none of the other seven economies 
under investigation were there locally-owned lead commodity firms with 
international operations. This has an important bearing on linkages, since 
firms operating in a global environment have invariably learned to introduce 
structured programmes of supply chain development as part of their 
purchasing function.  TNC lead commodity producers in Zambia, Ghana and 
Nigeria all reported that they had supply chain development programmes in 
keeping with their global practice.  
 
However, two factors undermine this policy commitment by TNCs to supply 
chain development. The first is that as a consequence of lead commodity 
producers committing themselves globally to long-term trust-intensive 
relationships with their suppliers, they have adopted a global-sourcing-
follower-supply policy (Barnes, Kaplinsky and Morris, 2004). This requires 
first-tier suppliers (and often, as first-tier suppliers replicate this commitment, 
to second-tier suppliers as well) to locate their operations in close proximity to 
the lead-purchaser in all its global operations. This motivates local supply, but 
not by local firms. And, second, firms with global operations tend to recruit 
purchasing managers from abroad. Particularly when these managers are 
working in remote and hostile environments, they have little feel for local 
conditions. Typically they will work on an eight-week-on-two-week-off rota. 
The first week of this involves settling down, and the last week preparing for 
their return home, leaving only a narrow window in which they can develop 
relations with local suppliers. Moreover, a consequence of the large groupings 
of expatriates living together in remote sites where they have little or no 
knowledge of the local economy, there is a sense of segregation. This often 
leads to an antipathy towards anything local, which translates into scepticism 
about the abilities of local employees and potential suppliers. Further, many 
purchasing officers are monitored by their ability to deliver within budget and 
within agreed time scales. Moving to new suppliers is a move into the 
unknown and there are potentially negative effects on performance.  
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An example drawn from the Tanzanian gold mining sector exemplifies these 
problems. The TNC has declared a strong global commitment to local 
sourcing and an equally strong commitment to this in their Tanzanian 
operations. However, the reality is often rather different, due to the “sociology 
of purchasing” rather than to duplicitous statements by senior management. 
Local suppliers find that the purchasing systems which are used and 
mandated by Head Office are too cumbersome. There is a great deal of 
paperwork, and the timescales allocated to supply once a Purchase Order 
has been issued are unrealistic. Typically, payment of invoices takes over 60 
days, which is often too large a financial exposure for local suppliers to cope 
with, particularly when they are small scale firms and inflation is high. 
Moreover, many potential suppliers reported that they had experienced 
corrupt practices in the purchasing department of this mine (which, in 2011 
had to close for some months due to its own staff stealing its fuel supplies!). 
 
By contrast, the TNC oil companies in Nigeria have been operating for some 
time, and have been subject to intense and prolonged criticism in their home 
countries on the lack of spill-over in their Nigerian operations. As part of their 
response to these criticisms, they have introduced structured supply chain 
development programmes. As was shown in the discussion of the depth and 
breadth of linkages above, this has resulted in frequent and often close 
contact with suppliers, and rapidly deepening local content. It is notable that in 
both of these cases, the nature and extent of linkages are a direct function of 
the foreign ownership of these lead commodity producers. 
 
Reflecting the political pressures which have built up to promote linkages, - 
both in the host and home countries - many of the lead mining companies 
have instituted local procurement as part of their Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) programmes. In 2002 the Ghana Mining Council 
mandated all mining companies to adopt CSR programmes to assist their host 
communities (Tememg and Abew 2009).The resulting CSR initiatives have 
not only improved mining company-host community relationships, but more 
importantly, have provided critically needed social and physical infrastructure 
which otherwise lay within the mandate of local and central (state) 
governments. CSR programmes promoting local supply have also been 
introduced by mining companies in Tanzania, and it is CSR rather than 
efficient mine operations which seems to be driving what limited local sourcing 
exists, particularly that involving near-sourcing. 
 
In Angola, it is the national ownership of the lead oil extracting firm which 
explains the growth of backward linkages. Sonangol, the state-owned 
company which dominates the oil sector, is explicitly tasked with promoting 
backward linkages. As a consequence of this commitment it initiated, and is a 
50-50 partner in a joint venture supplying control-lines to the sub-sea oil 
sector, an enterprise which is beginning to go beyond assembly to include the 
transformation of materials into the final product. 
 
Foreign ownership of supplier firms as a determinant of linkages 
Moving beyond ownership of lead commodity firms, the nationality of 
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ownership also surfaces as a factor affecting the capacity of suppliers to 
respond to the opportunities for local sourcing. Almost 80 percent of the 
suppliers in the Nigerian oil services sector are nationally-owned, and a 
further 6 percent were joint ventures with foreign firms (Table 32).  
 
Table 32: Ownership characteristics of oil service suppliers in Nigeria 
Characteristics 
Control system 
& ICT 
Fabrication & 
construction 
Well 
construction & 
completion 
Other 
sector  Total 
Ownership Status 
nationals only 
multinational  
joint ventures 
 
84.2 
21.1 
 - 
 
86.4 
9.1 
4.5 
 
70.6 
17.6 
11.8 
 
100 
 - 
 - 
 
78.8 
15 
6.3 
Year Of Registration  
1970 - 1980 
1981 - 1990 
1991 - 2000 
2001 till date  
not indicated 
- 
21.1 
5.8 
36.8 
26.3 
4.5 
31.8 
18.2 
18.2 
27.3 
17.6 
14.7 
8.8 
26.5 
32.4 
- 
40 
20 
20 
20 
8.80 
22.5 
13.8 
26.3 
28.8 
Company Listed 
yes 
no 
 
21.1 
78.9 
 
13.6 
86.4 
  
17.6 
82.4 
  
 - 
100 
  
16.3 
83.8 
Educational Status of 
Major Owner 
none 
secondary (O/A levels) 
diploma 
degrees 
 
 - 
 - 
15.8 
84.2 
 
 - 
9.1 
9.1 
81.8 
 
 - 
 - 
5.9 
94.1 
 
 - 
 - 
 - 
100 
 
- 
2.5 
8.75 
88.8 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
 
Two sub-sectors - fabrication and construction, and well construction and 
completion - had the highest degrees of national ownership, mostly 
established before the 1990s. Control system and ICT showed the highest 
presence of multinationals. Very few of the national suppliers were listed and 
almost all the major owners had university degrees. Hence, even though the 
Nigerian legislation on local content does not specify local ownership, de facto 
most of the suppliers in these sub-sectors are owned by local entrepreneurs. 
Accompanying policies to increase access to capital and create mid- and 
high- level skills enabled locally-owned enterprises to enter these supply links,  
 
The origin of foreign ownership as a determinant of linkages 
There are clear indications that the origin of foreign ownership has an 
important bearing on linkages, particularly in the case of the Chinese, Indian 
and Brazilian firms who have become recent investors in Africa‟s resource 
sectors. This difference emerges both with respect to the ownership of 
production facilities and in regard to the role of different nationalities of 
buyers. We begin with the production side of this equation. 
 
The ownership structure of the Zambia mining sector is diversified and 
includes Northern (Canadian, Australian and European), South African, 
Chinese and Indian mining companies. The national origins of these 
companies helped to shape value chain governance, and in so doing, affect 
the incorporation of local suppliers in these chains. The origin of foreign 
ownership mattered in three ways. First, China‟s policy towards outward FDI – 
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the “going-out policy” – shaped the strategic behaviour of Chinese mining 
firms, which tended to be less risk averse and more countercyclical in nature 
than their northern counterparts (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung and Qian, 
2009; Davies, 2009; Yao et al., 2010; Ren et al., 2010). Thus, while global FDI 
flows fell in 2008 and 2009 and northern FDI in Zambia‟s mining sector 
stagnated, the Chinese mining companies in Zambia responded counter-
cyclically. Backed by soft budget constraints and strategic intent to command 
access to resources, not only did Chinese mining firms expand their presence 
in Zambia, but at the same time, and backed by Chinese aid, a large industrial 
park was established as a future base for suppliers into the mines. During the 
same period, the Northern-owned mines sought to cut costs rather than to 
increase capacity, and in the process, reorganised their supply chains. Only 
the Chinese and South African mines did not cut production, investment and 
development projects. Nor did they retrench workers.  
 
A second indicator of home-country ownership determinants was that whilst 
the Northern-TNC firms worked independently of government and saw supply 
chain development as part of their corporate agenda, Chinese buyers relied 
heavily on Government-to-Government intermediation to promote linkages. 
On the one hand this is leading to the construction of a $800m industrial zone 
designed in part to promote supplier development to the mines. On the other 
hand, the Chinese firms focused less than their northern partners on the 
development of supply chain development capabilities in their purchasing 
departments. 
 
Third, Chinese, Indian and Northern mines differed in the governance of their 
supply chains. In general, Northern and South African buyers actively sought 
to outsource activities outside of their core competences. By contrast, 
Chinese and Indian buyers were more reluctant to do so. When they did, and 
when local firms did not meet their expectations, instead of promoting 
capabilities in their suppliers, they tended to bring back and internalise these 
supplies.  Partly as a consequence, or perhaps also as a partial cause, of this 
greater self-reliance Chinese and Indian buyers were less embedded in the 
local business community (Table 33). What this meant was that whereas the 
entry barriers were high for supplies participating in value chains governed by 
the traditional northern TNCs, once they were in these chains, contact was 
relatively frequent and the support provided by the buyers helped the 
suppliers to upgrade their capabilities. By contrast, entry barriers for local 
suppliers into Chinese and Indian firm governed value chains were low, but 
exit was frequent and minimal support was provided to suppliers. There was 
also a difference in the behaviour of Chinese and Indian firms, with the former 
more anxious to promote long-term relations with suppliers, and to build 
relations of trust. The Indian mining house was disproportionately focused on 
the price of its inputs rather than on quality. 
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Table 33: Selection of new entrants in the supply chain 
Supply chain  Main selection 
criteria  
Secondary selection 
criteria  
Entry barriers for 
suppliers  
Northern TNC 
buyers  
Historical 
relationships  
Increasing reliance on 
auditing to cut briefcase 
businessmen. Selective 
auditing. 
High entry barriers for 
new entrants  
Chinese buyers  Extensive auditing  Trust built with 
considerable effort  
Low entry barriers for 
new entrants  
Indian buyers  Ensure a large 
suppliers‟ base 
Increase competition 
between new and regular 
suppliers  
Low entry barriers for 
new entrants 
Small buyers 
(both foreign and 
small) 
Shopping around 
for suppliers  
Trial and error  Low entry barriers for 
new entrants 
Source: Fessehaie (2011) 
 
The distinctive nature of Chinese firms operating in Africa as procurers of 
local supplies was also evident in Angola. Here, too, a determining factor was 
the mode of entry of Chinese firms, linked closely to China‟s “going out” policy 
and its strategic search for access to Africa‟s resources. Between 2004 and 
2007, China‟s Exim Bank extended a total of $ 4.5bn in oil-backed credit lines 
to the Angolan government. In July 2010, the Angolan Minister of Finance 
confirmed that negotiations were underway to finalise a further $6bn from 
China Exim Bank to assist with Angola‟s reconstruction. Most of the Chinese 
investors that gained access to the large-scale China Exim Bank contracts in 
Angola were SOEs or large “national champion” private companies. The key 
determinant of their sourcing behaviour, therefore, was not private or state 
ownership, but whether they operated through China Exim Bank credit line. 
These credit lines tied a minimum of 50 percent of procurement of the total 
contract value of the project to imports from China for loans obtained outside 
the realm of the China-Angola agreement and 15 percent of Chinese 
procurement for loans within the terms of the agreement. In reality the degree 
of imports from China was very considerably higher than the minimum of 15 
percent. Local purchases of Chinese firms involved in the construction of 
infrastructure were limited to basic materials such as cement, bitumen, stone 
and sand, and occasionally paint, corrugated iron and timber. In many cases 
– for example, cement - even some of these were imported form China. One 
Chinese SOE reported that its local purchases were less than five percent of 
its annual spend and these are all very basic, low value products (such as 
gravel and charcoal). Many of these large scale Chinese investors also made 
extensive use of semi-skilled migrant labour from China. 
 
Where there were backward linkages, these predominantly involved an 
incoming Chinese supply chain. This happened either through vertical 
integration or outsourcing. Some Chinese companies began setting up their 
own factories to manufacture bricks and building inputs made from locally 
available materials such as wooden door frames, windows and balustrades. 
Chinese brick-making machinery has often replaced Angolan equipment. 
Locals only supplied emergency shortfalls. This also extended to basic 
consumables such as vegetables. Much of this outsourcing was to smaller 
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private Chinese companies in Angola which distributed Chinese products and 
services required for the construction industry. 
 
However, not all Chinese firms act in the same manner, and the operations of 
large SOEs and “national champion firms” was distinctively different from 
small and medium sized Chinese firms. Chinese SOEs tended to be more risk 
averse than private companies and only moved into overseas markets with 
state support. Indeed, they only entered the Angolan market under China 
Exim Bank financing. They avoided pursuing other projects funded by the 
Angolan Government or international donors. By contrast, private Chinese 
companies did not receive such support from their government. They 
ventured into Africa because of high domestic competition or because they 
saw market opportunities and were, as a general rule, much more likely to 
draw on local suppliers than their large-sized government-backed SOE 
counterparts. 
 
The experience of Gabon with respect to forward linkages tends to reinforce 
the conclusion that the engagement of Chinese and other emerging economy 
investors in SSA may reduce the extent of linkages from the commodities 
sector, in this case with regard to forward linkages. Over the past two 
decades, French timber firms have made large investments in the processing 
of timber, including in sawmilling, veneer and plywood manufacture. These 
investments were partly a consequence of their longevity in Gabon, partly 
because wage costs were higher in France than in Gabon (since timber 
processing is a relatively labour-intensive industry) and partly because they 
had responded to the requirements of the Forestry Code to process timber 
domestically. By contrast, the new Asian-based entrants into the timber 
industry – from Malaysia and China – were almost wholly focused on log 
extraction. Their forward linkages were minimal (Table 34). It is notable that 
the nationally owned firms too were reluctant to engage in forward linkages. 
 
Table 34: Ownership and forward linkages in the Gabon timber sector sub-
sector activities and final markets (n = 15) 
Ownership 
China MY EU  Gabon 
Activity 
Logging 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
  
Sawn-wood     
Veneer    
  
 * 
 
   
Plywood                   
Log export share 
a
 70% 70% 38% 90% 
Log export destination 
c
 
C
N 
C
N 
C
N 
C
N 
C
N 
E
U 
C
N  
C
N 
C
N 
C
N 
C
N 
C
N 
 a share of total log production exported unprocessed 
 b share of total log production channelled into linked processing sub-sectors 
 c CN=China, EU=Europe, SA=South Africa is the respective main export destination 
  for logs and processed wood products 
Source: Terheggen (2011) 
 
The distinctive character of Chinese presence in Africa‟s resource sector and 
its impact on linkages also surfaces in relation to the role of Chinese buyers. 
This distinctive role predominantly reflects the character of the Chinese final 
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market, comprising a set of much lower-income users than those in northern 
markets. In Gabon, where there has been a major reorientation in the 
destination of exports this has had profound implications for forward linkages, 
as well as for the nature of production in the commodity sector itself. As was 
shown in the earlier discussion of the breadth and depth of linkages, the 
market for Gabon‟s timber products has shifted very markedly from an earlier 
exclusive focus on the EU (and predominantly to France) to a situation where 
in 2010, the value of timber exports to China was approximately the same as 
exports to the EU. However, whereas exports to the EU increasingly comprise 
processed timber – sawn-wood, veneer and plywood - Chinese buyers are 
almost entirely interested in unprocessed logs. A subsidiary factor impacting 
negatively on forward linkages is that Chinese buyers tend to be less 
interested in timber quality, more willing to take a variety of species and to be 
almost wholly preoccupied with price. Moreover, there have been a number of 
occasions when Chinese buyers reneged on contracts or required a 
readjustment of prices downwards after the timber had been delivered. This 
has exacerbated the problems faced by Gabonese firms seeking to establish 
themselves in the industry.  
 
A further attribute of the Chinese market is that it is less concerned with 
producers meeting environmental and sustainability standards than the 
European market. This applies both to the standards set by buying firms 
themselves (reflecting the critical success factors in their final markets) and 
standards set by governments. This difference in the requirements of buyers 
has implications for backward linkages, in this case for service providers 
assisting logging and timber processing companies to meet standards in the 
production activities. It also has implications for horizontal linkages, since 
international experience shows that the capacity of service providers to assist 
producers with quality and environmental standards in one sector can be 
applied across a wide range of industries (Figure 19). 
 
Figure 19: European and Chinese buyers’ public and private standards 
 (1 = not important, 5 = critically important, n = 15) 
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CN 
 
Note: GPP=Green public procurement; ISO standards=ISO 14001 
Source: Terheggen (2011) 
 
There is thus evidence across a range of countries (Angola, Gabon and 
Zambia) and sectors (construction, copper and timber) that China‟s growing 
presence in Africa‟s resource sector has considerable implications for both 
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backward and forward linkages. Chinese firms – particularly, but not 
exclusively the large SOEs operating under the aegis of Exim Bank “aid” (the 
so-called “Angola mode”) – seem to operate with a higher degree of 
internalisation than do the northern firms which have historically dominated 
the commodities sector in Africa. On the forward linkage side, the similarity of 
labour costs in China and Africa (at least by comparison between Africa and 
Europe) and the relative insensitivity of Chinese buyers to low environmental 
and ethical standards, has also meant that forward linkages have been lower 
than those associated with northern firms operating in Africa‟s resource 
sector. 
 
However, it is an open question whether these differences reflect the new 
vintage of Chinese investment, or are a consequence of the mode of financing 
of Chinese firms and the nature of the Chinese final market. To the extent that 
the sourcing behaviour of Chinese firms reflects their lack of experience rather 
than factors intrinsic to Chinese political economy, then there might be 
expectations that the behaviour of Chinese firms with regard to both forward 
and backward linkages will become increasingly similar to that of their 
northern competitors. There is evidence that some degree of convergence is 
indeed occurring. In Zambia, the Chinese supply chain was becoming more 
quality-driven for critical supply inputs. In this, it was becoming more similar to 
the Northern and South African supply chains. Also, recently the Chinese 
mining company announced that a suppliers development programme will be 
launched for the newly-acquired mine. In Angola, private Chinese companies 
are increasingly sourcing local inputs and labour. Private firms were driven by 
profit-maximisation and, as the cost of importing labour and goods from China 
increased, responded by broadening their supply base to local labour and 
firms. It is however too early to conclude that the reality of operating in Africa‟s 
resource sector will lead to a closer degree of convergence between Chinese 
and northern firms. Many of the factors driving these differences – the mode 
of firm-financing, the nature of final markets and differences in wage costs – 
will continue to play a role in the determination of both backward and forward 
linkages for some years to come. 
 
Firm-specific attributes and their impact on linkages 
When individual firms shape whole industries or are major participants in an 
industry, they may play a disproportionate role in the development of linkages. 
The capacity of a firm to shape an industry is evident in the case of diamonds, 
where DeBeers has for many decades coordinated a cartel limiting the 
supplies of diamonds onto the market. For much of this period, DeBeers has 
thus acted as a playmaker in the global diamond value chain, controlling 
upstream linkages through its command over the downstream segments of 
the chain. This gave it the capacity to shape the final demand for diamonds 
and, in so doing, to determine the capabilities required by the cutting and 
polishing firms beneficiating diamonds. 
 
The irony of DeBeers command over the global diamond industry is that it has 
now itself become the tool of another party controlling access to diamonds, 
the Botswana Government since it, rather than DeBeers controls the major 
source of high quality and low cost global diamond supply. It has used this 
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power to force a joint venture on DeBeers (Debswana) and to use this to 
begin a process of broadening and deepening linkages. In the long run, this 
may lead to a switch the in the location of a key forward linkages in this sector 
from Europe and Asia to Botswana. 
 
Although not all industries are dominated by a single firm as is the case of 
diamonds, there are other cases where individual firms have distinctive 
strategies which shape the structure of value chains, and hence the degree of 
linkages, in particular contexts. An example of this is the gold industry in 
Tanzania and the DRC. In earlier discussion we showed how a verbal 
commitment by a large mining firm in Tanzania to increase backward linkages 
had little content in reality. By contrast, a Canadian firm, BANRO, which is 
building the first of four planned mines in neighbouring DRC appears to have 
taken a much more thorough approach towards increasing backward 
linkages. Before mining operations start, BANRO is gathering intelligence on 
the capacities of local and regional suppliers to provide inputs into the mine. 
Their procurement officers are engaging with local suppliers and have, for 
example, travelled to each of the regional urban areas to determine the 
availability and quality of products that they will require during the operational 
cycle of the mining operation. For example, 100 percent of the fresh produce 
used to feed its mine staff will be obtained from local producers in South Kivu 
Province, which is not the case in the adjacent Tanzanian gold mines. 
However, this positive picture is tempered by the fact that during the 
construction phase, the main contractor was from South Africa and therefore 
there has been significant benefit to the South African economy from this 
project. In Tanzania, the major contractors were outside of Africa, and most of 
the materials were sourced from Australia, Europe and North America. 
 
Firm-specific differences on sourcing are also evident within the Tanzanian 
gold mining industry. The Golden Pride Mine contracts the drilling, blasting, 
loading and hauling function to a third party, Caspian (Tanzania) Limited. The 
decision to contract out the drilling, blasting, loading and hauling services was 
driven by the need to reduce the „burden‟ of heavy investments in earth 
moving equipment. In contracting out these functions to a third party the mine 
has however retained the core function of determining the drilling sites and 
drilling techniques and patterns as dictated by ore geology. By contrast a 
second mine retained the bulk of drilling and blasting in-house, arguing that 
there is little capacity in the Tanzanian economy to draw on. A third mine 
adopted a case-by-case approach to its drilling, blasting, loading and hauling 
operations, as it does routinely in its global mining ventures. 
 
In Angola, the single backward linkage into the offshore oil sector is the 
supply (through the assembly and some manufacture) of flow-lines and 
control-lines. Oil producing companies tend to source this equipment as 
adjunct packages to the installation of sub-sea production systems through 
Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Installation (EPCI) turnkey 
contracts. By outsourcing the entire supply to sub-sea production systems 
contractors, oil companies reduce transaction costs and the risks associated 
with asset-specific technologies. In general, flow-lines and control-lines 
contractors are subcontracted by sub-sea production systems contractors. 
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This has limited market access for independent flow-lines and control-lines 
manufacturers. With Angolan local content policy assigning preference for 
joint-venture companies, a manufacturer of control-lines which in the past 
been locked out of the Angolan market grasped the opportunity provided by 
investing in a joint-venture with Sonangol, the Angolan State National Oil 
Company. As one of its senior management observed,  
 
Local content for us is a legal motivation. Why [is this firm in a] joint-
venture with Sonangol? Without it, it was hard to have contracts. That 
is why we chose to do joint-venture and enter the umbilical cable 
[control lines] manufacturing in Angola because it was a niche market 
despite all the technical difficulties to make it. Everybody who heard of 
it was sceptical. But we have now made it a reality. We had the 
experience of bidding for tenders but not winning not because we 
lacked in any technical requirement but because we did not have the 
local content advantage… (Teka 2011, page 39) 
 
In Ghana, Newmont appointed dedicated staff within the Ahafo mine 
procurement department with the task of maximising local sourcing of goods 
and services. This staff identifies capacity gaps, which will then be addressed 
within the joint Newmont–IFC Ahafo Linkages Program (ALP). In 2009, 50 
local companies received over $4m worth of contracts, representing a 200 
percent increase between 2006 and 2007, and more than 200 businesses 
were registered for the mentoring program. Moreover, the mining company 
developed an innovative import-substitution program for materials to control 
erosion during mine rehabilitation. Rather than importing non-biodegradable 
plastic sheeting from China, Newmont developed local capacity within 
womens‟ cooperatives to produce jute mats. The final outcome included a 
reduction in long-term costs of supply, creating sustainable income generating 
activities and improved environmental management (as the bark used for the 
mats was a pest for local farmers, and the materials used are biodegradable). 
To conclude, Newmont committed to maximise local employment linkages, 
publishing a legally binding agreement with the community inclusive of targets 
for local employment over an agreed timescale (Prescott, 2009). 
 
A final example of ownership-specific attributes is that of Vale of Brazil, 
currently ranked as the world‟s largest mining company. Vale is a very large 
and diversified company one of whose divisions is a large construction 
company with extensive experience of building infrastructure in Brazil and 
other emerging economies such as Angola. It is Vale which has the main 
contract for the development of the Moatize coal concession in Mozambique. 
The exploitation of the coal deposits requires the building of a railway. Vale‟s 
prior experience in both coal mining and railway construction, particularly in a 
low income economy environment, places it in a advantageous position to not 
only successfully complete this venture, but to do so by also utilising local 
inputs. 
 
General lessons on the role of ownership in promoting linkages 
In discussing the influence of ownership on the breadth and depth of linkages 
from the commodities sector, it is important to distinguish between what we 
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refer to as the localisation (that is, a deepening of domestic value added) and 
the indigenisation (that is, an increase in the share of national ownership) of 
linkages. A clear finding which emerges from our case-studies is that in most 
cases governments treated them as equivalents. It is assumed that national 
ownership will lead to a greater breadth and depth of linkages. We do not 
have a great deal of evidence to support or contradict this assertion. We 
found some cases where the pressures for indigenisation have led to an 
increase in the breadth of local sourcing, as in the case of Zambia‟s “suitcase 
businessmen” and the importation of basic consumables in Angola. But this 
has reflected a process of the outsourcing of the purchasing function from the 
lead-firms rather than a deepening of value added. Indeed in this Zambian 
case, the consequence of the indigenisation policy has been to weaken 
capabilities in the supply chain. 
 
A second conclusion to have emerged is that the lead commodity firms which 
drive commodity exploitation are predominantly foreign-owned or foreign 
controlled (through joint ventures and technology agreements). This seems 
unlikely to change in any material way in the near future. The only exception 
is South Africa.  Insofar as the national ownership of lead-firms has a bearing 
on linkages, we have found this to be of marginal significance, outweighed by 
the importance of local content policies. For example, the depth of linkages in 
Nigeria is much higher than that in the same sector in Angola, and this reflects 
not just the passage of time, but also the existence of long-lived policies on 
local content in Nigeria. Even in Angola, in flow-lines linkage development 
arises from local content policies rather than local ownership policies 
(although local ownership does have a bearing on the localisation of control-
line production). In Botswana, the development of forward linkages arose from 
the capacity of the government to limit the supply of diamonds to DeBeers 
rather than from its 50 percent share of the joint venture which allocates these 
diamonds. In the DRC the government has been able to strategically use its 
control over large deposits of copper, coltan and cobalt to force resource-
hungry Chinese SOEs to commitment to large investments in local 
infrastructure, in the development of local skills and in supplier development 
(Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2009), It is too early, however, to determine whether 
this contractual commitment will be reflected in real outcomes of linkage 
development. 
 
A third finding is that the commodities sector tends to follow a model which is 
replicated in many global industries. This is the “global-sourcing-follower-
supply” model in which the lead commodity producer in the value chain 
expects its first-tier global suppliers to satisfy their needs locally in their global 
operations. Hence OEMs such as Caterpillar follow the mining firms into their 
operations in Africa, adding value locally, but with a very limited extension of 
the domestic supply chain into the second- and third-tiers. Locally-owned 
firms tend to be confined therefore to the provision of low-technology and non-
scale intensive inputs to the lead commodity producers (for example, security 
and fresh food), and in a limited way as second and third-tier suppliers to the 
global OEMs who follow the lead commodity producers and locate close to 
commodity extraction. The exception here is South Africa, with a well-
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developed set of locally-owned first-tier suppliers, even in technology- and 
scale-intensive inputs. 
 
Fourth, the development of backward linkages to the commodities sector in 
Africa can in principle reflect two separate processes. On the one hand it 
might result from the domestic supply of previously-imported inputs. In other 
cases it might be a result of the outsourcing by the lead commodity firms of 
non-core inputs. Our primary conclusion on this issue is that to the extent 
which we observe an increase in backward linkages, this reflects the 
substitution of imports rather than an increase in outsourcing by lead 
commodity firms. 
 
A fifth conclusion to emerge from our case-studies is the distinctive and 
heterogeneous character of Chinese lead-firms rapidly-growing presence in 
Africa‟s commodities sectors. Unlike northern countries where the Washington 
Consensus has led to the separation of aid, trade and FDI in Africa, China‟s 
growing presence in Africa‟s resource sector has been characterised by a 
process of strategic bundling, in which access Africa‟s resources has been 
achieved through complementary aid and FDI. A further distinctive 
characteristic is the low level of domestic content in Chinese involvement in 
the commodities and infrastructure sectors. In infrastructural investments in 
Angola, Chinese firms tend to have much lower levels of local content than do 
northern and Brazilian and South Africa firms. But this is not always the case. 
In Zambia, Chinese lead-firms appear to be very willing to use local suppliers, 
but they do not invest in the upgrading of their suppliers in the same way as 
northern and South African lead commodity producers, and are more prone to 
delisting weak suppliers. As an extension of this, whereas Chinese firms are 
prepared to source from existing local suppliers, this does not extend into the 
mobilisation and promotion of locally-owned suppliers. Moreover, increasingly 
the locally-based suppliers are .Chinese-owned, that is they are following the 
follower-supply model of lead northern firms, but not just with respect to 
technology- and scale-intensive inputs provided by first-tier suppliers, but also 
in relation to the provision of relatively simple inputs which are 
characteristically supplied by second- and third-tier suppliers. The industrial 
processing zones under construction in Zambia and other African countries 
are a vehicle for the promotion of this model. In Sudan, the Chinese lead oil 
firms have nearly 100 Chinese supplying firms with them to Sudan, employing 
4626 people (Suliman and Badawi 2010).  
 
However, Chinese firms are not homogeneous, and there are signs that 
independent private sector firms operate differently to state owned firms. 
These private sector firms are more deeply imbedded in African economies, 
and appear to show a greater willingness to source locally, and from locally-
owned firms. However the evidence on this is only suggestive of this 
difference, as is the evidence that there may be a growing convergence in the 
behaviour of Chinese lead commodity producers with those of northern 
investors. 
 
A sixth conclusion which is evidence in two case-studies (but corroborated in 
other cases in other countries), concerns the “ownership” of final markets and 
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access to financial capital. In Gabon, when the final market and buyers shift 
from Europe to China, there was a profound change in the nature of 
production processes in the timber value chain and in a considerable 
weakening of forward linkages. In Angola, “ownership” of Chinese 
government aid by large Chinese SOEs resulted directly in thin backward 
linkages, since this aid was tied to the use of China-sourced inputs.  
 
Finally, an important component of ownership which affects the nature, 
breadth and depth of linkages from the commodities sector are firm-specific 
attributes. Individual firms have specific capabilities and trajectories and are 
inserted differentially into the global value chains. Therefore not all firms 
operate in the same way, even when they produce in the same sector and the 
same country, and have the same country of origin as their competitors. 
There is widespread evidence of this ownership-related factor, including in 
backward linkages in Angola, the gold mining industry in Tanzania and the 
DRC and the diamond industry in Botswana. De Beers is a distinct firm in the 
diamond industry and it is this distinctive character which has given the 
Botswana government the capacity to drive through a programme of forward 
linkage development. There is nothing unique to the significance of these firm-
specific characteristics, but our findings suggest only a relatively limited 
number of cases where African governments have used the opportunity of 
firm-specific strategic needs to further the development of backward and 
forward linkages. 
 
3.2 Infrastructure  
Infrastructure plays a critical role in promoting economic growth. Just as an 
efficient infrastructure can promote competitive production, so a poorly-
developed and unreliable infrastructure can become a major obstacle to 
economic life. Infrastructure can take various forms. It can be “hard” and 
embodied in road and rail transport, utilities (energy and water) and 
telecommunication networks. In each of these cases the effectiveness of 
infrastructure development is a function of reliability, quality of provision and 
the cost to the user. But there is also a compendium of “soft” infrastructure. 
This reflects the efficiency and cost of the administrative and regulatory 
regime which supports the productive sector. These characteristics of efficient 
infrastructure bound all economic activity. But they are particularly important 
for commodities producers and their suppliers and processors since, at least 
in the SSA context, the overwhelming bulk of commodities are exported and 
hence infrastructure plays a crucial role in reaching the market and in 
providing the necessary inputs for production. Four sets of factors are 
important in determining the role played by infrastructure in the development 
of linkages into and out of the commodities sector. 
 
First, the nature of the commodity has a significant impact on the 
development of infrastructure in a number of ways. Commodities produced 
and exported in bulk and in great volumes require large scale transport 
infrastructure to move their mined outputs. Lead commodity firms are more 
likely to be able to cover the costs of such infrastructural investment. This has 
externalities for the local economy as the infrastructure is also available for 
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firms supplying inputs to these mines and this impacts positively on linkage 
development. Two examples of the positive infrastructural externalities 
generated by such bulk commodities are the coal producing regions in the 
Mozambique Zambezi Valley Corridor (Perkins and Robbins, 2011), and the 
Zambian Copperbelt (Fessehaie, 2011). On the other hand, for high-value, 
low volume exported commodities, such as gold and diamonds, the need for 
large scale rail transport networks is less important to export output, and 
critical infrastructural issues often concern security rather than cost or 
extension of physical infrastructure. In a context of poor public provision, lead 
mining firms will make different strategic choices regarding the extent of 
private investment to source imports and operate the mines (Perkins and 
Robbins, 2011). For those linkages involving knowledge intensive services, 
the key elements of infrastructure are likely to be telecommunications, 
security and air transport, whereas the provision of tangible inputs into the 
commodities sector and the processing of the output of the commodities 
sector are most likely to require hard infrastructure such as roads and rail. 
 
Second, the nature of the infrastructure has important implications for the 
development of linkages. Some infrastructure is highly specific to a particular 
commodity producer, and has very low potential for positive spill-overs which 
might facilitate the growth of backward, forward or horizontal linkages. This is, 
for example, the case with regard to oil pipelines, which facilitate only the 
export of oil. In other cases, as for example the TanZam railway line between 
Zambia‟s landlocked Copperbelt and the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, 
the infrastructure has the capacity to meet the needs of multiple users, both 
feeding into and out of the copper mines, and feeding into and out of other 
sectors of the economy. 
 
Third, it is important to distinguish between the infrastructural needs of the 
lead commodity firms and those of the firms involved in backward and forward 
linkages to the commodities sector. If infrastructure in a commodity exporting 
developing country is primarily or solely focused on meeting the requirements 
of the commodity lead firm, then experience shows that it is likely to result in 
enclave infrastructural development, which will hamper the ability of local 
suppliers or processors to link in and participate effectively in the country‟s 
commodities value chains. That is, firms providing inputs into the commodities 
sector and using the output of the commodity sector may require very different 
forms of infrastructural support. By contrast, in other cases, the physical 
infrastructure can also serve the needs of other sectors, users and producers 
- this is widely referred to as „corridor development‟. Perkins and Robbins 
(2011) provide examples of this contrast between enclave infrastructure and 
corridor development in their discussion of infrastructure projects in Tanzania 
and Mozambique‟s Zambezi Valley project. In the latter case horizontal 
linkages are more likely to develop out of the vertical backward and forward 
linkages with the commodities sector.  
 
Fourth, by its nature, infrastructure is a public good. In many cases, it is not 
used up in consumption. For example, a road can be utilised by many 
different consumers, and for a substantial period of time. This makes it difficult 
– although not always impossible – for investors in infrastructure to 
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appropriate the fruits of their investments. Another public good characteristic 
of infrastructure is that there are network effects. That is, to be delivered at 
low unit cost, infrastructure requires many users to spread the costs of 
network construction, as in the costs of fixed-line telephony, sanitation and 
sewerage. Given the high unit costs of operation with a small number of 
users, this creates difficulties in investing in the infrastructure despite the profit 
potential of operations when many users are connected to the network. 
Further, in many cases infrastructure is very capital intensive and requires 
large sums of investment, putting such investments beyond the reach of an 
individual investor, or even often groups of investors. Moreover, infrastructure 
often has to be available before an economic activity can take place, rather 
than to be provided to support what is already in place. For example, a mine 
needs a road before production can proceed. Whilst this road can, and often 
has to be upgraded after the mine is in operation, it is a necessary precursor 
to commodity extraction. For all of these reasons, it is common for 
infrastructure to be provided by governments rather than by individual 
investors. However, the provision of infrastructure often spans national 
boundaries so that even if the fruits of investment can be reaped, this requires 
a decision-making and distributive arrangement which involves at least two 
and often more than two national governments.  
 
These four factors all emerge as significant determinants of linkages into and 
out of the commodities sector in our eight country-studies, albeit to different 
degrees. These differences reflect the character of particular commodities and 
particular economies. In discussing these contextual factors and analysing 
their impact as facilitators of or barriers against infrastructure and linkage 
development we will begin by considering the role played by infrastructure in 
the oil sector (Angola and Nigeria). This is a sector which is often seen as a 
quintessential enclave activity, wholly dedicated to commodity exports and 
with few externalities to the surrounding economy. In addition, by holding the 
commodity constant, it is also helps to explain the importance of country-
specific factors. We follow this with a discussion of the role played by 
infrastructure in Zambia, Mozambique and Gabon where in each case high 
volume commodity exports have spurred the development of infrastructure 
with high externalities for other sectors. We conclude with a discussion of the 
experience of diamonds in Botswana and gold in Ghana and Tanzania. They 
share a highly valuable and low volume output, affecting the nature of forward 
linkages. In the case of gold, the contrast between Ghana and Tanzania 
highlights the importance of country-specific differences. 
 
Oil: enclave infrastructure with different linkage outcomes 
The oil industries in Angola and Nigeria are classic cases of enclave 
infrastructural development but with very different linkage outcomes. In both 
countries the oil firms‟ required the construction of purpose-built terminals to 
bulk-load and export oil form offshore production wells. In both countries the 
poor development of national infrastructure - where in other contexts (such as 
oil development in the North Sea) oil producers could assume reliable local 
supply – led the lead oil firms to create insulated oil terminals and invest 
directly in the supply of key infrastructural inputs such as power and water. 
Hence suppliers firms that were located within the oil terminals and supplying 
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goods and services to the oil companies had access to a functioning physical 
and services infrastructure which gave them a competitive advantage over 
suppliers located outside the terminals. The manufacturing and services 
suppliers outside these oil terminals involved in backward and forward 
linkages lacked the scale and resources required to provide efficient 
infrastructure and had to overcome major cost penalties arising from highly 
inadequate infrastructure provision. In Nigeria, as a result of effective state 
action many of these local external suppliers managed to survive and link to 
the oil industry, whereas in Angola only suppliers within the enclave oil 
terminals were able to engage in backward linkages. 
 
In both countries the provision of national infrastructure was hindered by 
conflict. This was particularly the case in Angola which experienced nearly 
three decades of civil war and the virtual collapse of most forms of hard and 
soft infrastructure. According to the African Development Bank, 80 percent of 
Angola‟s transport infrastructure was not operational in 2009 (BMI: 2009:6). 
The World Bank, in its 2010 Logistics Performance Index ranked Angola as 
142nd out of 155 countries (Arvis et al, 2010). Customs, Infrastructure and 
Logistics Quality and Competence were the worst three performing indicators. 
Business Monitor International (2009) places Angola at the bottom of its 
ranking of infrastructure in Sub-Saharan African countries. Only 10.4 percent 
of Angola‟s roads are paved although rapid on-going road construction by 
Chinese firms will result in a much higher proportion (24 percent) in the near 
future (MOFCOM, 2010).  
 
In Angola, the two sets of firms involved in the supply of control lines and flow-
lines leased their premises in one of the eight major oil terminals within an 
industrial park located along the Kwanza Basin in Lobito where the country‟s 
major offshore blocks are located. This was because public infrastructure was 
inadequate to allow for reliable and cost-effective supply from sites outside of 
this industrial park. In contrast local second- and third-tier SMEs outside the 
terminal had to face the challenges posed by poor and unstable electricity and 
water supply, inefficient customs services and lack of access to financial and 
ICT services. This severely hampered their ability to develop supply linkages 
to the oil companies. For similar reasons, in the Angolan construction industry 
the large Chinese companies provided their own water and electricity, 
whereas the smaller Chinese and national construction firms suffered from 
lack of access to reliable and low costs access to these key inputs.  
 
In Nigeria, although the general state of infrastructure was poor, the lead oil 
companies in the oil enclaves found infrastructure generally adequate to their 
needs (Table 35).  Telecoms and water utilities were rated as adequate or 
very adequate and transportation received a mean score from respondents of 
4.5 (on a scale of 1 to 5). The exception was power and internet functioning 
which remained inadequate even for the lead oil producers.  
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Table 35: Infrastructure performance assessment by oil firms in Nigeria 
 
Very 
adequate Adequate 
Can’t 
say Inadequate 
Very 
inadequate Mean 
Public power 
supply/electricity 8.3 16.7 - 58.3 16.7 2.42 
Water supply 16.7 58.3 - 8.3 16.7 3.41 
Telephone and 
communication 16.7 75 - - 8.3 3.92 
Internet services 16.7 33.3 - 50 - 3.17 
Transportation 58.3 33.3 8.3 - - 4.50 
Note: Very inadequate =1, inadequate = 2, can‟t say = 3, adequate = 4, very adequate = 5. 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
 
It is significant that supplier firms outside the enclave oil terminals were much 
less satisfied with the quality and cost of infrastructure provision, particularly 
in regard to transport, energy and internet services (Table 36). Public supply 
of energy was the largest inhibiting factor, with 84 percent of suppliers 
indicating that provision was either inadequate or very inadequate. 
Furthermore they also regarded the conditions of public power and water 
supplies as deteriorating, while those of the telephone/communication, 
internet services and transportation were improving. Outside of the oil 
terminals themselves, the provision of electricity is so poor and unreliable in 
Nigeria that most industrial firms provide their own power to run operations 
through petrol-fed generators. This is a major cost constraint on their ability to 
be competitive, since the unit cost of private power is roughly ten times that of 
the cost of public electricity. 
 
Table 36: Infrastructure performance assessment by suppliers to oil industry 
 
Very 
adequate Adequate 
Can’t 
say Inadequate 
Very 
inadequate Mean 
Public power 
supply/electricity 1.3 5 10 41.3 42.5 1.81 
Water supply 10 40 8.8 18.8 22.5 2.96 
Telephone and 
communication 10 57.5 8.8 13.8 10 3.44 
Internet services 8.8 55 6.3 21.3 8.8 3.34 
Transportation 8.8 46.3 11.3 25 8.8 3.21 
Note: Very inadequate =1, inadequate = 2, can‟t say = 3, adequate = 4, very adequate = 5. 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
 
This differential experience between lead commodity producers and their 
suppliers is reflected in the views of oil firms and suppliers on their satisfaction 
with infrastructure provision. The former are systematically less negative 
about the infrastructure available with the exception of access to the internet 
(Figure 20).  
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Figure 20: Infrastructure performance in Nigeria 
 
Very inadequate is scored 1, inadequate is scored 2, can‟t say is scored 3, adequate is 
scored 4, and very adequate is scored 5. 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
 
Corridor infrastructure in Zambia, Mozambique and Gabon 
In Zambia, Mozambique and Gabon, the need to transport high volumes of 
bulky commodities led to the development of roads and rail, in the first two 
countries, and water-based transportation, in the latter. Whilst in Gabon 
infrastructure is poor and seriously inadequate in supporting forward linkage 
development, in Zambia relatively well-developed transport infrastructure has 
led to a level of industrial agglomeration facilitating near-sourcing by lead 
copper firms. Mozambique represents a different case of prospective 
infrastructural development. It is implementing an integrated plan to 
coordinate mining investment, infrastructural development and promotion of 
businesses and agricultural activities in Northern Mozambique through the 
Zambezi Valley corridor. In each of these cases, meeting the needs of the 
lead commodity producing firms also provides infrastructure for firms and 
farmers in other sectors. 
 
Policy and public provision have been crucial in the development of 
infrastructure in Zambia. This public provision has a long history. Historically, 
copper mining in Zambia spurred the development of a rail line from South 
Africa through Zimbabwe to the Copperbelt and through to the Congo and to 
Lobito Bay in Angola. In the 1970s the Chinese funded the construction of the 
TanZam railway linking the Copperbelt to Dar es Salaam. At that time, and for 
many years after, this was China‟s largest external aid project.  Further, to 
meet the demand of the mining industry for low-cost electrical power and 
energy, the Kariba Dam and the hydroelectric power stations on the Zambezi 
and Kafue Rivers were developed. However, the decline of the mining sector 
between the early 1980s and 2005 negatively affected the maintenance and 
expansion of infrastructure, which is now available at comparatively high cost. 
Transport prices for the route from Lusaka to Durban in South Africa were $6 
per tonne/km in 2007, against $5 in China and $3.50 in Brazil. Three factors 
help to explain these high transport costs in the North-South Corridor (World 
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Bank, 2009). First, there are long border crossing delays, especially on the 
Chirundu Border with Zimbabwe. It was estimated that a 20 percent reduction 
in border crossing time would reduce transport prices to the importers by 10-
15 percent. Second, fuel prices are high - almost 80 percent of the fuel prices 
in Zambia were constituted by taxes and levies, which meant that 40 percent 
of total transport costs were linked to taxation (World Bank, 2009). And, third, 
the quality of physical infrastructure was poor due to lack of investment from 
Government or private mines.  
 
Poor infrastructure represented a cost penalty to both forward and backward 
linkage firms. To address this issue, the Zambia government, together with 
other neighbouring countries, launched the North-South Corridor Programme 
in April 2009. This ambitious programme aimed to reduce transport costs for 
two main routes, from the Copperbelt to Dar es Salaam, and from the 
Copperbelt to Durban. This would be achieved by rehabilitating physical 
infrastructure and improving the regulatory regime (reducing cross-border 
clearing procedures, harmonising transit and transport regulations, and 
simplifying administrative requirements). The programme aimed to involve the 
expanding extractive industries in Zambia and the DRC as key drivers (North-
South Corridor International Financing Conference, 2009). The first concrete 
step to implement the programme took place in 2009, when Zambia adopted 
the One-Stop Border Post Act, the legal foundation for the joint administration 
of the Zambia-Zimbabwe border post.  
 
In terms of corridor development policy, Mozambique is far ahead of any other 
country in the region. Based on its positive experience with the Mozal gas 
facility, Mozambique sees the coal mining operations in and around Tete in 
north-west Mozambique as an opportunity to combine a complementary set of 
resources – minerals and inexpensive power - into a range of possible 
industrial development projects. Mozambique wants to avoid “enclave” 
development of coal mining operations, and maximise backward, forward and 
horizontal linkages, by promoting “feeder” infrastructure servicing the 
agricultural, forestry and agro-processing sectors. Three originally distinct but 
currently integrated development corridor initiatives are being pursued: the 
Beira, Nacala and Sena-Zambezi Spatial Development Initiatives (SDIs) 
 
In light of these objectives, the Mozambique Government is actively pursuing 
efficient transport solutions which avoid meeting only the demand of the 
mines. This is taking place in partnership with the private sector. The key 
investor in the Moatize coal concession, the Brazilian firm CVRD (Vale), has 
been increasingly involved in the development and management of the 
railway required for the transport of bulk volumes of coal. (As we saw above, 
Vale is not only the world‟s largest mining company, but has extensive 
presence in the infrastructure sector too). In order to facilitate such 
partnership, the government has reformed its regulatory framework, 
terminated an unsatisfactory railway concession, made resources available 
for co-funding and facilitated coordination between mining companies. This 
decisive approach, adopted by the Government of Mozambique at the highest 
level, is not common and displays a high level of commitment. In Mozambique 
the Cabinet has approved the establishment of the Mozambique SDI 
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Programme in the Ministry of Transport and Communication with 
implementation to be co-managed with the Ministry of Planning and 
Development. The SDI Programme has already commenced with a range of 
sector-scoping studies to deepen the understanding of the range of economic 
development possibilities that exist on the corridors that make up the 
Programme. These will, in turn, inform future infrastructure development 
strategies. 
 
In the timber sector, there are three ways (road, rail, water) of transporting 
logs and wood products, each with different unit costs. Gabon has the poorest 
road network density of the Central African region (around 30 metre per 
square kilometre). Road infrastructure is not only limited in length but also of 
poor quality and poorly maintained. The high costs of road transportation are 
a direct result of inadequate transportation networks, poor maintenance of 
existing roads and road congestion. Transportation via railways with the 
Trans-Gabonese railway is limited as it consists of a single track running from 
Franceville (in the Southeast of Gabon) to the industrial centre Owendo in 
Libreville (the capital located in the Northwest of the country).The river is the 
cheapest mode for the plantation owners but this has had major impact on the 
development of general infrastructure, since it is really only suitable for the 
transport of a limited variety of species, and wholly unsuitable for other 
products including timber products produced through forward linkages from 
log production. The existing harbour infrastructure, designed for Okoumé logs 
that float, is unable to handle increasing volumes of wood products. As a 
consequence, the costs for domestic transportation of logs and wood products 
made up a substantial part of total production costs varying between 14 
percent and 25 percent.  
 
The Gabonese Government is not geared to counter these infrastructural 
obstacles to commodity exploitation and (especially) for linkages from the 
commodities sector. Vital services in the industry are the responsibility of 
poorly funcitoning, inefficient and corrupt state monopolies such as SEPBG 
(Société des Parcs à Bois du Gabon) handling log and wood product 
transportation at the port, and Comilog (a mining company), which acquired 
the rights to manage the Trans-Gabon railway. Despite the termination of 
other state-owned monopolies, like the energy and water company SEEG, the 
private monopolies do not appear to operate with greater efficiency than the 
public monopolies which they replaced. 
 
Gold and Diamonds: A tale of two different infrastructure outcomes 
Tanzania and Ghana are countries where gold extraction is associated with 
very different outcomes on linkages and patterns of infrastructural 
development. In Ghana, backward linkages are relatively well-developed, and 
public provision of infrastructure is generally good. By contrast, in Tanzania, 
linkages are weak and the quality of infrastructure is poor.  
 
In Ghana, resource-rich areas such as gold mining areas have continued to 
receive government investments to develop their infrastructure. The success 
of the mining sector in recent decades is widely attributed in part to the huge 
investments in infrastructure in mining areas made by government with 
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support from the World Bank/IMF and other international donors (Owusu 
2001; Aryeetey et al. 2009). The enhanced infrastructure in gold mining areas, 
particularly that of the road network and ICT, also broadened and deepened 
consumption (final demand) linkages, and has supported the physical 
connectivity that allow backward linkages to operate. Due to improved 
infrastructure, notably air transport, roads, and power supplies, many gold 
mining support companies have now located their headquarters in Accra and 
many of the mining companies and lead OEMs have located regional offices 
in Ghana. The benefits such a situation produces in terms of job creation, 
demand for services/goods and other benefits to the national economy and a 
region such as Accra where no gold is mined is apparent.    
 
In Tanzania, the gold mines are located in remote areas with very weak 
infrastructure. This places a particular burden on the input side, where 
machinery and equipment is often both costly and bulky and where extensive 
supplies of energy are required to operate equipment. By contrast, gold is a 
high value low volume product and is easily transported by air to South Africa 
for beneficiation. The very poor quality and high cost of transport 
infrastructure to the mines severely constrains the operations of the lead 
mining firms, and this is not only a problem of hard infrastructure. In 2011 one 
of the largest mines had to close down operations for some months since 
much of its stored fuel had been stolen by its own staff! Mining companies 
also suffered severely from long delays in customs clearance, often 
accompanied by high levels of corruption. The weak provision and in many 
cases the non-provision of publicly supplied energy and other utilities has also 
meant that the mining houses have to provide these services themselves, not 
only involving a high pecuniary cost, but also a high cost in terms of 
managerial attention. Mining companies consistently complained about the 
negative impact of inadequate, unreliable and poor infrastructure on their 
operating cost.  All of these factors were of compounded significance for 
suppliers to the mining industry. Many of the locally-owned supplying firms, 
and potential suppliers, lacked the resources and the scale to provide for their 
own infrastructure needs. There is no doubt that weak infrastructure is one of 
the major factors holding back backward linkages in the Tanzanian gold 
mining sector. Partly as a consequence of this weak infrastructure, the 
Tanzanian gold mining industry remains a largely enclave activity, in 
significant contrast to Ghana where both the breadth and depth of linkages 
are growing.  
 
In response to these widely-acknowledged problems, the Central 
Development Corridor (CDC) was planned to connect the Tanzanian maritime 
Port of Dar es Salaam with its Great Lakes hinterland. The objective was to 
crowd-in investment into the agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture and 
tourism sectors. By providing transport and energy infrastructure, these 
sectors would help the region‟s growth and diversification processes. 
However, Tanzania never mainstreamed the CDC vision into effective policies 
and effective policy delivery. Moreover, there were enormous backlogs in 
implementation, lack of funding from the Government and its donors, 
institutional capacity bottlenecks and failure to coordinate with neighbouring 
countries.  
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The Botswana diamond beneficiation industry is a case where adequate 
infrastructure provision contributes to the development of forward linkages. 
This is partly due to the highly specific nature of the commodity, involving the 
transport of very high value products in very small volumes. In order to 
guarantee the security of this high value commodity, a diamond security 
transfer facility was completed at the Gaborone International Airport and a 
high security exclusive road was constructed, connecting the airport and the 
diamond hub. 
 
Most of the forward-linkage diamond beneficiating firms were located in the 
Gaberone area and were easily able to take advantage of the available 
infrastructure. However, whilst water supply is reliable in Gaberone, the firm 
located in Serowe suffered from less reliable water supply. A significant 
amount of Botswana‟s electricity – up to 40 percent at times – has been 
imported from South Africa and other neighboring countries. This has opened 
Botswana to insecurity of supply given the power supply shortages that South 
Africa‟s electricity utility has experienced over the past few years. Since 
cutting and polishing equipment and technology is dependant on electricity, 
most firms have installed back-up generators. Internet has been unreliable in 
Botswana and slows during peak times. However the government is installing 
fibre optic cables and expects telecommunication speed and prices to 
improve in the short-term. 
 
General lessons on the role played by infrastructure in linkage 
development 
Turning to the general lessons learned from this country and sector 
experience, it is clear that the nature of the commodity affects the types of 
infrastructure which is required. At the one extreme are the very large-scale 
coal mines in Mozambique which in themselves will pay for the cost of 
infrastructure development, but which will have major externalities for other 
sectors. The diamond industry in Botswana lies at the other extreme with very 
limited demands for highly specific infrastructure. Between these two 
extremes lies a range of sectors which to a greater or lesser degree involve 
externalities for other sectors, potentially positive (as in the case of the 
Central  Development Corridor in East Africa) but also potentially negative (as 
in the case of the use of rivers to transport logs in Gabon). 
 
It is also possible to observe the impact of infrastructure on the competitive 
provision of backward and forward linkages into and out of the commodities 
sector. In general, the low level of public provision in some of the economies 
such as Tanzania and Angola places severe penalties on all users of 
infrastructure. However, whilst the lead commodities firms can afford to cover 
their own infrastructure needs and to solve their own problems, their suppliers 
and users find this more difficult. This means that whilst the lead commodity 
producers may wish to increase outsourcing, weak infrastructure forces them 
to either internalise these non-core value added activities or import from 
stable foreign suppliers. In general, more cases were found in which suppliers 
and users were adversely affected by infrastructure by comparison with the 
lead commodity firms (Angola, Botswana, Tanzania, Gabon and Nigeria) than 
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where there was little difference in the impact of the quality and cost of 
infrastructure (Ghana and Zambia). 
 
Political will, government capabilities and capacity to provide for the public 
provision of public goods emerges as a key factor in linkage development. 
Botswana is an excellent example a government deciding to use its political 
will and develop a policy framework in alignment with the lead diamond 
company (De Beers) as well as international cutting and polishing firms, and 
in the process to develop an efficient and fit-for-purpose infrastructure. 
Mozambique shows a similar level of government commitment and decisive 
action. Tanzania is at the other extreme, an economic environment in which 
not only is the existing infrastructure inadequate to meet the needs of either 
the lead commodity producing firms or their suppliers and users effectively, 
but also where there seems little capacity to make a difference in the future. 
But even where governments are aware of the need to upgrade the 
infrastructure required to meet the needs of the lead commodity producers in 
the commodities sector, in few cases were we able to observe a recognition 
that attention has to be given to meeting the specific needs of supplier firms 
providing inputs into the commodities sector.  
 
Finally, on the policy front, a specific issue arises when action is required at 
the supranational level. This is evident in relation to the Central Development 
Corridor which links the Great Lakes interior to the East African seaboard. 
There are enormous potential gains for production linkages from this Corridor, 
perhaps even greater for horizontal linkages than for backward and forward 
linkages. However, there appears to be a chronic incapacity of the 
governments involved in this collective effort to work together in an effective 
and timely manner. This contrasts sharply with the Southern Corridor in 
Mozambique, which has potential externalities in Malawi and Southern 
Tanzania. In this latter case, and partly as a consequence of the nature of the 
commodity (which in itself will cover the costs of infrastructure development), 
the primary government in question (Mozambique) and the involvement of an 
emerging company firm which has deep experience both in mining and 
infrastructure (Vale), progress seem much quicker and better directed. 
 
3.3. Capabilities, skills and the National System of Innovation 
Linkages into and out of the commodity sector require a range of 
complementary capabilities. Prime amongst these are the skills of their labour 
forces. But these skills need to be harnessed effectively, so organisation and 
managerial routines are additional core requirements. Further, since 
technologies are changing rapidly, firms also require the capacity to identify, 
effectively assimilate and improve new technology, and this often happens as 
a precursor to developing their own innovative technologies.  This sets out a 
challenging agenda for individual firms in linking to the commodities sector 
with efficiency, and there is much which they can undertake on their own to 
achieve these objectives. But, typically, it will also require the firm – and the 
ensemble of firms in a value chain - to be supported by a range of public and 
private sector institutions. These backing institutions are often very local in 
nature and comprise a “regional system of innovation” (Braczyk, Cooke and 
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Heidenreich, 1998). They also often have sectoral specificities (a “sectoral 
system of innovation”, Malerba 2002). But most typically they are assembled 
on an economy-wide basis and comprise a “national system of innovation”, 
(Lundvall, 1992; Freeman 1995). 
 
In relation to skills – a number of studies have found strong evidence that a 
better educated workforce and the increased supply of skills have a major 
impact on economic growth (Barro, 1999; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2007).  
Raising education levels  raises the productivity of the existent labour force in 
relation to existing tasks. Further, a better educated labor force is more 
adaptive and are better able to deal with new routines and technological 
changes. Thus skills are a core component of innovation of new products and 
processes and the restructuring of corporate positions in global value chains  
Managerial skills and the routines which are established within firms are a 
critical component of the capacity of individual firms to use their endowments 
of skilled and unskilled labour, their technological capabilities and their 
equipment to meet the requirements of cometitive production (Teece et al, 
1997). In some cases the required skills may be of a very high level nature 
and be incorporated in R&D. But most typically, competitive production and 
technical change require the capacity for implementing incremental changes. 
As countries develop and as firms expand into new products areas requiring 
new technologies, their need for skills increases. It is a paradox that, in 
general, the greater the level of capabilities which a firm and country 
possesses, the more it feels a skill constraint. This reflects their industrial 
ambition, and because they are competing in a deeper pool of knowledge-
intensive production. 
 
GIven the nascent development of industry in much of SSA, the capabilities 
required to develop linkages into and out of the commodities sectors tend to 
be at the bottom of the capability ladder. Therefore, in assessing the extent to 
which capabilities in different countries, and in different sectors, affect the 
breadth and depth of linkages, our research focused on two basic sets of 
issues. The first was the provision and mobility of skills. To what extent did 
skill shortages affect the development of linkages, and how have 
governments responded with investments in training. Related to these 
shortages, was there any evidence that the migraton of skills – between 
sectors domestically and across naitonal borders – affected linkage 
development? The second set of factors was the extent to which the 
institutions in the National System of Innovation (NSI) has a bearing on the 
breadth and depth of linkages into and out of the commoditeis sectors. The 
nature and determinants of R&D and leading-edge innovation applied only to 
the development and sustainability of linkages in South Africa‟s commodity 
sectors. 
 
The centrality of skills and technology support in linkage development is 
illustrated in the case of backward linkages into Angola‟s oil industry (Figure 
21). First-tier firms supplying control- and flow-line into offshore oil-production 
were asked to rank their key requirements for deepening supply on a scale of 
1-7, and to rate the performance of the local economy on the same scale. 
They determined that three factors were critical - skills, general industrial 
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capabilities, and within general industrial capabilities, the specific capabilities 
of the metalworking sector.  
 
Figure 21: Need for both skills and technology support in Angola 
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Source: Teka (2011) 
 
Before embarking on this analysis it is helpful to briefly overview the general 
level of skill development and commitment to high level research training in 
the eight economies under examination. As can be seen from Table 37, all of 
the SSA economies are a long way behind frontier economies such as Japan 
and Sweden with respect to human resource development. Some African 
economies such as South Africa and Botswana do show progress in many 
elements of skill development, particularly by comparison with other SSA 
economies such as Tanzania and Gabon. But even these outlier economies 
are some way behind Brazil, a resource-dependent middle income economy 
which in many respects is a role model for African resource economies.  
 
Table 37: Comparative human resource indicators, 2010 
 Adult literacy 
rate (% aged 
15 and above) 
Expected years 
of schooling 
(children) 
Education 
Expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
Mean years of 
schooling 
(adults) 
Researchers 
per million 
inhabitants 
Researchers 
per 000 total 
employment 
Angola 67.4 4.4 .. 4.4   
Botswana 84.8 12.4 .. 8.9 942
a
 2.5
 a
 
Gabon 88.2 12.7 .. 7.5 380
d
 0.9
 d
 
Ghana 67.3 9.7 .. 7.1 28
b
 0.07
 b
 
Nigeria 74.8 8.9 .. 5.0 119
 b
 0.04
 b
 
South Africa 89.3 13.4 5.1
 c
 8.2 815
 b
 2.8
 b
 
Tanzania 73.2 5.3 6.8
 c
 5.1 67
 b
 0.15
 b
 
Zambia 71.4 7.2 1.4
 c
 6.5   
Brazil 90.0 13.8 .. 7.2 1,098
 c
 2
 c
 
Japan  15.1  11.5 6,997
c
 13
 c
 
Sweden .. 15.6 .. 11.6 7,758
 b
 14
 b
 
a = 2005; b = 2009, c = 2007  
Source: Adult literacy, expected, mean years of schooling, education expenditure from International 
Human Development Indictors online <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/tables/default.html>. Researchers‟ 
data from UNESCO data online <http://www.uis.unesco.org/> (accessed July 2011) 
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All of these components of skill, as well as the character of the NSI, have 
implications for the efficiency with which the commodities sector operates, 
and as a factor which facilitates or constrains linkages to and from the 
commodities sector. In reviewing the evidence of our case-studies, we will 
focus on four sets of issues – the existence and nature of skills shortages, 
investments in training to fill these gaps in skills, the flow of skilled labour in 
and out of the commodities value chain, and the role played (where relevant) 
by the NSI. As in the case of other drivers of linkages, the evidence is often of 
a partial nature. 
 
Skill shortages 
Skill shortages are pervasive across all of the sectoral studies under review, 
although the level of skillls in which shortages are experienced varies greatly. 
In summary, the country-by-country picture is as follows: 
 
In Angola, the government has set exacting targets for the growth of locally-
employed skill workers. In the oilfield services sector providing control lines to 
the oil sector, there has been a steady increse in the share of citizens who in 
2010 accounted for 90 percent of total employment in the basic and mid-
skilled categories, 45 percent of managers, but only 17 percent of engineers 
(Table 38). The manufacturers of flowlines, which are more recent in origin 
employ a smaller share of basic and mid-level skilled locals, and a similarly 
low share of local engineers. Thus, in both of these backward linkage firms, 
the short-term need for skills is met through the use of migrant labour. A 
similar pattern of skills shortage was observed in the constructon sector, 
leading most of the Chinese firms to import skills from China. The Chinese 
firms reported not just a shortage of skills, but also argued that Chinese 
labour was used to working at a higher pace and for much longer hours than 
the Angolan emplyees, frequently at lower wages as well. 
 
Table 38: Percentage Share of Angolans in skills in backward linkages feeding 
into the Angolan oil sector (2004-2014) 
 
 
Period 
 
Total 
Workforce 
Local (Angolan) workforce 
Basic & 
Mid-Skilled 
 
Managers 
 
Engineers 
Control Lines 
2004 50 80 30 0 
2009 160 90 45 17 
2014* 180 90 60 52 
Flow Lines 
2003 - 70 - 5 
2009 - 72 - 20 
2014* - 85 - 35 
*: projected     Source: Teka (2011) 
 
In Botswana, where the forward linkage into diamond cutting and polishing is 
made up almost entirely of labour, skills are the key obstacle to the deepening 
of linkages. In the cutting and polishing sector itself, expatraites made up only 
7 percent of the total labour force, but more than half of top management and 
one-third of middle management. In a seleciton of supplier firms, expatriates 
made up less than five percent of the total labour force. 
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In South Africa – the country with the most highly educated population in 
SSA – firms supplying mining equipment and specialist services identified the 
shortage of skills as a significant constraint. Skills shortages exist at all levels 
– managerial and artisanal as well as technical levels such as machine 
operators. The shortage is exacerbated – particularly at the managerial and 
higher skill levels – by emigration, most significantly to Australia. At the same 
time, South African firms complain that they are unable to secure skills abroad 
because they cannot obtain the necessary work permits. Enterprise Survey 
(ES) data for 2003 and 2007 provide further confirmation of the importance of 
the skill shortage. In 2003, firms in the capital goods sector cited skills 
shortage as their most significant constraint. In 2007, skills shortage was 
identified as the second most important constraint after crime. It is cited by 
firms as one of the major reasons why they are increasingly relocating the 
manufacture of products outside of South Africa – notably to China. But firms 
also cite the skills shortage as impacting on the location of research and 
development, with South African firms increasingly favouring locating their 
operations in Australia which offers both better availability of skills and strong 
linkages with well-endowed publicly supported research institutions.   
 
In Gabon, an absence of domestic skilled labour proved to be a major cost 
penalty to all companies in the timber chain. With their international 
connections and deeper pockets, large-scale companies found it easier to 
bear the “skill cost” penalty. Smaller Gabonese-owned companies were most 
severely affected and found it more difficult to deepen forward linkages. This 
shortfall in skills led to the recruitment of skills from abroad. Senior positions 
(management, technicians) were most often filled by labour recruited from 
Europe and/or Asia (depending on the ownership of production), whereas in 
administration, transport and in production, skilled labour was sourced from 
neighbouring Central African countries where wages were approximately one-
third or lower than those in Gabon. It is striking that so severe is the skill 
shortage in Gabon that 15 percent of unskilled labour was migrant (Table 39) 
 
Table 39: Employment categories and country of origin in Gabon’s timber 
value chain (percentage) 2009 
  Distribution Origin 
 Gabon Foreign 
Management 7 24 75 
Technicians 4 59 41 
Administration 6 87 13 
Labourers 75 84 16 
Transport 6 70 31 
Environment & Social 2 74 26 
Total 100   
Source: Terheggen (2011) 
 
In Nigeria the labour market constraints on skills appear to be less severe, at 
least from the perspective of backward linkage firms feeding into the oil 
sector. Eighty percent of these firms were satisfied with availability of skilled 
labour, although one-third of firms resorted to recruiting skills from abroad. In 
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the ICT sector where skill shortages were considered most severe, almost 
half of the firms recruited from abroad (Table 40). A reflection of the relative 
absence of skill constraints, 56 percent of firms believed that the Nigerian 
educational and training system met their needs adequately, although there 
were sub-sectoral differences with the levels of satisfaction being lower in 
control system and ICT (47 percent) and higher in the fabrication and 
construction sector (68 percent).  
 
Table 40:  Perceptions of skill availability in firms supplying to the Nigerian oil 
industry (number and percentage of firms) 
 
Control 
systems & 
ICT 
Fabrication & 
construction 
Well 
construction 
& completion Others Total 
Can find adequate skilled 
labour 84.2 81.8 73.5 100 80 
Have to employ skilled 
labour educated abroad 47.4 31.8 23.5 20 31.3 
Share of non-Nigeria skilled 
labour 
up to 10% 
11%-20% 
above 20% 
22.2 
55.6 
22.2 
42.9 
14.3 
42.9 
50 
50 
 - 
 - 
100 
 - 
36 
44 
20 
Educations/training 
provided in Nigeria meet 
company‟s requirement 47.4 68.2 52.9 60 56.3 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
 
The training response 
In the context of these skill shortages inhibiting the competitiveness of the 
lead commodities firms and their suppliers and customers, both governments 
and firms responded with training programmes, albeit to a varying degree. 
 
In Angola the supplier firms ran intensive in-house training programmes, 
involving both on-the-job training and sending labour to affiliates abroad 
(Table 41). Most of the training abroad is in the USA and Europe (83 percent), 
but some also occurs in Brazil (25 percent) and South Africa (10 percent). 
Most of the firms (88 percent) have funded local learning institutions, of which 
the bulk (54 percent) was directed to the National Petroleum Institute (INP), 
and 46 percent to other institutions. Nearly half the respondents (43 percent) 
have collaborated with local institutions in curriculum development. Of these, 
83 percent have had such collaborations with the INP 
 
Table 41: Local content and intra-firm training in Angola (% of respondents) 
 Yes No INP Various 
Do you have in-house training programmes 100 0 -- -- 
Do you train employees on-the-job 100 0 -- -- 
Do you train employees abroad 100 0 -- -- 
Do you have a funding policy for local learning institutions 88 12 -- -- 
Which local learning institutions have you funded to date -- -- 54 46 
Have you collaborated in curriculum development with 
any local institution 
43 57 -- -- 
Which local institutions have you collaborated with in 
curriculum development 
 
- 
 
-- 
 
83 
 
27 
Source: Teka (2011) 
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Given its single-minded focus on increasing participation by Angolans in the 
oil industry (which as we saw in the discussion on the depth of linkages 
reflects the Angolan government‟s perception of domestic content), there 
have been extensive developments in training in publicly-funded institutions, 
particularly those involving secondary and professional levels skills. There is 
some disquiet in the private sector however that the focus on these skills 
training programmes was decided without consultation with the oil sector and 
the private sector in general. Thus, many of the skills being produced do not 
meet the specific skills gaps which are constraining linkages to the oil sector, 
especially higher level skills. This criticism is levelled particularly at the 
National Petroleum Institute (INP) and the Ministry of Industry‟s professional 
training programmes. The National Petroleum Institute (INP) was established 
in 1983 to provide technical and professional training for oil industry workers 
and it has been supported with funds by oil companies and oil services 
companies. But since it was established in 1983, the INP has produced a total 
of only 1,910 graduates at an average of 72 graduates per annum. The 
Agostinho Neto University, which is the largest, oldest and the only publicly 
funded university in the country, only produces an average of 32 engineers 
per annum. Courses in private universities which have been emerging since 
1991 following the legalisation of private education are geared mostly toward 
social sciences (law, international relations, philosophy, etc), and to some 
extent information technology. The state-owned oil company, Sonangol, has 
established three corporate training centres, but only one of the three centres 
involves higher (tertiary) level skills training. The latter‟s annual enrolment 
capacity per annum is 480. Thus, despite these different initiatives, the 
cumulative average of the engineering output by the different higher education 
institutions is well below the oil sector‟s needs. Oil companies have estimated 
that Angola needs to produce around 1,300 higher level 
technicians (engineers) annually if the targeted rate of Angolanisation of 
human resources in the oil sector is to succeed.   
 
Moving away from oil to the Angolan construction sector, at the 2006 Forum 
on China Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) Summit held in Beijing, China‟s 
President Hu Jintao announced, as part of an eight-point plan, that China 
would provide training for African professionals. Chinese small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) operating in Angola were encouraged to invest in human 
resources development. In the construction sector, some of the larger SOEs 
sent students to China to study engineering and architecture and other 
relevant skills, but expected them to either work for the SOE on their return or 
to work n other infrastructure projects in Angola.  
 
In Nigeria, almost all the major oil companies investing in Nigeria carry out 
training programmes and sponsor education through grants of scholarships. A 
good example is Shell which has made a wide-ranging commitment to training 
which includes:  
 
 The Shell Intensive Training Programme, introduced in 1998 with the 
objective of preparing young graduates for employment in the oil 
industry 
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 University scholarship grants for about 850 university scholarships 
annually  
 The endowment of Shell Professorial Chairs in 7 universities; 
 Youth Development Schemes through which they have trained 355 
youths in a range of skills such as welding, pipefitting and carpentry, 
entrepreneurship and leadership development and conflict 
management; 
 Building of infrastructure that promotes education. For example, in 2004 
Shell completed a total of 86 infrastructural projects, including 
classroom blocks, teachers‟ quarters and libraries, among others.  
 
However, most of these oil-company sponsored training programmes are 
designed to meet its own needs, the needs of the oil-extracting sector or wider 
society. None are specifically focused on enhancing skills in the industries 
supplying inputs to Shell or other oil companies. 
 
The Nigerian government has made large investments in training to meet the 
needs of the oil industry. The Petroleum Technology Development Fund 
(PTDF) was established in 1973 and was given responsibility for developing, 
promoting and implementing petroleum technology and human resource 
development. This was  to be achieved through research and the training of 
Nigerian as graduates, professionals, technicians and craftsmen in the fields 
of petroleum and other engineering areas, geology, geosciences, 
management, economics and other relevant fields in petroleum and solid 
minerals industry, both locally and abroad. The PTDF endowment programme 
has focused on advancing petroleum technology education in six Nigerian 
Federal Universities, providing an endowment fund of between $66,000 and 
$400.000 (N10 mn and N60 mn) per university. The PTDF also carries out a 
number of programmes including an Engineering Design Training Programme 
(EDTP), a Welders Training and Certification Programme (WTCP), a Local 
Scholarship Scheme (LSS) and the Overseas Scholarship Scheme (OSS). 
Between 2001 and 2006, 450 M.Sc and 84 Ph.D scholars were trained in the 
OSS programme.  
 
Past attempts by government in establishing a national system of innovation 
also include the establishment of the Petroleum Training Institute (PTI) in 
Delta State (in 1973), the Federal University of Petroleum Resources in Delta 
State, and also the National College of Petroleum Studies in Kaduna (NCPS, 
in 1995). The PTI functions as an educational institution, and also trains lower 
and middle level manpower to meet the indigenous labour requirements of the 
oil and gas sector, while the NCPS is trains high level manpower. 
 
In Tanzania, the Mineral Policy (1997) called for the establishment of training 
institutions in relevant core and industry supporting skills, and for foreign 
investors in the field to train Tanzanians. However, beyond this broad verbal 
commitment, the Mineral Policy concern with skill development has seen little 
effective action. The Act did not specify either target levels for training, or a 
time-scale for the achievement of its (loosely-specified) goals. Moreover, a 
provision in the act provides the space for each of the large mines to bargain 
for specific exemptions, and most often this involves Mining Development 
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Agreements (MDA) which allow for the unrestricted employment of expatriate 
labour, both for themselves and for their lead suppliers. African Barrick Gold 
and AngloGold Ashanti, in collaboration with the Tanzanian Chamber of 
Minerals and Energy (TCME) and Vocational Education and Training 
Authority (VETA) have embarked on a technical training project, the 
Integrated Mining Technical Training (IMTT). The programme is specifically 
designed to train artisans (tradesmen) and is located at the Moshi VETA 
institute.  
 
Botswana’s diamond linkage policy was very effective in aligning skills 
demand with skills development through mandating and enforcing intensive 
training at the firm level. Cutting and polishing are very firm-specific skills, 
which constitute the firms‟ core competitive advantage. Locals are mostly 
trained to specialise in a section of the manufacturing process, in order to 
protect the firms‟ competitive command over the whole process. Skills were 
developed by the cutting and polishing factories through a combination of on-
the-job training and apprenticeships in the firms other operations. For the 
companies to operate efficiently they need a low labour turnover in order to 
justify the investment they make when training their workers. The firms have 
made a tacit agreement through Botswana‟s Diamond Manufacturers 
Association to refrain from poaching each other‟s workers. 
 
In South Africa, training is fairly widespread in the industry, particularly on 
the part of foreign owned firms. Data from the 2003 Enterprise Survey showed 
that 76 percent of foreign firms in the sector offered training. However, there 
are some indications that the number of firms offering training has declined. In 
the 2007 survey, only 59 percent of foreign firms and 44 percent of domestic 
firms offered training. Firms regard the Skills Education Training Authorities 
(SETA) training system as cumbersome and ineffective. Many firms 
complained about the declining number of mining engineers and the Chamber 
of Mines described the situation as “dire.” 
 
Mobility of skills 
The public nature of skill-development arises from the fact that investors in 
most forms of training are unable to appropriate the fruits of their investment. 
This means that skills produced by a particular firm may be used by other 
firms, either by competitors or by firms in other sectors and other countries. It 
is for this reason that as a general phenomenon, cutting across countries and 
sectors, there is systematic market failure in skill provision. But not all skill 
loss is a loss to the economy. The “leakage” of skills from one firm may be a 
gain to another, helping to diffuse knowledge and skills through the economy. 
Where skills leak abroad, the loss may have few positive externalities, except 
in cases where “brain-drain” subsequently turns into “brain-gain” as nationals 
return home after gaining experience abroad. 
 
In Nigeria, skills spill-over from the mining companies to upstream and 
downstream, industries and into other sectors were significant (Table 42). 
More than half of the supplying firms were aware of ex-employees who had 
developed expertise with the company and were now engaged in other 
sectors. However, an even larger number of firms (69 percent) employed 
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personnel previously employed by the oil companies. More than 90 percent of 
the oil firms confirmed they were aware of ex-employees now in other sectors, 
whilst more than 80 percent stated that they have employed personnel 
previously employed by their suppliers. 
 
Table 42: Skill spill-overs in backward linkages in the Nigerian oil sector 
 
Control 
system & 
ICT 
Fabrication & 
construction 
Well 
construction 
& completion Others Total 
Aware of ex-employees who 
developed expertise with the 
company and are now engaged 
in other sectors 52.6 59.1 61.8 40 457.5 
Employ personnel who were 
previously employed by the oil 
companies 68.4 72.7 64.7 80 568.8 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
 
In Zambia, soon after privatisation and the retrenchment of staff in the mines, 
there was an influx of ex-employees from the mines‟ operations departments 
into the supply chain. They had acquired technical skills from the operations 
department and marketing skills and knowledge of the procurement process 
form the sales departments in the mines. Although these skills spill-overs 
were of benefit to suppliers, this benefit was seldom considered to be very 
critical by the firms acquiring these skilled workers and there was little 
correlation between these spill-overs and the performance of suppliers (Table 
43). That is, the degree to which suppliers drew on the ex-employees of 
mines (about half of all suppliers did so) showed no clear relationship 
between three types of upstream suppliers, those with a positive growth 
trajectory, those who were stable and those who were experiencing declining 
growth and profitability. In total, 24 firms employed personnel who used to 
work in the mining companies. Slightly more than 50 percent of this group 
fared well, but one third did not and exited from the supply chain.  
 
Table 43: Zambian suppliers employing ex-staff from the mines 
 Positive 
performance 
Static 
trajectory  
Negative 
performance  
Total  
Employed staff from the mines 14 2 8 24 
Not employed staff from the 
mines 
9 5 7 21 
Not responded  3 - 2 5 
Total  26 7 17 50 
Source: Fessehaie (2011) 
 
In Tanzania, there were limited instances in which skills spill-overs took place. 
For example three exploration firms were established by ex-employees of 
mining firms. However, these were limited cases. The mining sector offered 
better wages compared to other sectors of the economy, which anyway offer 
limited employment opportunities. Instead the mining sector was drawing 
skills from other sectors. The most notable and acknowledged skills migration 
was the flow of logistics and purchasing skills moving from other sectors to 
the mining field. There has however been a significant (although not 
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systematically recorded) leakage of skills abroad, and there are reports of 
Tanzanian mining engineers working in the DRC and other countries. (On the 
other hand, there are also Ghanaian mining engineers working in Tanzania). 
 
In the Angola construction sector, skills migration occurred from the Chinese 
firms operating in the construction sector. Chinese white collar workers left 
Chinese SOEs to form their own companies and to operate in the Angolan 
market. An example is a Chinese design firm of which four of the five 
Directors had previously worked with large SOEs in the construction sector. 
One Director estimated that links to their previous employer accounted for 
around 80 percent of their turnover. 
 
In South Africa a combination of factors is leading to the leakage of skills 
abroad. The skills shortage observed has resulted in some companies moving 
some of their operations overseas. These firms are finding it advantageous to 
shift their more labour intensive operations outside of South Africa – notably 
to China. For example, one of the largest South African operations now 
fabricates 20 percent of needed capital equipment in China whereas 
previously equipment was produced exclusively in South Africa. Of more 
concern to the long term future of supply of mining equipment and knowledge 
intensive services to the mining industry is that some of the major mining 
companies are locating their research and development activities abroad. The 
country favoured is almost invariably Australia; with the main attraction being 
the availability of highly skilled labour and the linkages to well-funded 
research centres. Moreover, based on individual decisions reflecting the 
transition to majority rule in South Africa, a significant number of highly skilled 
workers are moving abroad, a process made easier by the global shortage of 
mining skills in a context of a sustained boom in commodity prices and the 
decline in South African mining activity.  
 
But, the picture is not uniformly negative. The decline in local mining output, 
particularly in gold, has resulted in a number of highly skilled South Africans 
selling their expertise abroad and/or moving into mining related activities 
where they can engage their skills and experience. A number or the specialist 
mining service companies that have emerged in South Africa in recent years 
have been founded and developed by persons with skills and experience 
developed in mining and related activities. 
 
Supportive institutions in the NSI 
Given the underdeveloped nature of the industrial sectors in most of SSA, in 
most cases the role which the NSI plays in the existing pattern of linkages 
from the commodities sector is limited. 
 
In Angola, public expenditure in education has increased in recent years 
reaching nearly eight percent of State budget. But the country‟s output in 
terms of research, science and technology remains very weak. Expenditure 
on education has grown rapidly, from five percent of government expenditure 
in 2001 to 7.9 percent in 2009 (Table 44). This increasing proportion is of a 
growing government budget as revenues expanded during the commodities 
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price boom. The output of R&D expenditures in terms of patents and journal 
publications barely registers. 
 
Table 44: Education expenditure and research output 
Education budget Research output per million population 
 
Year 
% share of 
budget 
 
Year 
Scientific & 
technical 
journals 
Patents granted 
by USPTO 
2001 5 -- -- -- 
2002 5.1 -- -- -- 
2003 6.2 -- -- -- 
2004 10.4  -- -- 
2005 7.1 1993-7 -- -- 
2006 3.8 1995 0.16 -- 
2007 5.6 2001-5 -- 0.01 
2008 7.9 2004-5 0.22 -- 
2009 7.9 2009/10 -- -- 
Source: MINFIN (2010); GOA (2007/8); UNCTAD (2008) 
 
In Nigeria the NSI and its interactions with the oil and gas value chain is more 
developed than in Angola. This arises from the relatively higher level of 
education in Nigeria and the depth of investments in the NSI since 
Independence. This is reflected in the innovative capabilities of the industries 
supplying inputs into the oil sector, as well as in the source of support for 
these innovations (Table 45). More than two thirds of the firms interviewed 
had access to new technology. This resulted from agreements for upgrading 
and maintenance with their own suppliers and from technology agreements 
with foreign companies. A smaller proportion of firms – one-third – had 
developed relationships with universities and local Research and Technology 
Organisations such as the Petroleum Training Institute and the Nigerian 
Institute of Welders. 
 
Table 45: Innovative activities amongst suppliers and the sources of innovative 
support (percent within sector) 
 
Control 
system 
& ICT 
Fabrication & 
construction 
Well 
construction 
& completion Others Total 
Access to new technology 78.9 81.8 67.6 100 76.3 
local innovation/tech agreements 
with foreign companies 57.9 40.9 44.1 60 47.5 
agreements for upgrading& 
maintenance 63.2 50 58.8 80 58.8 
relationship with local research 
centres or the university 42.1 27.3 32.4 40 33.8 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
 
In Ghana, Research and Technology Organisations have been established 
over the years including the National Research Council out of which emerged 
the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR); the Noguchi Memorial Institute for Medical 
Research; the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC); the Ghana 
Standards Board (GSB) and the Cocoa Research Institute. However, despite 
the existence of these RTOs, in general Ghana‟s NSI remains weak due to 
  
94 
lack of investment and proper management of S&T, and is specifically weak in 
relation to institutions focusing on either the needs of the gold sector or its 
suppliers. Total expenditure on research and development (R&D) as a 
percentage of GDP is less than one percent. 
 
Tanzania’s 1997 Mineral Policy articulates a vision of establishing “centres of 
technical excellence in various fields for capacity building, and setting up 
mechanisms for exchange of knowledge and experience” and promoting 
linkages with universities, colleges, research institutions and industry. This 
sectoral policy vision resonates with the vision of the Tanzania Commission 
for Science and Technology. Evidence however indicates that this 
coalescence of visions is yet to be implemented. First there are no centres of 
excellence to support the mining industry in Tanzania. The Tanzania Industrial 
Research and Development (TIRDO) does not include mining sector research 
in its portfolio, and nor does it target linkages with the mining sector. And, 
second, there is limited interaction between what institutions do exist in the 
NSI and the commodities sector. Mining companies reported that their only 
interaction with the universities was when undergraduate students receiving 
training from the mines as part of the curriculum and when students 
conducted firm-sponsored research projects as part of their final year 
undergraduate studies. An exploration manager with a mining firm 
characterised these interactions as “minor and inadequate”.  
 
Botswana’s 2005 National Research, Science and Technology plan focused 
research into mining bi-product utilisation; research into downstream 
processing and beneficiation of mining products; research seeking to improve 
the efficiency of current processing technologies including environmentally 
cleaner production technologies; ICT research to support process control; and 
chemical sciences and engineering and research into improved extraction and 
processing technologies. This plan for the industry is yet to be implemented.  
 
Zambia‟s total budget allocated for innovation and skills creation was low. 
Activity-based budgets are available only for 2004, and reveal that on average 
less than one percent of the total government budget was devoted to 
innovation and skills in that year. Moreover, most of the allocation was spent 
on recurrent expenses. This was compounded by very low private sector 
R&D. Linkages between public institutions in the NSI and the private sectors 
were almost non-existent. This meant that the research conducted in public 
institutions was rarely transferred to commercial exploitation. The 1997 
Science and Technology Act established a number of institutions, which from 
2009 were endowed with a Strategic Research Fund. The latter, however, did 
not target specific industries. Respondents from the National Technology 
Business Centre (NTBC), the body responsible for working jointly with the 
private sector on innovation technology, reported undertaking no project with 
the suppliers in the Copperbelt.  
 
In Gabon, there is a shortage of trained scientists at domestic scientific 
institutions. For example, the Agricultural and Forestry Research Institute 
(IRAF), which is part of the National Scientific and Technological Research 
Centre (CENAREST), has 22 full-time researchers for four departments, 
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including one in forestry science. The same holds true for educational 
institutions like the Schools of Forestry at the University of Omar Bongo and 
the National Water and Forestry School (ENEF) at the University of Masuku. 
Graduates are reluctant to work in the logging and processing areas. None of 
the logging and processing companies were familiar with what training 
programmes existed and were not willing to invest time and financial 
resources into developing links with these institutions.  
 
In South Africa, the competitiveness of the mining equipment industry is 
hampered by deteriorating mining-related research capacity at the CSIR and 
MINTEK. Skilled personnel have been lost and a number of programs closed, 
particularly at the CSIR. Formerly COMRO – the research arm of the 
Chamber of Mines – undertook very significant research on behalf of the 
industry. The CSIR which absorbed COMRO continued to have large scale 
mining research projects – principally in trackless mining and rock 
engineering. However, these research programmes had a limited life and 
currently the capacity at the CSIR has been depleted almost to extinction. It is 
widely stated in the industry that MINTEK has seen a significant decline in its 
capacities. The Council for Geosciences is similarly said to be experiencing 
difficulty and losing staff.   
 
Few of the firms interviewed in mining specialist services and equipment in 
South Africa had significant links with the Science Councils which fund 
research – and where they did, these links were becoming more limited over 
time. Firms make much more use of privately funded research. There appears 
to have been a significant growth in local research consultancies that serve 
the industry that undertake research or provide specialist consultancy 
services. Local firms are increasingly accessing publicly funded research 
institutions and universities located abroad, particularly in Australia.  
 
General lessons of the contribution of the NSI to linkage development 
Capabilities, and the growth of capabilities, are the essential ingredients of a 
broadening and deepening of linkages between the commodities sector and 
other sectors of the economy. Beyond this broad and self-evident statement, 
our research identified two sets of capabilities which were of particular 
relevance to the lead-commodity firms and to their suppliers and customers. 
These were skills – their number and quality, the training programmes which 
created them, and their mobility – and the National System of Innovation.  
 
Across the board, and to varying degrees, the skill constraint was reported as 
being a critical determinant of linkages. The shortage of skills is not unique to 
SSA, or to the commodities sector in general. However, it is particularly 
acutely felt in the SSA commodities sector with the partial exception of the 
Nigerian firms supplying fabrication and construction; well construction and 
completion; and control systems and ICT services to the oil industry. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the single factor holding back linkage development 
across the sectors is that which relates to skills shortages. In many cases, 
governments have set specific targets for the commodities sector on the 
employment of local skills. Yet, at the same time, despite governments 
targeting the greater use of local skills in the commodities sector, the levels of 
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training provided were almost always considered to be very inadequate. The 
disciplines taught were not attuned to the specific needs of the commodities 
sector, the levels of training were insufficient and there was generally an 
inadequate intercourse with the users of skilled labour on what types of skills 
were required. It is not surprising therefore that in most countries there was 
simultaneously both the need to import skills from abroad and a loss of 
domestically-trained skills migrating to other countries. Moreover, and this 
might be considered fine-tuning given the gravity of the problem, only in 
Botswana was there any evidence of targeting the specific skill needs of firms 
supplying inputs into the commodities sector and beneficiating the outputs of 
the sector. 
 
The picture which emerges with regard to the NSI is perhaps even more 
striking. Whilst each of our sample countries had institutions in the NSI which 
nominally addressed the needs of the commodities sector and its linkage 
firms, it was only in Nigeria and South Africa that there appeared to be any 
resulting productive synergies. And even here, the formerly world-leading 
innovative capacity in South Africa‟s mining support institutions is in danger of 
bleeding away, with a decline in the quality of mining engineering graduates 
and the emigration of experienced engineers. Their bidding-away by 
aggressive recruitment policies in Australia and other countries is graphic 
evidence of the value of a strong NSI. 
 
3.4 Policy development, management and implementation  
Competitiveness is a moving frontier. The confluence of factors which makes 
a firm, a value chain, a region or a country competitive at a particular point in 
time seldom endures. Competitors soon enter the fray and the only route to 
sustaining incomes is to endogenise the ability to learn and change. This is 
generally loosely referred to as the capacity to innovate which has become 
the holy grail of both corporate and national policy in recent decades. 
However, it has become increasingly evident that the word “innovate” is in 
itself not very helpful. It masks a series of subsidiary processes, each of which 
has its own particular challenges. At the one end of the innovation cycle is the 
capacity to “invent”, to introduce a new idea for a product, or a process or a 
way of organising production. In general, this is the “high-tech” end of the 
innovation cycle. However this stage of invention is in itself not a guarantor of 
success, as the invention has to be translated into a product or service which 
consumers find attractive and which produces returns which exceeds the 
costs of introduction. Thereafter, this useful and valued invention has to be 
produced, marketed and distributed in a timely fashion, and with due attention 
to costs, quality and delivery. Together, all of these diverse stages are 
referred to as “innovation management” a burgeoning field of analysis which 
recognises that whilst the assembly and coordination of these innovation 
inputs may not be rocket-science (at least by comparison with the inventive 
stage) it may indeed be the most difficult stage in the innovative cycle (Tidd, 
Bessant and Pavitt, 2005).  
 
A further important lesson learned from the analysis of innovation is that the 
most successful managers of innovation do not see it as a sequential process 
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which starts with a process of producer-driven invention, which is then 
subsequently passed through the various links in the value chain until it 
reaches the final consumer. Instead, the most successful processes of 
innovation occur when the various parties in the innovation chain interact 
throughout the innovation process, and where final users play an important 
role in the pulling, shaping and sometimes moulding of innovations (Gibbons, 
2001; von Hippel, 1986). 
 
Our analysis of the role that policies play in the promotion of linkages in the 
commodities sectors in the African countries under review draws on these 
insights from innovation theory. We begin by asking the question about the 
nature of the “invention”, that is do governments and firms have a Vision for 
the promotion of linkages from commodities? From this follow a series of 
“management of innovation” type concerns – is the vision translated into 
policies, and are these policies coherent? Are these policies backed by 
incentives which ensure that they are implemented effectively? And does the 
government and the corporate sector have the capacity and the will to 
implement these policies? Finally, there is the issue of reflexivity – do the 
various stakeholders who relate to the management of linkage policy interact, 
and do they as a collectivity, display the capacity to adjust policies 
dynamically? 
 
Angola 
The primary focus on local content on backward linkages in Angola has been 
on the Angolisation of the labour force. A subsidiary concern has been the 
development of local supply chain to the oil industry. However, to all intents 
and purposes, the Angolan government has conflated “local value” with local 
ownership. This is as much an agenda of national identity as one of promoting 
the development of the local economy through the development of linkages 
from the oil sector. Targets were set on the proportion of Angolan labour in 
both the extractive and supply industries, which aimed at 100 percent Angolan 
labour at basic skills level, 80 percent at mid-skills level and 70 percent at 
higher skills level. However, an industry-wide assessment carried out in 2004 
indicated that while the targets for basic and mid-skills levels were exceeded, 
the target for higher skills level remained below target. 
 
As we saw in the discussion of the breadth and depth of linkages, a three-tier 
system has been established for Angolan content in the supply industry 
(supply of goods and services). Goods and services of low capital and 
knowledge intensity have to be purchased from national companies. Goods 
and services with average levels of capital and know-how have to be supplied 
by joint venture companies between national and foreign companies. Lastly, 
no preferential treatment is applied to highly-technological and capital 
intensive goods and services. Local content policy does not identify these 
products in detail and these are settled by bilateral negotiation between 
government and the oil industry, providing much scope for discretionary 
decisions (and bribery) by individual government offices. National suppliers 
are defined as firms that are fully-owned by Angolan citizens or 51 percent of 
share capital is owned by Angolan citizens. However, preferential treatment 
applies only to inputs supplied at a premium of less than 10 percent over the 
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cost of imports. These provisions apply to all contracts above $150,000. It is 
notable that there appear to be no provisions forcing the degree of local 
content in these domestically-sourced inputs, and hence in most cases local 
content has only minimal local value added. 
 
This policy environment suggests a broad, but poorly specified vision on 
linkages. That is, government knows what it wants (more local participation 
and ownership), but this is weakly translated into policies designed to promote 
any depth in backward linkages. Sonangol has responsibility for 
implementation, together with the Ministry of Petroleum But there is a limited 
institutional and support base to realise these targets.  
 
There are a range of problems in the implementation of the local content 
policy. The allocation of inputs in the three tiers of technological complexity 
(Table 46) – which appear to have been arbitrarily determined - 
underestimates the technology and capital content of most of the products the 
policy designates to be of average technology and capital levels. Moreover, 
the national training institutes are focussed disproportionately on mid-level 
technical skills. Finally, there is a lack of coordination and integration between 
industrial policy and policy towards the oil sector. Industrial policy is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Industry, whilst policy towards the oil sector 
(including with regard to backward linkages) is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Sonangol. There are no joint-working arrangements 
in policy design and implementation between the Ministry of Industry and 
Sonangol and the Ministry of Petroleum. Consequently, there is a lack of 
policy coordination between industrialisation policy (as far as incentives and 
capability development programmes are concerned) and oil sector policies.  
 
Table 46: Categories of preferential products since 2003 
Exclusive to local firms  Exclusive to joint-venture firms 
Food stuffs & Catering, 
Transportation  of equipment & materials, 
Supply of technical materials (IT & electric 
equipment, etc), 
General Cleaning & Gardening 
General maintenance of equipment & vehicles, 
Operation and management of supply points 
(service stations), 
Retailers of lighting oil, gas & lubricants, and 
Transport of goods from terminals to supply points 
Purchase/processing of geographical data; 
Vertical, directional, horizontal drilling of wells & 
completion; 
Geological control of drilling (mud logging); 
Production tests; 
Operation & maintenance of oil production 
installation; 
Operators & managers of terminals; 
Manufacture of plastic/synthetic fibres for the oil 
industry; 
Drilling, production material, etc 
Source: Teka (2011) 
 
For example, Business Development Service Centres (BDS) are a public-
private business capacity development initiative intended for local SME 
development in the different sectors of the economy. It is an initiative between 
the Angolan government, UNDP and Chevron (American oil producing 
company and the oldest operator in the Angolan oil market). This initiative is 
implemented by Chevron in collaboration with other oil operators and 
Sonangol without any involvement from the National Private Investment 
Agency (ANIP) or the Ministry of Industry. Moreover, Sonangol (as the public 
sector partner) only recognises but does not support the initiative with any 
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tangible incentives comparable to the ones offered to local firms in the 
concession market.  
 
Botswana 
The Government of Botswana has a particularly well-developed vision for the 
development of forward linkages from the diamond mining industry. This 
sector specific policy is rooted in the National Development Plan (2006 and 
2009), which identified six strategic objectives to guide the future development 
of the economy - education, innovation, agriculture, medical, transport and the 
diamond industry. It is intended that there will be strong links between these 
strategic interventions. For example the diamond hub will be supported by the 
education hub which will produce skills for the different industries in the 
diamond hub, whilst the innovation hub will attract business to perform 
research for the industry and the transport hub will ensure that the all the 
necessary transport infrastructure needed by the industry is in place.  
 
This is not the first time the Botswana Government has targeted downstream 
beneficiation. Faced with the likely exhaustion of low-cost near-to-the-surface 
diamond mines, attempts were made in the early 1980s to promote a cutting 
and polishing industry. De Beers did not support the government's ambitions 
at that time, arguing that cutting and polishing activities were not economically 
viable in Botswana. But after political pressure was exerted on De Beers, 
three cutting and polishing factories were started between 1980 and 1990. 
However government policy at that time was not backed by clear monitoring 
or strong sanctions and none of these factories ever reported a profit or 
showed any signs of expanding. Although this early attempt was a failure, it 
proved to be an important learning experience. 
 
After employing consultants to map the value chain and determine an 
appropriate path to deepening forward linkages, an ambitious Vision for 
diamond beneficiation was developed in 2005, this time backed by clear 
supportive policies and by strong sanctions. An opportunity was provided for 
this Vision by the expiry of De Beers 25-year diamond mining lease. The fact 
that De Beers sourced more than half of its diamonds from Botswana through 
a 50-50 joint venture with the government (Debswana) gave the government 
significant bargaining power. As part of the new agreement a 50-50 joint 
venture between the government and De Beers, the Diamond Trading 
Company (DTC) Botswana was established and clear performance targets 
were set. The agreement stipulated that these sales and employment targets 
should be reached by 2010, the penalty clause for non-performance for De 
Beers were such that the employment target was met rapidly. In 2010, $482m 
of rough diamonds were sold to the 16 sight-holders by the DTC Botswana 
and according to the agreement at least 80 per cent of the rough diamonds 
have to be cut and polished domestically. 
 
In order to implement this strategy, the Botswana Government established 
two sector specific institutions, the Diamond Office and Diamond Hub. The 
Diamond Hub is the sector executive agency tasked with the practical 
implementation of policy. To this end the Diamond Hub has implemented five 
policies designed to provide a favourable business environment for the 
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industry. The first is a reduced corporate tax rate (15 percent rather than 25 
percent) for the cutting and polishing firms. The second provides for the fast-
tracking of Work Permit applications for skilled labour used to train locals, and 
for labour visiting to maintain and repair their equipment. The third is an 
exemption from paying the economy-wide training levy if firms have their own 
training programmes (which have to be accredited with the Training 
Authority). The fourth is an exemption from paying taxes on polished 
diamonds exports and the fifth is that the sight-holders do not have to pay 
import duties on their technology imports. The Diamond Office is responsible 
for the inspecting diamond exports, issuing Kimberley Process12 certificates 
and, together with DTC, for monitoring the activities of the companies by 
undertaking six-monthly audits. 
 
Thus the government has a clear vision, backed by policies which embody 
both negative sanctions (exclusion from rough diamond supply) and positive 
sanctions (exemption from work permits, import duties and lower taxes). What 
happens on the ground, and does the government have the capacity to 
implement and monitor these policies? It is only five years since the 
programme was introduced, but the trajectory is in general a positive one.  
Based on interviews with three senior government respondents and seven 
senior industry managers (five of the 13 Sight-holders and two brokers), it 
seems that there is a clear dialogue between the public and private sector, 
since in general both sets of respondents weighted the coherence of the 
Government‟s vision and policies similarly (Figure 22). Moreover, as one 
senior private sector executive observed, “Policy is working with and not 
against the industry, the culture is very open and we can recommend things to 
the Diamond Hub”. The major difference in perspectives was that the private 
sector felt that government policies were more promoting of backward 
linkages than did the government officers themselves. 
 
Fig 22: Industry and Government Responses on Government’s Policy 
 
Sample size: 3 government respondents, 7 industry respondents (5 manufacturing firms and 
two brokers). Key: 1 – Not at all, 2 – Slightly, 3 – Moderate, 4 – Very and 5 - Extremely 
Source: Mbayi (2011) 
                                            
12
The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme certifies diamond rough exports and imports in 
over 70 member countries to confirm that they are from conflict-free sources.  
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Having a vision and complementary policies is of course one important strand 
of effective policy implementation. But it needs to be backed by the capacity 
and the will to implement these policies adequately. Here there is agreement 
between the government and private sector respondents on the integrity of 
government efforts and, in general the will of government to execute its policy. 
Not surprisingly, however, government respondents tended to rate their 
capacities to implement these policies more highly than did the private sector 
(Table 47). 
 
Table 47: Industry and Government responses on Government’s Capacity 
(percent response) 
 Government (n=3) Industry (n=7) 
Yes No Yes No 
Do you think the government has the capacity 
to implement its policies for the cutting and 
polishing industry?   
100 0 29 61 
Do you think it really wants to?   100 0 86 14 
Do you think issues of personal integrity 
amongst the relevant government officials 
affect the Government‟s ability to implement 
its policies for the industry?  
0 100 0 100 
Source: Mbayi (2011) 
 
Most often “policy” is seen as an agenda for government alone. Yet it is firms 
who manufacture rather than the government, so it is also important to 
interrogate firm-policy in the same way as that of governments. Do firms have 
a vision, is this backed by consistent “policies” (for example, supply-chain 
development policies), do these policies have sanctions (suppliers are 
rewarded or “fined” for poor performance) and do they have the will and the 
capacity to implement these firm-specific routines? Again, it is of interest to 
assess the views of both government and private sector respondents on these 
issues, in the same way as we have done fro government policies. Figure 23 
shows a much greater divergence in assessment between these two sets of 
respondents than was the case for government policies. The private sector 
believed that it scored highly on all the relevant counts, whilst government 
officials were more sceptical of these firm-specific capabilities. Neither of the 
two government officials polled on this issue believed that the firms really 
wanted to implement their beneficiation strategies, whereas four of the five 
companies responding to this question believed that the private sector as a 
whole did indeed want to push through their commitment to cutting and 
polishing. 
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Figure 23: Industry and Government views on corporate beneficiation policies 
 
Sample size: 2 government respondents, 5 industry respondents (manufacturing firms)  
Key: Where: 1 – Not at all, 2 – Slightly, 3 – Moderate, 4 – Very and 5 - Extremely 
Source: Mbayi (2011) 
 
Gabon 
Gabon has a clear vision for the broadening and deepening of forward 
processing. The 2001 Forestry Code established direct local processing 
requirements in which 75 percent of timber production needed to be 
processed domestically before exportation by January 2012. Prior to that, 
beneficiation had largely been driven by the private sector reacting to changes 
in European consumption patterns. Timber beneficiation is also part of the 
2006 Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which aims to develop a 
private-sector driven diversified economy and to reduce poverty. As part of 
the 'reform' process, the government issued a Sectoral Programme for 
Forests, Fisheries and the Environment that, inter alia, focuses on 
environmental considerations and the maintenance of a sustainable and 
regulated tropic timber logging and processing industry. 
After the entry of Asian firms as serious investors in the timber value chain, 
the close-fit between government and private sector policies (in which both 
stakeholders were driving forward linkages) weakened. Between 2004 and 
2007, the volume of plywood exports decreased by over 40 percent. In 
particular Asian-owned and small Gabonese firms concentrated on the export 
of raw, unprocessed logs to China, contrary to the objectives of the Forestry 
Code. At the same time, there is evidence to suggest that logging which does 
occur in parts of Gabon flouts the Code‟s provision on sustainable logging 
practices. It was thus clear that the objectives of the 2001 Forestry Code were 
being undermined by the actions of the private sector. The government 
responded in August 2010 with a total ban on log exports, a sledgehammer 
approach whose consequences are as yet unknown.  
We can thus observe a policy environment where there is a clear vision 
(forward linkages and sustainable logging). However, whilst the Forestry Code 
set explicit targets, rules and incentives, the translation of these into day-to-
day routines has been weak. This is a result of government failure, the 
political economy of Gabon and poor private sector compliance (though 
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varying by ownership). The response of the government was a heavy-handed 
sanction with untold economic consequences but even then, weak will and 
capacities in government threaten to undermine what policy coherence exists. 
Ghana  
The Government of Ghana has a vision for backward linkages from the gold 
mining industry which is loosely articulated as giving preference to “made in 
Ghana” products, to public corporations, to domestically-based firms and to 
the employment of Ghanaians. Detailed legislation included provisions for 
local content, but these were not part of a vision for linkage development. It 
was not backed by specific sanctions and, as an instrument of industrial 
policy, has had little impact on either the breadth or the depth of linkages. The 
most detailed of these poorly-specified policies on local content were those 
which required the mines to submit detailed programmes for the recruitment 
and training of Ghanaian personnel. 
 
In recent years there has been a groundswell of concern that the mines have 
been operating as enclaves even though, as was shown in the earlier 
discussion of breadth and depth of linkages, local content has grown as a 
consequence of market forces (rather than of government policy). This has 
led the Ghana Chamber of Mines (GCM) and individual companies to commit 
themselves to a policy to develop local business through the Local Business 
Development Programme (LBDP). This programme also overlaps with a 
series of CSR policies designed to promote near-sourcing into the mines and 
in so doing to benefit the local communities in which the mines are located. 
 
This is an embryonic policy and does not function effectively, for three sets for 
reasons. First, there is a lack of coordination between industrial policy and the 
policy framework affecting the mines. The Investment Promotion Agency 
which is responsible for industrial policy implementation is, by law, banned 
from working with the mining and oil sectors. Second, the tariff structure 
exempts mining companies from import duties on a wide range of inputs. This 
does not apply however to the mining supply firms, who continue to pay tariffs 
on the import of their inputs. This has the effect of favouring the importation of 
inputs rather than in obtaining them from domestic suppliers. And, third, 
suppliers and service companies, notably SMEs, confront difficulties in 
accessing finance and generally pay high interest rates. The local banking 
system also has only a limited developmental capability and SMEs are poorly 
supported. 
 
Nigeria 
Nigeria has a long history of policy development focusing on an increase in 
backward linkages, and local content legislation dates back to the late 1960s. 
The first provisions were found in the Petroleum Act of 1969. Later, the joint 
operating agreements (JOA) and the production sharing contract (PSC) 
between the Nigerian government and the foreign oil companies in 1991 and 
1993 respectively, included provisions for the involvement of indigenous firms 
in the supply of commodities.  In 2005, a Nigerian local content policy involved 
the issuance of 23 directives designed to promote backward linkages through 
provisions on the domestic supply of goods and services and the awarding of 
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low-tech on-shore supply of goods and services to indigenous firms. The 
government set targets of 45 percent local content in the oil and gas sector in 
2009 and 70 percent in 2010. There has thus been a sustained policy 
environment designed to promote a greater breadth of input provision. 
 
The Vision for the promotion of backward linkages was strengthened in 2011 
when The Nigerian Content Act (2010) was enacted: 
 
Nigerians independent operators shall be given first consideration in 
the award of oil blocks; oil field licenses, oil lifting licenses and in all 
projects for which contract is to be awarded in the Nigerian oil and gas 
industry. In the bidding for any license, permit or interest and before 
carrying out any project in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, an 
operator shall submit a Nigerian content ('Plan') to the board 
demonstrating compliance with the Nigerians Content Act. Finally, the 
award of contract shall not solely be base on the principle of the lower 
bidder; where a Nigerian indigenous company has capacity to execute 
such job, the company shall not be disqualified exclusively on the basis 
that it is not the lowest financial bidder, provided the value does not 
exceed the lowest bid price by 10 percent. 
 
This strengthening of local content policy was embedded in a wider Vision for 
the economy as a whole. Vision 2020 specified particular targets and 
sanctions for the oil sector, including for backward linkages. The First 
Implementation Plan covered the period 2010-2013 and included provisions 
for the promotion of private sector investment in both upstream and 
downstream links of the oil and gas industry and the growth of national 
content in value added. The very ambitious target was to increase local 
content in oil and gas from 2 percent in 2009 to 35.5 percent in 2010 and to 
70 percent by 2013. Thus, whereas the earlier legislation was focused on 
national ownership and the breadth of linkages, the 2010 legislation also 
explicitly targeted the deepening of value added. 
 
These ambitious targets for local content have not been met in the past. This 
was partly because local capabilities did not allow for production costs at a 
premium of less than 10 percent above the import price and partly because 
there was no systematic monitoring of these targets by the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC). Nevertheless, as can be seen from the 
comparison of local content in Nigeria compared to other SSA economies 
(see Section 49 above), there has been a substantial growth in domestic 
content, at least in the sub-sectors which we have examined. Two-thirds of 
the Nigerian supplier firms we interviewed said that local content policies had 
been an important driver of their linkages to the oil and gas sector. 
Nevertheless despite the general strategic thrust of local content policy, there 
are significant inconsistencies between different government policies (Table 
48). Suppliers to the oil and gas industry reported that there was greatest 
conflict between deepening their linkages and the need to respond to policies 
on import tariffs and taxation.  
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Table 48: Consistency of government regulations with meeting objective of 
increasing local content (percent) 
Regulations Consistent No opinion Inconsistent  Mean  
Ownership regulations 37.5 45 17.5 2.20 
Labour market regulation 32.5 42.5 25 2.08 
Taxes/tax holidays/duty 
rebates 26.3 36.3 37.5 1.89 
Licensing 33.8 41.3 25 2.09 
Import tariff 18.8 38.8 42.5 1.76 
Business registration and 
start up 32.5 46.3 21.3 2.11 
Source: Oyejide and Adewuyi (2011) 
 
Thus the Nigerian policy environment is one in which the government has 
developed an increasingly global Vision for the sector over the past decade. 
The early focus on local content policy has been sustained and is now 
complemented by a more decisive understanding that localisation does not 
only refer to ownership of suppliers, but also to the depth of value added. The 
policy environment has a number of inconsistent elements to it, and has in the 
past been poorly monitored. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the weaknesses in 
policy integration and implementation, local content policies have been an 
important driver of the increasingly broad and deep participation of local 
suppliers in the oil and gas value chain. 
 
South Africa 
South African mining equipment and specialist services activities have 
developed progressively over many years to serve a long-established local 
mining industry. Moreover, the scale of mining allowed for local supply firms to 
exploit economies of scale while the diversity of South African mining allowed 
local firms to exploit economies of scope with many buyers who found it 
advantageous to source specialist outside expertise from external suppliers.  
Further, the extraction and processing of South African minerals presented 
very significant technological challenges allowing for the development of local 
expertise and technological capacities. State support took a number of forms 
including policies to encourage import replacement through tariff protection, 
extensive support for world-class training in mining engineering and artisanal 
skills and the development of significant research institutions and funding.   
 
However, in recent years, governmental policies have not been supportive of 
mining or mining equipment and specialist services. While the prices for South 
African commodities have risen, by contrast with other countries with a well-
developed and diversified mining sector such as Australia, in South Africa 
mining output remained effectively static. Output growth was constrained by 
uncertainty over property rights – a combination of government changes to 
existent mining rights; perceived uncertainty and corruption in the awarding of 
mining rights and threats of nationalisation. Output was further constrained for 
some minerals, notably coal, by infrastructural bottlenecks. Not only were 
ports and rail failing to invest in additional capacity to handle increased 
tonnage, but there was a deterioration in existing capacity. 
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In regard to the mining equipment and specialist services sector specifically, 
government support is very limited.  The sector receives no financial support 
and it does not appear in the technologies identified for support in the 
Department of Science and Technology‟s 10 year plan (DST, 2008). The DST 
has instead chosen to support science-intensive activities – including space 
science, energy, climate change, biotechnology and human and social 
dynamics. None of the supplying companies interviewed made extensive use 
of any of the government technology support programmes for firms. Some 
companies did claim the R&D tax credit administered by the DST, but the 
applied nature of the research and design in mining equipment and specialist 
services meant that many of the expenditures related to applied technology 
development in mining sis not qualify for support. 
 
Mining equipment and related services was not included in the National 
Industrial Policy Framework nor in the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP). 
Instead, industrial policy has focused on beneficiation rather developing 
backward linkages or extending the technological capacities developed in 
mining equipment and specialist services laterally into new non-mining 
markets and products  
 
Tanzania 
In the heady post-Independence years of Ujamaa, the Government of 
Tanzania had grand ambitions for the development of the economy as a 
whole, and within this, for the exploitation of its natural resources. As part of 
this, the mineral sector was reserved for the state. Years of successive 
economic stagnation led to the abandonment of the Ujamaa policies from the 
mid 1980s, and after some years of policy stagnation, the minerals sector was 
subject to a major change in policy environment. This reflected a more 
general process as Tanzanian domestic policy-making capacities were 
replaced by externally inspired structural adjustment policies.  
 
The 1997 Mineral Policy of Tanzania was an attempt to provide for the 
development of the minerals sector. Its prime purpose was to attract inward 
FDI into the mining sector. But beyond a vague commitment to local sourcing, 
it failed to address either the breadth or the depth of linkages. It articulated a 
vision of “developing the country‟s ability to provide essential inputs to the 
mining sector”. However the objectives of these and other sections of the 
Mineral Policy lacked specific targets. In addition there were no specific 
positive incentives or negative sanction promoting the achievement of this 
broad goal. No targets were set and no clear monitoring mechanisms were 
developed to ensure the local content could be encouraged. The primary 
concern of local content policy – to the extent that there is any – is one which 
conflates local content with local ownership. Key steps in the exploration 
sector are reserved for Tanzanian companies, and (somewhat eccentrically), 
Tanzanian-control is defined as 100 percent ownership by local citizens, 
rather than majority ownership. 
 
The failure to develop policies designed to directly promote backward linkages 
was reflected in similar policy failure with regard to the drivers of linkages 
which were considered earlier in this Report. Tanzania‟s infrastructure is in a 
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woeful state, and recent improvements have been limited. Roads leading to 
some mines remain unpaved and some mines like the Geita Gold Mine are 
yet to be connected to the national electricity grid. The supply of utilities 
supplies is highly erratic and they are of poor quality. Skill development is 
poor and inadequate. Moreover, to compound these weaknesses, policies are 
inconsistent. Mines have access to duty free imports of inputs, but this does 
not apply to their suppliers, who therefore face a double disadvantage – a 
weak infrastructure, and disadvantageous tariffs on their own imported inputs. 
Further, each of the new mines strikes bilateral agreements with Government 
on specific provisions and rather than this resulting in increasing obligations 
on foreign investors, in general these have led to individual TNCs bargaining 
for specific exemptions on the employment of expatriates, on tax and on duty 
free imports. All of these have the effect of reducing rather than increasing 
backward linkages. 
 
Recent changes to the Mining Act in 2010 contained some provisions which 
might improve the environment for suppliers to the mines (Perkins and 
Robbins, 2011). In applications for prospecting licenses and mining licenses 
mining companies are expected to provide a list of goods and services which 
might be supplied by local firms. However, no targets have been set, there is 
a total absence of incentives and sanctions and there are no provisions for 
monitoring Progress. Finally, exacerbating the situation is a milieu of 
pervasive corruption, with various provisions in the legislation allowing for 
individual discretionary decisions, chaotic physical infrastructure and weak 
soft infrastructure (such as customs clearance). All of this provides ample 
scope for the exercise of discretion by individual gatekeepers of permits and 
certification. 
 
Zambia. 
As in the case of Tanzania, the early post-Independence policy agenda in 
Zambia was characterised by a strong commitment to a nationalist agenda. In 
1969, Zambia nationalised the copper mines, and placed them under the 
umbrella of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). The long history of 
mining in Zambia had led to a situation in which there were extensive 
backwards and forwards linkages. However, economic decline led to 
stagnation and then a fall in mining output after the mid-1970s. As was the 
situation in much of continent, the consequences was a series of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes, reflecting a policy agenda set by parties external to 
Zambia, and leading to major programmes of privatisation and liberalisation. 
By 2001, all of copper the mines bar one (KCM) had been privatised. The 
liberalising of mine ownership was associated with the liberalisation of 
imports, and this policy environment led to a major increase in the import of 
inputs and a reduction in backward linkages. In other words a policy 
environment which had led to the development of extensive linkages, not so 
much as a consequence of strategic and focused government policy, but as 
an indirect consequence of policies towards industry, in general, was swept 
away, removing the incentives for the broadening and deepening of backward 
linkages. 
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The economic policy of the years following privatisation was geared towards 
private sector development. Within this, policy-makers failed to see the 
potential for private sector development in the localisation of upstream 
linkages. These were not included in any industrial and private sector 
development programmes. In 2007, the World Bank, through the IFC, 
undertook a suppliers‟ development programme in the Copperbelt Province. 
This was, and remains, a donor and private sector-funded programme, with 
little ownership from Government. Staff from the relevant ministries attended 
only a few initial meetings.  
 
The legal framework for the mining sector privatisation process was set by the 
1995 Mines and Minerals Act. The Act liberalised the investment regime and 
provided for fiscal incentives to be negotiated with each mining company and 
enshrined in Development Agreements (DAs). The 1995 Act, and later the 
2008 Act, granted the mines VAT exemption and eliminated custom and 
excise duties on all machinery and equipment. The tax regime only applied to 
the firms holding mining rights, which included the mines but not their 
suppliers. Suppliers of capital goods, therefore, paid a customs duty ranging 
from 15 to 25 percent for some goods (unless these goods qualified for 
preferential regional trade agreements under SADC), plus VAT on all imports. 
This measure conferred a cost penalty on local suppliers since mining imports 
were duty free. 
 
All the Development Agreements included provisions for local procurement, to 
be monitored by an inter-ministerial committee comprising the Ministry of 
Mines and Mineral Development and Ministry of Commerce, Trade and 
Industry. However, these provisions were largely disregarded by both the 
mines and Government, with the exception of a limited IFC-led suppliers‟ 
development programme. Poor institutional capacity in the Ministries involved 
meant that no comprehensive assessment of the supply chain was 
conducted, nor were monitoring mechanisms established or support 
programmes designed. This was due, among other reasons, to high staff 
turnover in the Ministries, lack of clear implementation and monitoring 
mechanisms and a highly personalised style of management, which built on 
individual rather than institutional, capabilities.  
 
Thus, Zambia‟s policy towards linkages in the mining sector involves a poorly-
developed vision and an absence of detailed supportive policies embodying 
either positive or negative sanctions to promote backward linkages. Policies 
were inconsistent insofar as the policy commitment to linkage development 
was undermined by trade policies putting local suppliers at a disadvantage. 
Implementation and monitoring capabilities in government are weak and to 
the extent that any of the Development Agreements had any specific linkage 
commitments by individual mines (a rare occurrence) even this was lost when 
the 2008 Mining Act removed the only legal obligation of the mines to develop 
local supply chains.  
General lessons on the impact of policy on linkage development 
We have provided a general framework for thinking about the effectiveness of 
the policy agenda which might both broaden and deepen linkages into and out 
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of the commodities sector. The first step is whether government has a Vision 
which incorporates linkage development. It is our judgement that visions do 
exist, notably in Angola, Botswana (especially), Gabon and Nigeria. At various 
times in its long history of mining, the considerable potential for further 
development of mining equipment and specialist services and the extension of 
the capabilities developed therein are largely ignored in South Africa. Ghana, 
Tanzania and Zambia all lack a vision. However, even where visions exist, in 
some cases this is a vision which is confined to the fostering local ownership 
(Angola and Nigeria) rather than local value added. This generally results in a 
situation of “broad” linkages with very little “depth”, that is, where localisation 
translates into the localisation of the import function. 
 
The second relevant consideration is whether specific policies have been 
enacted to promote linkages. Here there is more evidence of activity, with 
countries possessing specific policy instruments (usually on the employment 
of locals). But these are not embedded in a clear vision for the role of the 
commodities sector in general, and for linkages in particular. Two extreme 
examples of this are Angola and Tanzania, both of which reserve some 
activities for locally owned firms, but where in neither case is this articulated 
or incorporated in a wider programme to systematically broaden and deepen 
linkages. 
 
A widespread finding is that many of the policies affecting linkage 
development are inconsistent and exclusive. A particularly pervasive example 
is where mining companies are provided with privileged access to duty-free 
inputs and work permits, and where their suppliers are not. This is a positive 
disincentive to linkage development.  
 
Too often, to the extent to which a vision or specific policies exist, these 
statements of intent are not backed by positive incentives promoting desirable 
behaviour and negative incentives penalising inappropriate behaviour. This is 
perhaps the major reason why policies do not translate into real-world 
linkages. A subsidiary reason is that even where incentive structures exist, 
monitoring may be poor, in some cases through lack of systems, in other 
cases through lack of capabilities, and in yet other cases because too much 
discretion given to individual government officers merely provides the scope 
for corruption. Finally, there is the issue of governments and the private sector 
going on a journey together. Only in the case of Botswana do we find close 
interaction between the public and private sectors, although in other contexts 
such discussions are beginning to emerge as in Ghana through the aegis of 
the Ghana Mining Council. 
 
So do we have a role model? At the one extreme lies Botswana. It has a 
clearly defined vision, backed by mutually supportive policies embodying a 
range of positive and negative incentives and sanctions. Implementing 
capabilities are still weak, but these appear to be growing over time. At the 
other extreme is Tanzania, which in a sense is a role model of how not to go 
about linkage development. It displays an absence of vision, poorly developed 
policies which when they do exist are often contradictory, and a highly 
inefficient and which promote a corrupt bureaucratic system. In between are 
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countries such as Nigeria which are on a positive trajectory of both linkages 
and appropriate policy development, and Zambia and South Africa whose 
trajectory and policy capabilities are regressing.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
As we pointed out in the Introduction to this Report, in principle there is 
significant potential for increasing the breadth and depth of linkages from the 
commodities sector in Africa, particularly with respect to backward linkages. 
This will provide direct opportunities for commodity-exporting economies to 
make the most of the current commodities boom, and perhaps also allow 
surrounding non-commodity exporting countries to gain indirectly from 
sustained growth and linkage opportunities in the region. A primary difficulty 
which stakeholders face in grasping these opportunities is that there is an 
almost complete absence of data and supporting analyses on the nature and 
determinants of existing pattern of linkages which can be used to inform 
actions for the future. It is this knowledge gap which our detailed empirical 
investigations have sought to fill. Given the difficulties of data-collection in this 
area, the information which we have gathered on eight countries, on the 
infrastructure supporting the growth of linkages into the commodities sector 
and the factors driving corporate decision-sourcing practices is uneven and 
imperfect. But in the context of a major gap in knowledge it does provide new 
and important insights to inform policy. So, what are the key conclusions 
which emerge from our comparative analysis? 
 
First, we have observed some signs of progress in the development of 
linkages, particularly with regard to backward linkages. Even in Tanzania, 
perhaps the weakest performing economy in our sample, the pressures for, 
and the desire to promote linkages show signs of development in recent 
years. Other economies, notably Botswana and Nigeria, are moving forward 
at a more rapid pace. But not all African countries are moving forward, and 
there are signs that to the extent that there is movement in the pattern of 
linkages in South Africa and Zambia, this may be a regressive rather than a 
progressive movement. 
 
But, second, although there are widespread signs of growing linkages from 
the commodities sector, looking under the surface often reveals that it is the 
breadth of linkages (the percentage of spend which is local) rather than the 
depth of linkages (the domestic value added of this expenditure) which is 
expanding most rapidly. In the most extreme cases – for example the 
“suitcase business men in Zambia” and the provision of basic general goods 
in Angola – the major consequence of outsourcing is to (inefficiently) move 
the import function from the lead commodity firms and first-tier suppliers to 
small scale local entrepreneurs. But this is not always the case, since in other 
countries (for example South Africa and increasingly in Nigeria), local linkages 
also show considerable local value added. 
 
Third, as we postulated in our opening analysis, there are some generic 
drivers which explain this pattern of linkages in all sectors and contexts. Many 
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commodity lead-firms have indeed made the strategic decision to increase 
outsourcing. This is in response to local content legislation and CSR 
pressures but also because they no longer wish to take responsibility for what 
they consider to be non-core operations. Another generic factor is that the 
possibilities for linkage development very much reflect sectoral and 
technological characteristics. Whilst almost all commodity production will 
involve the provision of similar products (such as fresh food and other 
consumables), producing equipment for offshore oil extraction in Angola 
provides much greater challenges than does the provision of fresh meat and 
vegetables to sustain mine workers in Tanzania. Further, there are important 
differences between economies, as exemplified in the different operating 
conditions which gold-mining lead commodity producers find themselves 
operating in Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa. A final generic factor is the 
passage of time. Those economies with long-lived commodity sectors show 
deeper levels of linkage development, again as evidenced in the contrast 
between gold-mining in these three economies. 
 
Fourth, there are a series of contextual drivers which explain linkage-
outcomes in particular circumstances: 
 
 Skills and the ensemble of institutions which affect the development of 
firm-level and sector-level capabilities “shouts out” in all of the country-
studies as being the single most important determinant of linkage 
development. This of course reflects a global challenge in an 
increasingly knowledge-driven world, but its effects are particularly 
acutely felt in Africa‟s commodity sectors. They are an important factor 
explaining why outcomes differ in the same sector in different 
economies, for example in the provision of knowledge-based services 
into the offshore oil industries in Angola and Nigeria. 
 
 The nature of ownership affects linkage development. Lead-firms from 
different countries and selling into different countries appear to operate 
in different ways. Linkages form Chinese firms are particularly 
distinctive. In Zambia, their investment expansion has been 
countercyclical diminishing the harmful impact of market slowdown on 
suppliers. On the other hand they provide no support to their suppliers. 
In Angola, Chinese SOEs rely almost entirely on Chinese suppliers, 
although some of these have relocated to Angola. There are, however, 
signs that the sourcing criteria of some Chinese investors (notably 
Chinese private companies) may be converging with those of northern 
investors. Another major ownership factor is the differential role played 
by national and foreign suppliers and customers in the commodity 
value chains. As a general finding, there are strong pressures for local 
suppliers to be owned by nationals. This has resulted in a pervasive 
trend to conflate local value with local ownership. In some 
circumstances indigenisation has not only substituted for localisation of 
linkages, but has even undermined the development of local linkages, 
as in the case of Zambia where the outsourcing of importation to 
“suitcase businessmen” has eroded the position of established local 
suppliers.  
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 Infrastructure emerges as a significant contextual driver in the 
development of linkages. This has particular relevance in the case of 
backward linkages, most notably in the way in which poor roads 
undermine the capacity of local suppliers to feed into the Tanzanian 
gold mines which are some distance from areas of settlement and 
industry, and in Gabon where the reliance on rivers influences the 
product mix of exports. But it is not just hard infrastructure which 
impedes linkage development, since the efficiency with which logistics 
operate also has a bearing on linkage development. Botswana and 
South Africa are two economies which show how effective soft 
infrastructure such as business support and trade facilitation can be in 
the promotion of linkages. 
 
 Not surprisingly, policy is critical as a contextual factor explaining the 
breadth and depth of linkages. It has pervasive impact not just in 
regard to the commodity sector itself, but on the contextual 
determinants of linkage development, that is ownership, skills and 
infrastructure. Bluntly-speaking, some countries do this well. Botswana 
is perhaps the exemplar here, although it is still too early to tell whether 
this focus and strategic integration will endure and whether it will 
achieve competitive advantage in the future. At the other extreme are 
Tanzania and Gabon, where the policy framework acts to impede 
linkage development. But even in the cases where policy functions 
well, there is scope for improvement.  
 
A fifth major conclusion which we draw from our empirical studies is therefore 
that there is considerable scope for enhancing linkage development. This 
affects reshaping the path of linkage broadening and then the deepening of 
linkages. We have concluded that the most effective performers, whether in 
the public or private sector, show the capacity to develop a coherent vision for 
linkage development, supported by joined-up policy instruments which 
embody both incentives and sanctions to foster linkage development. In turn 
these visions and policies need to be backed by appropriate skills, effective 
institutions and by the real will to make a positive difference. There is a great 
deal of well-meaning lip service paid to the promotion of linkages, which is not 
backed by appropriate actions, and it is this which explains the sub-optimal 
pace of linkage development. 
 
Finally we conclude that the gap between rhetoric and performance arises 
from a series of misalignments. Firstly, within value chains, lead-firms often 
fail to back up their strategic commitment to broadening and deepening 
linkages with appropriate institutional structures. We observed very few cases 
of the supply chain development functions which characterise many of the 
leading global manufacturing sectors (such as autos and electronics) and 
global retailing. Secondly, there is a major misalignment between 
governments‟ stated objectives on linkage development, and the institutions 
and structures which are available to promote linkage development. Too often 
government industrial policy is misdirected and hence constrained in being 
able to harvest „low hanging fruit‟ and assist firms to build their capabilities so 
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as to enter lead commodity producers supply chains. In the most extreme 
cases, government confuses indigenisation with localised value added. 
Support for linkage development is placed with the ministry responsible for the 
commodities sector rather than where it belongs, that is the ministry 
responsible for the development of industry and services relevant to the 
commodities sector. Thirdly, a final area of misalignment is the pervasive 
failure of governments, lead-commodity firms and other actors in the 
commodity value chain to work together with suppliers to build strong 
linkages. International experience suggests that this misalignment is perhaps 
the single most important factor constraining the further development of 
linkages.   
 
Thus we have observed discernible signs of progress in the extension of 
linkages from Africa‟s commodities sectors. But we have also observed 
considerable scope for further development. Even in the best cases, there is 
room for improvement, allowing Africa to make the most of the commodities 
boom. What policy actions need to be taken to allow this potential to be 
realised is the subject of Discussion paper 14 (Morris et al, 2011b). 
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